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The essays in this collection are the product of the second phase
of an exchange of visits between Soviet and American international
lawyers, conducted under the auspices of the American Society of
International Law and the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace on the one hand, and the Institute of State and Law of the
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. on the other. The first phase
of this exchange was a conference of American and Soviet legal
practitioners which took place in New York from January 7th to
11th, 1974, and dealt with the legal aspects of trade between the
Soviet Union and the United States.
In response to an invitation from the Institute of State and Law,
a delegation of ten persons representing the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace and the American Society of International
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Law visited Moscow during the period of June 15th to 26th, 1975,
and exchanged views with Soviet scholars on the law of the sea, with
special emphasis on the protection of the marine environment. Al-
though both the American and Soviet delegations included several
persons who had participated in the sessions of the Third Law of the
Sea Conference, the discussions held in Moscow were of an aca-
demic character and were entirely unofficial.
In arranging these meetings with their Soviet colleagues, the Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace and the American Society
of International Law had in mind first, the desirability of an ex-
change of views in order to identify the points where United States
and Soviet interests and views converged and where they diverged;
second, the provision of a nonofficial and academic occasion for a
wider and freer exchange of views than is possible in official meet-
ings; and third, an opportunity to lay a foundation for a long-term
continuing exchange of views on a variety of scholarly subjects.
The papers in this collection reflect the format of the meetings.
An American and a Soviet paper were prepared for each item on the
agenda, and it is these papers that appear in this collection. These
studies provided the starting point for the open and wide-ranging
discussions which took place between the members of the two
delegations.
The participants in the conference were as follows:
Richard R. Baxter
Professor of Law, Harvard University; President, American Society
of International Law: Editor-in-Chief, American Journal of Interna-
tional Law
0. V. Bogdanov
Professor of Law; Acting Head, Division on General Problems of
International Law, Institute of State and Law of the Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
William E. Butler
Professor of Law, University of London
Thomas M. Franck
Professor of Law, New York University and Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University; Director, International Law Program, Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace
Richard Frank
Director, International Project, Center for Law and Social Policy
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P. P. Gureev
Head, Law Department, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R.
John Lawrence Hargrove
Director of Studies, American Society of International Law
L. A. Ivanaschenko
Senior Researcher, Division on International Law of the Sea, Insti-
tute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Y. Kasmin
U.S.S.R. Delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference, Committee I
Milton Katz
Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies, Har-
vard University; Chairman, Board of Trustees, Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace
V. A. Kiselev
Senior Researcher, Department on Public International Law of the
Sea, Institute Sojuzmorniiproekt
B. M. Klimenko
Senior Researcher, Division on International Law of the Sea, Insti-
tute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
H. Gary Knight
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Advisory
Committee on the Law of the Sea; Executive Board, Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Rhode Island
0. S. Kolbasov
Head, Division on Legal Problems of Protection of the Environ-
ment, Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R.
A. L. Kolodkin
Head, Department on Public International Law of the Sea, Institute
Sojuzmorniiproekt
V. M. Koretsky
Academician, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R.
F. N. Kovalev
Deputy Head, Law and Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
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V. N. Kudrjavtsev
Chairman of the Soviet delegation; Associate member, Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.S.R.; Director, Institute of State and Law of the
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
B. A. Kuvshinnikov
Secretary-General, Secretariat of the Soviet-American Committee
on Protection of the Environment
M. I. Lazarev
Professor of Law; Head, Division on International Law of the Sea,
Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R.
A. L. Makovsky
Head, a department of the Institute Sojuzmorniiproekt
Charles W. Maynes
Secretary and Director of International Organizations Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
P. A. Moiseev
Professor of Biology; Deputy Director, Research Institute of Marine
Fisheries and Oceanography
John Norton Moore
Chairman, Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea; Deputy
Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Con-
ference.
A. P. Movchan
Deputy Director, Institute of State and Law of the Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
T. M. Starzhina
Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R.
Robert E. Stein
Adjunct Professor of Law, The American University; Director,
North American Office, International Institute for Environment
and Development; Senior Research Manager, American Society of
International Law
G. I. Tunkin
Deputy Chairman of the Soviet delegation; Head of Chair, Moscow
State University; Associate member, Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R.; President, Soviet Association of International Law
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FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE WORLD
OCEAN
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent activities aimed at progressive development and codifica-
tion of law of the sea principles and rules have brought about quite
a number of problems new to the science of international law. Legal
regulation of marine scientific research ranks with the more impor-
tant of them.
Freedom of scientific investigation is a key question here. No
other issue has been given as much consideration by international
legal writing and by reports of international law experts and ocean-
ographers dealing with the subject.
It is but natural that the Soviet Union and the United States
should be particularly interested in the issue since: (1) these two
countries carry out the most extensive and systematic research into
the marine environment; and (2) they bear the bulk of difficulties
entailed by their participation in oceanic research projects on an
unprecedented scale and of vital importance for all of humanity.
Soviet scholars are well acquainted with articles and scientific
reports by M.B. Shaefer, W.L. Sullivan, W.T. Burke, R. Revell,
C.A. Auerbach, J.A. Knauss, P. Handler, W.S. Wooster, J.A. Teg-
ger Kildow, M.D. Bradley, M. Redfield, and others dealing with
questions of freedom of scientific research. We hope that our Ameri-
can colleagues have had an opportunity to become acquainted with
the articles and papers by our scientists.
As a legal issue, the freedom of scientific research is a versatile
problem which comprises many subproblems. Thus, defining the
contents of this principle, as well as determining the scope of ensu-
ing rights and duties of states engaged in scientific research into the
marine environment, is of great interest. The juridical notion of the
term "scientific research" has not yet been agreed upon; the classifi-
cation of investigations of various kinds, and the criteria of their
differentiation from similar uses of the sea have not been developed
either.
* Senior scientific worker at the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences. D.Sc. (Law).
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However, due to various reasons, doubt recently has been cast
upon the expediency of the further existence of freedom of marine
research per se.
The question which has caused discussion and which has chal-
lenged international lawyers is whether the legal regime of peaceful
scientific research should be preserved and whether the World
Ocean should be left open for free conduct of all kinds of investiga-
tions and scientific experiments by all states on the basis of their
common and equal right to use the high seas, or whether the existing
regime should be dismissed and replaced by control over these uses
by coastal states and by an international body in all parts of the
maritime expanses.
II. THE SOVIET LEGAL POSITION ON FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
ON THE HIGH SEAS
It is the general belief of Soviet international lawyers, oceanogra-
phers, economists, and other experts that freedom of the high seas
undoubtedly should be preserved and confirmed. The Soviet doc-
trine proceeds from the premise that freedom of scientific research
on the high seas is a generally recognized rule (principle) of the law
of the sea. Any denial of its existence as part of the law of the sea
de lege lata is juridically groundless. Let us present the arguments
to the contrary.
It is argued that freedom of the high seas does not cover and has
never covered scientific research. Some views have been expressed
at Subcommittee III of the U.N. Preparatory Committee for the
Law of the Sea Conference to the effect that freedom of scientific
research cannot be interpreted as one of the freedoms of the high
seas; neither can it be considered as "a generally recognized princi-
ple of international law, nor as a generally recognized principle of
the freedoms of the high seas, completely recognized by the interna-
tional law."
A. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas as Support for
the Freedom of Scientific Research
The right of states to conduct free scientific investigations in and
on the ocean is rejected, in particular on the strength of the fact that
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas' makes no direct mention of
freedom of scientific research as one of the "freedoms. ' 2
1 [Ed. Note] April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(effective for United States Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].
See, e.g., Dixit, Freedom of Scientific Research in and on the High Seas, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 1, 3 (1971).
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This argument proceeds from an erroneous treatment of the free-
dom of the high seas as constituting a certain fossilized set of its
uses, a set of specific "freedoms," each of which is viewed as being
lawful only in the case of a direct mention in a universal treaty or
convention.
However, the longstanding practice of using maritime spaces tes-
tifies to the fact that freedom of the high seas, since its establish-
ment as a principle of international law, always has been under-
stood as the right of states to be involved in any kind of marine
activity, provided that: (1) the activity in question is not prohibited
by special agreements between states; (2) the activity in question
is not limited by restrictions which ensue from other states' possess-
ing the same rights; and (3) the activity in question is not restricted
by generally recognized principles of international law.
If a particular use of the sea is not prohibited, does not interfere
with the rights of other users, and is carried out in compliance with
generally recognized international law principles, its lawfulness fol-
lows from the principle of freedom of the high seas. Any other inter-
pretation of this principle would stop the development of any new
peaceful uses of the high seas which are not specifically referred to
in existing international agreements.
The references to article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas 3
as proof of the nonexistence of the freedom of scientific research are
groundless not only in principle, but also in substance. The article
under consideration reads:
[Freedom of the high seas] comprises, inter alia, both for
coastal and non-coastal states:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas.4
It is true that one cannot find any direct reference to freedom of
scientific research in this article. But as can be easily seen from the
travaux preparatoires of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea, the drafting participants deliberately turned down the very
[Ed. Note] Note 1 supra.
I[Ed. Note] Id. art. 2.
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idea of listing all possible "freedoms," rather, the drafters agreed to
enumerate "some of the main freedoms" only.5
The exemplary and unrestrictive nature of the list of freedoms of
the high seas is clear from the very text of article 2 of the High Seas
Convention.
First, the list is preceded by the notation that freedom of the high
seas includes the four mentioned "freedoms" only inter alia;1 in
other words, these are mentioned in particular. Second, the text of
the article directly mentions other freedoms ("[t]hese freedoms
and others")7 of the high seas as existing in addition to those free-
doms enumerated. Furthermore, it is of no small importance that
freedom of scientific research was implied when mentioning these
"other freedoms." In its commentary to article 2 the International
Law Commission pointed out: "The list of freedoms of the high seas
contained in this article is not restrictive. The Commission has
merely specified four of the main freedoms, but it is aware that there
are other freedoms, such as freedom to undertake scientific research
on the high seas . .. ."I
The study of materials pertaining to this matter shows that it was
not uncertainty with regard to the existence of the principle of the
freedom of scientific research that prevented the treaty article from
making a specific mention of this freedom in the list of most impor-
tant uses of the seas; but it was the attempts of certain Western
powers to prevent the contents of this freedom in order to justify
their unlawful nuclear tests on the high seas.
B. Applicable International Customs as Foundations for the
Freedom of Scientific Research
Another point of interest is that the convention clauses under
consideration did not set up a new principle of international law,
but only confirmed juridically an existing customary rule. Scien-
tific research in the high seas has long been conducted without any
restrictions, provided, naturally, that the rules and principles regu-
lating relations between states and the use of the sea space be ob-
served. This procedure of carrying out marine scientific expeditions
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., 1 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL
RECORDS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/37 (1958).
[Ed. Note] High Seas Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
[Ed. Note] Id.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report to the General Assembly on the Work of the Eighth Session,
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). This report was also issued
as 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9 (1956).
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has long been recognized by states and has not been questioned
until recently.
1. The "Safe Conduct" of Scientific Expeditions
Moreover, well-known is the practice of the past, when ships en-
gaged in marine scientific research enjoyed a kind of legal protection
in the form of the so-called "safe conduct". The La P6rouse expedi-
tion undertaken in 1785 for the purpose of making discoveries had
such a safe conduct. Before that, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville,
another French navigator, went on his round-the-world voyage from
1766 to 1769 on the "La Boudeuse," with a similar safe conduct from
the British. The well-known English seafarer Captain Cook went on
his last voyage in 1776 at the height of the American War of Inde-
pendence against the English, a war in which the French also were
involved. Even though the French were aiding the Americans, the
French Minister of the Navy instructed all French ships to regard
Cook and his vessels as neutral.
Late in the 19th century Charles de Boeck of France and Carlos
Calvo of Argentina wrote that they were not aware of a single in-
stance where a belligerent state would refuse to follow the rule which
exempts from capture a warship or a nonmilitary vessel fitted for
purposes of exploration or discoveries, or where such a state would
refuse it safe conduct.
In the early 19th century a number of expeditions were under-
taken to make a general geographic description of oceans and seas,
and an oceanographic expedition of the corvette "Challenger"
(1872-1876) was followed by other expeditions with the special aim
of investigating the physical, chemical, and other properties of the
marine environment, the sea flora and fauna, and the structure and
composition of the seabed.
Oceanographic expeditions and round-the-world voyages for sci-
entific purposes increased in number and became more and more
regular, among them the voyage of the Russian corvette "Vityaz"
(1886-1889), the United States expedition on the "Albatross" (1888-
1905), the Belgian expedition on the "Belgique" (1901-1903), the
British voyage on the "Discovery" (1901-1904), and others.
2. Protection for Scientific Vessels During Naval Warfare
The lawfulness of all these activities was taken for granted. There
was no need for their legal protection since no one either interfered
with them or encroached upon them. A real threat to the normal
conduct of marine scientific investigations could arise, however, in
19761
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the event of naval hostilities. And states, taking into consideration
the importance of these activities for all nations, came to an agree-
ment on some special rules for their protection during naval war.
The Hague Conventions of 1907 on the laws and customs of naval
war9 prohibited the capture of enemy vessels involved in peaceful
scientific research on the high seas. They also established a favoura-
ble order for ships of scientific expeditions entering ports of neutral
states and staying there. 0 Thus scientific expeditions received spe-
cial legal protection, even under circumstances in which the appli-
cation of the principle of freedom of the high seas was restricted.
3. Long-term International Research Programmes
The scale of scientific research in the World Ocean is increasing
in our age, particularly in the last quarter century. Hundreds of
special ships furnished with modern equipment are involved in sci-
entific research. Long-term research programmes, some of which are
of a global nature, are being worked out. Many of these programmes
are coordinated on an international level and are carried out by joint
efforts of scientists from many countries. The most significant of
them are the Second International Polar Year (1932-1933), the In-
ternational Geophysical Year (1957-1958) and its continuation-the
International Geophysical Cooperation Year (1959), and the recent
Long-Term and Expanded Programme of Oceanic Exploration and
Research, of which the International Decade of Oceanic Exploration
is an important element.
All these intensive and multifold activities are carried out by the
states and their citizens on the solid legal foundation of the principle
of freedom of peaceful scientific research in the sea. Not a single
state has ever questioned the rightfulness of these uses of the high
seas. An international practice which has been followed for a long
time is convincing proof of a general recognition by states of the
principle of freedom of scientific research on the high seas.
I [Ed. Note] Convention on the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2332 (1910), T.S. No. 541 (effective for United States Jan. 26, 1910); Convention
Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351
(1910), T.S. No. 542 (effective for United States Jan. 26, 1910); Convention for Adaptation
to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of July 6, 1906, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2371 (1910), T.S. No. 543 (effective for United States Jan. 26, 1910); Convention on
Certain Restrictions on the Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396 (1910),
T.S. No. 544 (effective for United States Jan. 26, 1910); Convention on the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 (1910), T.S. No. 545 (effective
for United States Feb. 1, 1910) [hereinafter cited as Neutral Powers Naval Convention].
" [Ed. Note] Neutral Powers Naval Convention, supra note 9, art. 14, para. 2.
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III. SOVIET-AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The existence of freedom of scientific research as a principle of
international law and its paramount importance for effective imple-
mentation of marine scientific research is recognized both by Soviet
and American authors. Nevertheless, the differences in their under-
standing and interpretation of freedom of scientific research as a
legal principle should not be overlooked.
A. The Differences Between the Soviet and American Views
The Soviet lawyers take as their premise that the principle of
freedom of scientific research, viewed as one of the elements of the
generally recognized freedom of the high seas, can be in effect within
the maritime space limits defined by international law as constitut-
ing "the high seas," and within these limits only." The high seas,
according to the 1958 convention, include "all parts of the sea that
are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State.","
Some of our American colleagues suggest too broad an interpreta-
tion of this principle. They try to use it as a legal basis for relieving
coastal states of control over scientific research conducted within
their territorial waters as claimed in accordance with existing rules
of international law.'"
In July 1971 at the Malta Pacem in Maribus Conference on the
most efficient ways of exploration and exploitation of the World
Ocean, American participants suggested that any "open research,"
i.e., research which is in the interests of all mankind and which is
carried out with the intention that its results be published openly,
could be conducted in the territorial waters of a coastal state with-
out its consent.'4 Similar recommendations previously were made by
the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources es-
tablished by the United States Congress in 1966.'1 The Commission
" A. KOLODKIN, MIROVOY OKEAN 215-16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KOLODKIN];
SOVREMENNOE MEZHDUNARODNOE MORSKOE PRAVO 138 (M. Lazaryof ed. 1974); A. VYSOTSKY,
PRAVOVYE PROBLEMY SVOBODY NAUCHNYKH ISSLEDOVANII V MIROVOM OKEANE (1974); Zhudro,
Nekotorye voprosy mezhdunarodnopravovogo rezhima otkrytogo morya in OCHERKI
MEZHDUNARODNOGA MORSKOGO PRAVA 154 (V. Koretsky & G. Tunkin eds. 1962).
1[Ed. Note] High Seas Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
"1 W. BURKE, TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF the Ocean 121 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BURKE];
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 792 (1962); Henkin, Changing
Law for the Changing Seas, in USES OF THE SEA 69, 70-71 (E. Gullion ed. 1968).
[Ed. Note] See generally PACEM IN MARIBUS (E. Borgese ed. 1972).
,S [Ed. Note] 33 U.S.C. § 1104 (1970); see COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING
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undertook an intensive investigation of a broad array of marine
problems, including the legal ones. In its report to the President the
Commission recommended in particular that the principle of maxi-
mum freedom for scientific inquiry be effectuated and that the
United States take the initiative in proposing a new convention on
scientific research, embodying, inter alia, provisions providing for
the possible conduct of scientific research in the territorial waters
and on the Continental Shelf of a coastal nation without its prior
consent.'"
The legal order in force is proclaimed to be "out of date." It
allegedly does not meet the needs of science and technological prog-
ress and must be "modernized." The report states: "To observe,
describe, and understand the physical, geological, chemical, and
biological phenomena of the marine environment, the marine scien-
tist must conduct investigations on a global basis. But the existing
international legal framework does not facilitate these investiga-
tions.""
Similar views were expressed in W.L. Sullivan's paper which was
delivered at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea
Institute in the United States,'8 in the speech of P. Handler, the
president of the National Academy of Sciences, delivered in March
1973 to Subcommittee III of the U.N. Committee on the Preparation
of the Conference on the Law of the Sea," and by others.10
Some American scientists even call for complete revision of "an-
cient" doctrines of international law pertaining to coastal power in
order to adjust them to current needs.
However, one cannot agree with the assumption that the existing
legal regime governing scientific research in coastal waters hampers
the continuing advance of world oceanography. No one doubts the
necessity for freedom of action for scientists in carrying out scien-
tific inquiry. But the exploration of the World Ocean cannot be
AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 201 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as OUR NATION AND THE SEA]. These recommendations had some effect on
the draft articles concerning scientific research submitted by the United States to the United
Nations Preparatory Committee for the Law of the Sea Conference. United States: Draft
Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research, July 20, 1973, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC .lIh/L.44.
" OUR NATION AND THE SEA, supra note 15, at 202-03.
" Id. at 201.
" Sullivan, Freedom of Scientific Inquiry, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 364 (L. Alexander ed. 1970).
" Handler, The Importance of Free Oceanographic Research, 7 MARINE TECHNOLOGY Soc'Y
J., Sept. 1973, at 20 [hereinafter cited as Handler].
10 BURKE, supra note 13, at 115-16.
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undertaken without due regard for existing political boundaries and
for the different legal status of its parts. These boundaries and
differences have taken shape and have become firmly established
due to certain historical and socioeconomic conditions of state de-
velopment, and presently they are confirmed by generally recog-
nized rules of international law. The problem of freedom of scientific
research can be solved only within this framework and on the basis
of these rules and not by rejecting them.
Any kind of legal regulation of state activity in the World Ocean,
including scientific research, should proceed necessarily from two
equally valid legal principles underlying the contemporary regime
of maritime space: (1) the principle of the freedom of the high seas
and (2) the principle of state sovereignty in coastal waters. Neglect-
ing either of these principles would run contrary to existing interna-
tional law, contrary to the interests of coastal states and contrary
to the international community as a whole.
It also should be pointed out that the expanded interpretation of
freedom of marine scientific research and the introduction of such
recently coined notions as "the principle of maximum freedom" and
"the utmost freedom of scientific research," which are understood
as covering the waters of a coastal state, compromise the very prin-
ciple of freedom of scientific research and make the whole problem
much more complicated to settle. The differences in interpretation
of the contents of the freedom of scientific research do not prevent
Soviet and American experts from being equally concerned about
the future of that freedom. It would not be an exaggeration to state
that never before in the history of exploration and research into the
World Ocean has the threat to regular marine scientific expeditions
been so real as it seems to be now.
B. The Importance of Freedom of Scientific Investigation
Some say that the principle of the freedom of scientific research
is out of date and cannot help to settle problems challenging hu-
manity in our day. These assumptions seem to be groundless for
several reasons.
To begin with, it should be borne in mind that the concept of
freedom of scientific research on the high seas was formed in the
course of a long historical process, and consequently, the concept
was strengthened itself as a result of the objective necessity for
states to use maritime space freely in order to conduct scientific
research and experiments.
Many of the greatest discoveries, which enriched humanity with
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new knowledge about our planet and let mankind realize the great
role of the World Ocean in its life, would not have been possible
without such freedom. It is the long time practice of free marine
scientific inquiry that has permitted the buildup of a solid scientific
foundation, an important springboard for a peaceful offensive on the
ocean.
The existence of such an objective necessity, i.e., a necessity
which is caused by specific material conditions of international life,
hardly can be denied seriously in our day. Neither can the present
need for freedom of oceanic research be denied. Such a need has not
passed; on the contrary, it has grown as never before."
In the years to come the World Ocean undoubtedly will become
one of the most important, and in many instances, the main source
of meeting the peoples' demands for food and energy. Many states,
and above all, the developing ones which are striving to strengthen
their national economies and increase their standards of living, set
their hopes to a great extent on marine resources.
It is quite obvious that the problems arising here, among them
such urgent ones as the practical utilization of the World Ocean's
expanses through exploitation of its biological and mineral re-
sources, pollution control and the preservation of ecological balance,
long-term weather forecasting, and many others, cannot be solved
effectively without carrying out a vast complex of fundamental sci-
entific research and experiments aimed at the exploration of the
most significant phenomena and processes of the World Ocean.
These investigations include (1) the development of the theory of
physical, chemical, biological, and geological processes, (2) compre-
hensive studies of the hydrometeorological regime, hydrobiology,
and hydrology of the oceans and seas, and (3) geological and geo-
physical studies of the Earth's crust and the upper mantle under the
oceans and seas.
The need for broader knowledge of the sea is stressed in many
resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly. The General Assembly
has approved a resolution introducing the above mentioned Long-
Term and Expanded Programme of Oceanic Exploration and Re-
search, which is a reflection of such a need. The purpose of the
11 FREEDOM OF OCEANIC RESEARCH (W. Wooster ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as OCEANIC
RESEARCH]; Grabovsky, Frantsiya i okean, NOVOE VREMYA, No. 4, 1975, at 28-29; Handler,
supra note 19, at 21-22; Knauss, Development of the Freedom of Scientific Research Issue of
the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 1 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INT'L L. J. 92 (1973); Schaefer,
Freedom of Scientific Research and Exploration in the Sea, 4 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 46 (1969);
Vysotsky & Nastin, 0 svobode nauchnikh issledovanii v Mirovom okeane, MEZHDUNARODNAYA
ZHEZN, No. 4, 1975, at 78-87.
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Programme is "to increase knowledge of the ocean, its contents and
the contents of its subsoil, and its interfaces with the land, the
atmosphere and the ocean floor and to improve understanding of
processes operating in or affecting the marine environment, with
the goal of enhanced utilization of the ocean and its resources for
the benefit of mankind." 2
The increasing practice is joint scientific expeditions with partici-
pation by several countries is another proof of the recognition of
the great importance of marine scientific investigations. There arose
a need for an international body to coordinate all these activities.
To this end the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
(IOC) under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) was established in 1960. Since the
time of the establishment of this organization, the number of its
member states has doubled. At present roughly half of the planet's
countries participate in IOC activities. This is convincing evidence
both of the importance of marine science and of the necessity for
cooperation.
The main factors which demand the further development and the
strengthening of freedom of scientific research include: (1) the un-
precedented, increased role of scientific expeditions and experi-
ments in the ocean; (2) the growth of marine expeditions in number;
(3) the broadening of the World Ocean investigation programmes;
(4) the engineering complications involved in such investigation;
and last but not least, (5) the very methodological foundation of
modern marine investigation projects, a foundation which is based
upon the conception of the unity of the World Ocean and the inter-
connection of all its processes.
The principle of freedom of scientific investigations meets both
the interests of world science and the particular needs of different
countries, including those of the developing states. Freedom of re-
search is a matter of primary necessity for the present national and
international projects of scientific investigation, as it is the only
possible approach guaranteeing unimpeded and unhindered con-
duct of peaceful scientific research and experiments of various types
in the World Ocean. At the same time, such freedom does not in-
fringe upon the rights of coastal states in their territorial seas and
on their Continental Shelves. Such freedom provides flexibility in
2 [ED. NOTE] UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, COM-
PREHENSIVE OUTLINE OF THE SCOPE OF THE LONG-TERM AND EXPANDED PROGRAMME OF OCEANIC
EXPLORATION AND RESEARCH 7, col. 2, para. 4 (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
Technical Series No. 7, 1970), U.N. Doc. UNESCO/OC SC.70/XVI.7/A.
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choosing place and time for observations and experiments or in
making alterations and changes in research schedules, which is in-
dispensable for marine scientists.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
It is interesting to note, however, that some individuals who
actively support further development and broadening of oceanic
research programmes oppose freedom of inquiry, thus neglecting the
direct connection between the effectiveness of such programmes and
the legal order of their undertaking. They make suggestions and
submit projects aimed at the limitation or elimination of freedom
of investigation in the World Ocean. These alternatives to free con-
duct of marine research can only seriously harm the interests of
ocean science and, in the final analysis, the interests of all human-
ity.
A. The Proposed Exclusive Right of a Coastal State to Control
Scientific Research Within its "Economic Zone"
To be sure of this point, one has only to become acquainted with
the propositions of certain states at the Third U.N. Conference on
the Law of the sea. These propositions suggest that coastal states
be provided with an exclusive right to undertake marine scientific
research or to establish complete control over any kind of research
carried out within the 200-mile coastal belt ("economic zone").13
The introduction of such a regime would result in exempting vast
marine expanses, constituting about 40 percent of the World Ocean
surface, from free utilization by states for the purposes of peaceful
scientific investigation and the establishment of a restrictive legal
order.
Supporters of such an order declare that it is not aimed at inter-
ference with scientific research, but is aimed exclusively at the pro-
tection of economic and other interests of coastal states in their
economic zones.24 However, the imposing of control by a coastal
state over any kind of scientific research conducted by other states
in its economic zone, in the final analysis, would lead to vast areas
of the high seas being practically closed for scientists.
Initially, the undertaking of scientific research would be seriously
23 [Ed. Note] See, e.g., Iraq: Draft Articles on Scientific Research, April 25, 1975, item
2(b), para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.13/Rev.2 [hereinafter cited as Iraq: Draft Arti-
cles].
21 [Ed. Note] See, e.g., Statement by Mr. Hamid (Iraq), Third Committee of the Third
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.22 (1975).
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hindered by the very necessity to apply to a coastal state for permis-
sion to conduct such research. The suggested procedure for getting
the consent of a coastal state is so complicated and involves so many
formalities that the implementation of the research programme
planned to be carried out in this particular area may finally prove
to be either very difficult or altogether inexpedient.
For instance, one of the draft proposals suggests a list of terms
containing over 10 items which must be satisfactorily complied with
before permission to conduct a research expedition would be
granted. Under such a draft proposal any state planning a research
expedition would be expected: (1) to disclose the nature and the
objective of the undertaking and (2) to give full information regard-
ing the sponsoring institution, the scientific staff, the vessels, equip-
ment, Ocean Data Acquisition Systems (ODAS), and remote sen-
sing devices operating in the atmosphere or beyond. It should also
provide the coastal state with the opportunity to participate in all
stages of the research project, including the stages of working out
the project and processing the collected data. Moreover, it should
undertake that results of scientific research shall not be published
without "the explicit consent" of the coastal state. 5
As is well-known, planning, preparation, and organization of con-
temporary marine research expeditions is an extraordinarily com-
plicated process which is both time and labour consuming.
Technologically developed countries take one to three years to cope
with the tasks involved in preparing for such an expedition. It is self-
evident that the requisite data can be submitted to the coastal state
at the final stage of preparation only when all plans are adopted and
schedules are worked out. It would take probably not less than a
year to get through all the permission formalities. But by that time
the planned expedition may well have lost its scientific value.
It is known as well that even after a scientific project has been
approved, in the course of carrying out investigations in the field,
the necessity may arise for changing either the routes of the expedi-
tions or their operative schedules, or both. Such changes are quite
normal, are determined by a number of objective factors, and above
all, are determined by the very nature of oceanic investigations, that
is, the complexity and shifting character of the subject of
study-the World Ocean. If bound by the data reported to the
coastal state, scientists would be deprived of any maneuverability,
which is indispensable for them. The situation will be even more
21[Ed. Note] Iraq: Draft Articles, supra note 23, item 2(b), para. 2.
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aggravated if the route of the expedition crosses the economic zones
of two or more states.
In our analysis of the possible consequences of the introduction
of coastal state control we have proceeded, so far, from the assump-
tion that, provided all the terms were observed, the coastal state
would finally grant its consent to the undertaking of research in its
economic zone. But the main point is that there is no guarantee of
getting such consent even if all the formalities are observed. Thus,
in fact, the imposing of coastal state control would leave the fate of
numerous oceanic research projects to the discretion of coastal
states.
As mentioned above, oceanologically the World Ocean is a single,
integral entity. All of its processes are mutually linked and are
mutually conditioned. Current long-term programmes of investiga-
tion into the ocean and its parts are based upon this conception of
its integrity. In many cases such programmes include the systematic
and sometimes simultaneous conduct of scientific experiments in
many different regions of the sea including those regions which are
supposed to obtain the status of economic zones. So in case of the
refusal of a coastal state to grant permission to undertake peaceful
scientific experiments in areas of the high seas adjoining its terri-
torial waters, the unified system of investigations would lose some
important links which would affect negatively the efforts of many
states in studying the marine environment.
Analyses and evaluations of 53 projects of the Long-Term and
Expanded Programme of Oceanic Exploration and Research were
made by an American scientific research institute to define the
dependency of these projects upon oceanographic investigations in
coastal waters. (The latter were not precisely defined, but were
considered to include the geographical Continental Shelf and its
overlying waters or the region of coastal sea belt extending to at
least several tens of nautical miles offshore.) The study ascertained
that three-fourths of these projects were dependent to a considera-
ble extent upon coastal access, and many of them could not be
undertaken without such access."6
We are being assured that a coastal state, being aware of the
importance of fundamental oceanic investigation for its own inter-
ests and for those of other states, would not hinder the undertaking
of such investigations. But the present practice of conducting mar-
ine scientific research in coastal regions under the jurisdiction of a
"s OCEANIC RESEARCH, supra note 21, at 29-39.
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coastal state gives evidence to the contrary. In many instances
coastal states have refused to grant permission to undertake scien-
tific investigations and experiments in their territorial waters and
on their Continental Shelves. In spite of the provision of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,27 which states that a
coastal state shall not normally withhold its consent to purely scien-
tific research into the physical or biological characteristics of the
Continental Shelf,28 the number of refusals is considerable.
It is hardly reasonable to make the success of peaceful research
of vital importance for all nations dependent upon an individual
state's good will, which might prove to be extremely unreliable.
Projects of that kind should repose not upon the unsteady basis of
coastal state discretion and good will, which in many cases is af-
fected by considerations which are very remote from the needs of
fundamental science, but should repose upon the stable interna-
tional legal principle of freedom of scientific research on the high
seas. This principle has long been recognized in international law
and is reaffirmed daily by extensive international experience.
The application of this principle in the economic zone would lead
neither to damaging the rights of coastal states, nor to encroach-
ment upon their specific interests in these areas of the sea. As is
apparent from the draft proposals on the subject submitted by some
states, these rights and interests could well be guaranteed by appro-
priate international agreement.
B. The Proposed "Internationalization" of Oceanic Activities on
the High Seas
A grave threat to free conduct of scientific research and, in the
final analysis, to the whole future of oceanic science, is harboured
in concepts of the so-called internationalization of oceanic activi-
ties, suggested to a considerable extent by American scientists and
politicians." As it has been pointed out in Soviet scientific writings,
these concepts seem to be untimely and unacceptable in principle.3 "
The analysis of some proposals based upon these concepts and sub-
27 [Ed. Note] April 29, 1958, [19641 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311
(effective for United States June 10, 1964).
[Ed. Note] Id. art. 5, para. 8.
Skolnikoff, National and International Organization for the Seas, in USES OF THE SEA 98
(E. Gullion ed. 1968); Borgese, Towards an International Ocean Rfgime, 5 TEX. INT'L L. F.
218 (1969).
10 G. KALINKIN & N. OSTROVSKY, MORSKOE DNO; KOMU ONO PRINADLEZHIT? 87-89 (1970);
KOLODKIN, supra note 11, at 218.
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mitted to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea permits one now to come to a conclusion about their practical
uselessness as well.
One of the draft projects on scientific research submitted by a
group of developing countries suggests endowing an international
body, which is supposed to be set up to govern the exploitation of
the seabed mineral resources, with the exclusive right to undertake
any kind of scientific investigation in this area. "Marine scientific
research in this international area," the project says, "shall be con-
ducted directly by the International Authority and, if appropriate,
by persons, juridical or physical, through service contracts of asso-
ciations or through any other such means as the International Au-
thority may determine, which shall ensure its direct and effective
control at all times over such research."13
Thus, states are deprived of their rights to the free conduct of
scientific research in the part of the high seas beyond economic
zones ("international area"); the International Authority alone
would enjoy this right. The International Authority, according to
this proposal, would carry out all scientific research directly or by
hiring physical or juridical persons. In other words, substantial
restriction of the sovereign rights of states is suggested by passing
their vital prerogatives to a certain supranational authority-
"internationalization" of their oceanic activities.
As a basis for the idea of internationalization, references are
sometimes made to the "specific" nature of contemporary marine
activities. True, the very character of contemporary marine activi-
ties may bring to life international organizations capable of coordi-
nating and combining the efforts of all countries in this field. But
the states, the members of these organizations, have never relin-
quished their sovereign rights, which includes the right to free use
of the sea. None of these organizations has ever substituted, or is
entitled to substitute, itself for a sovereign state or to place itself
above it.
The existence at present of over 150 sovereign states, which are
divided into two diametrically opposed social systems, each of
which with different political and economic foundations, principally
different aims of foreign and domestic policies, and principally dif-
ferent systems and organizations of production, makes it possible to
combine the efforts of states in exploration and exploitation of the
World Ocean only on the grounds of respect for their sovereign rights
31 [Ed. Note] Iraq: Draft Articles, supra note 23, item 2(a), para. 2.
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and of consideration for their mutual interests.
The proposals to place oceanic research under the authority of an
international body ignore these premises and the established experi-
ence of states. It has been long recognized that the high seas are not
only open for free use by all nations, but also that the use itself is
carried out on the basis of full equality of states: "The high seas
being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty."3
Thus, the principle of the freedom of the high seas, including the
freedom of scientific research, stands to the effect that neither a
single state nor a group of states united within an international
organization may enjoy a preferential or exclusive right to under-
take scientific research on the high seas. Neither can they prohibit
any other state from carrying out such research. They are not and
never have been entitled to impose their rules on the scientific ves-
sels of other states which are engaged in peaceful research on the
high seas.
The establishment of an international body's exclusive right to
undertake scientific investigations on the high seas or to provide it
with the power to control the activities of coastal states would mean
(1) the elimination of freedom of scientific research, (2) the restric-
tion of the sovereign rights of states on the high seas, and (3) the
passing of these rights to this body. Therefore it would run contrary
to the U.N. Charter as well as to other fundamental sources of
international law.
Such is the legal side of the problem. However, the above consid-
ered suggestions are utterly out of touch with reality from the practi-
cal point of view as well.
Supposing an international authority were set up, the first ques-
tion to be answered would be the question of working out the "strat-
egy" of scientific research, namely, determining the main fields of
investigations and their priorities. Who in that authority would give
an evaluation of the planned expeditions and what criteria would
be used for the purpose of such evaluation? How numerous would
the administrative and scientific staff of the organization have to be
in order to cope with its tasks? Even these few questions show the
doubtfulness and frailty of the structure suggested.
Further development of marine science demands intensive large
scale and global investigations and experiments in the World
Ocean. Contemporary oceanic research is a complex of interrelated
32 [Ed. Note] High Seas Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
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scientific undertakings which involve a great number of scientific
research ships, aircraft, satellities, and oceanic data acquisition sys-
tems. It is hardly probable in the present situation that sovereign
states would agree to place their scientific fleets and other equip-
ment under the full control of an international body.
Marine scientific expeditions are at present very expensive. Ac-
cording to rough estimates, the yearly expenses of 10 to 15 countries
for oceanic research comes to some US$2 billion. There are some 250
large scientific research ships in the world, and operational expenses
to maintain them alone constitute several million dollars annually.
It is hard to believe that the projected profits of an international
body resulting from exploitation of seabed resources would be suffi-
cient to cover these expenses.
Moreover, as it is known, scientific expeditions in the sea are but
one element, though an indispensable one, of fundamental World
Ocean investigations. The study of the sea is being carried out in
numerous research centres of many countries far from the sea
expanses. Marine expeditions are inconceivable if they are out of
touch with the vast theoretical and practical work of these institu-
tions and computing centers and with the activities of many con-
cerned enterprises.
Generally speaking, contemporary investigations into the World
Ocean, as well as with the exploration of outer space, are a purpose-
ful use of the scientific and economic potential of a country in this
particular field. It is highly improbable that sovereign states would
place this potential at the disposal of an international body.
V. CONCLUSION
The harmful consequences for the further progress of marine sci-
ence through imposing restrictions on scientific research within the
200-mile economic zone were analyzed above. These consequences
evidently would be aggravated if similar restrictions were intro-
duced in vast expanses of the ocean beyond national jurisdiction.
As for granting an international authority the exclusive right to
engage in scientific research, it would virtually result in stopping
projects of investigation which are going on now on an unprece-
dented scale.
All this would cause an irretrievable damage to further develop-
ment of marine research. It would delay the full scale utilization of
the resources of the World Ocean for many years and would make
impossible the solutions of the problems of marine environmental
protection and the preservation of ecological balance as a whole.
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Only freedom of scientific research on the high seas accords with
the level and scope of modem research in the World Ocean, the
exploration and exploitation of which is one of the cardinal
directions of present scientific and technological progress. The prin-
ciple of freedom of scientific research provides a solid guarantee for
carrying out unhindered the coordinated activities of oceanic re-
search, envisaged by the agreement between the governments of the
Soviet Union and the United States on cooperation in scientific
research of the World Ocean.?
The scientists of our countries decided to combine their efforts for
comprehensive exploration of the World Ocean for peaceful pur-
poses and for the benefit of all mankind. They can and should
combine their efforts to elaborate a scientific foundation for the
most reasonable legal order for such investigations.
3 [Ed. Note] Agreement with the Soviet Union on Cooperation in Studies of the World
Ocean, June 19, 1975, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1452, T.I.A.S. No. 7651 (effective June 19, 1973).

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN
THE OCEANS
Richard R. Baxter*
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of scientific research in the oceans has come to be a
shared concern of the Soviet Union and the United States. We are
both major maritime powers. We have the two largest navies in the
world. We both have large merchant marines-but not the largest
ones in the world, for the Soviet Union ranks sixth and the United
States eighth in terms of tonnage, the figures in the latter instance
being somewhat distorted by the exclusion of United States owned
merchant ships which are registered under flags of convenience,
such as those of Liberia and Panama. Both of our countries have
major scientific interests and capabilities in the oceans. We have
observed with great interest the major commitment to scientific
research in the oceans that the Soviet Union began to make in the
1950's,' a program which, so far as the available figures indicate,
surpasses that of the United States.
Scientific research in the sea serves both national and interna-
tional interests. Research in fisheries can, for example, improve the
catch of a national fishing fleet. But more fundamental research
into the geology of the oceans or into climate, as affecting and af-
fected by the oceans, can contribute to the welfare and perhaps even
to the survival of mankind as a whole. In the United States it has
become platitudinous to speak of the oceans as our last great reserve
or as our last frontier, but these expressions do remind us of how
much we have yet to learn about the oceans. Enhanced knowledge
will enable us not only to preserve or utilize the oceans, but also to
widen our knowledge of the world in which we live. That knowledge
may in time permit us to protect ourselves against some of the worst
disasters that can be contemplated-starvation and the exhaustion
of resources, earthquakes, and changes of climate that might bring
a new ice age. Scientific research which may enable us to deal with
* Professor of Law, Harvard University; President, American Society of International Law;
Editor-in-Chief, American Journal of International Law. A.B., Brown University, 1942;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1948; Diploma in International Law, Cambridge University, 1951;
LL.M., Georgetown University, 1952.
' CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE & NATIONAL OCEAN POL-
ICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., IST SEss., SoviET OCEAN ACTIVITIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY 39-53
(Comm. Print 1975).
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these problems will benefit all nations and must be of concern to all
nations.
Ddtente has reduced the sources of friction between our two coun-
tries on questions of scientific research, and we are now entering a
new era of collaboration in ocean research.' We have had our diffi-
culties in the past, as we must be frank to acknowledge. The Soviet
Union thought it improper that two United States Coast Guard
icebreakers, engaged in oceanographic research, should pass
through the Vilkitsky Straits, which the Soviet Union considers to
be within Soviet territorial waters.3 Our two countries have ex-
changed protests about the conduct of seismological field tests in
the North Pacific.' And American oceanographers have expressed
concern that in the late 1960's and early 1970's the Soviet Union was
not prepared to allow research by American scientists on the Conti-
nental Shelf of the Soviet Union.'
In this happier era, we find not only that Soviet-American scien-
tific collaboration is feasible, but also that there are close resembl-
ances between the negotiating positions of our two countries on
questions of scientific research in the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. We both generally find ourselves in support of
freedom of scientific research in the oceans, although there are dif-
ferences in the precise positions of the United States and the Soviet
Union which should not be underestimated. It is greatly hoped that
we shall be able to maintain our cooperation not only in scientific
research but also in the drawing up of new treaty law with respect
to scientific research.
II. THE EXISTING LEGAL REGIME
It is of some importance to consider the existing legal regime of
scientific research in the seas, for if the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea is not successful in drawing up new treaties,
then scientific research, like other aspects of the utilization of the
sea, will be governed by the existing Geneva Law of the Sea
2 Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Studies of the
World Ocean, June 19, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1452, T.I.A.S. No. 7651 (effective June 19,
1973).
' Soviet Union Bars Completion of U.S. Scientific Voyage, 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 362 (1967);
see W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 65-70 (1971).
1 US. Protests Soviet Failure to Give Notice of Scientific Tests, 58 DEP'T STATE BULL. 16
(1968).
" Kildow, Nature of the Present Restrictions on Oceanic Research, in FREEDOM OF OCEANIC
RESEARCH 5, 14-15 (W. Wooster ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Kildow].
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Conventions of 19586 and by customary international law. What is
the present position under the Conventions of 1958?
There is no question that insofar as internal waters are concerned,
no scientific research may be conducted by a foreign state without
the permission of the coastal state. The same is true of scientific
research in the territorial sea, both under customary international
law and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. Foreign vessels enjoy only a right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea, and scientific research is not a form of innocent
passage as defined in article 14 of the Territorial Sea Convention.
Any research in the territorial sea can therefore be conducted only
with the permission of the coastal state. It is well understood, of
course, that with the drawing of straight baselines, the claims made
by states to broader territorial seas, and the claims that have been
asserted by archipelago states to the waters of such archipelagoes,
the area of internal waters and of territorial seas has been much
increased on a global basis.
Many states have established exclusive fisheries zones-a form of
contiguous zone not referred to in the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone-outside their territorial seas. The
United States position has been that research with respect to fisher-
ies in such areas can be undertaken only with the consent of the
coastal state. Research unconnected with fisheries conducted in the
water column beyond the territorial sea is considered not to require
permission .'
It is only in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf that
any express reference is made to scientific research in the
Conventions of 1958. Article 5, paragraph 8 of the Convention pro-
vides:
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of
any research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken
there. Nevertheless the coastal State shall not normally withhold
Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective for United States Sept. 30, 1962); Convention on the Continental
Shelf, April 28, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective
for United States June 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention]; Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective for United States Sept. 10, 1964); Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [1966]
1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective for United States March 20,
1966).
1 Schaefer, The Changing Law of the Sea-Effects on Freedom of Scientific Investigation,
in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE FUTURE OF THE SEA's RESOURCES 113, 115 (L. Alexander ed. 1968).
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its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution
with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or biolog-
ical characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso
that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires, to partic-
ipate or to be represented in the research, and that in any event
the results shall be published.'
Overshadowing this provision is the uncertainty about the breadth
of the Continental Shelf under article 1 of the Convention. But the
imprecision of the right to conduct scientific research in the shelf
does not end there. There may well be dispute about what consti-
tutes "purely scientific research." There have been disagreements
concerning whether naval or Coast Guard oceanographic vessels be-
long to a "qualified institution."9 Article 5, paragraph 8 provides for
what is basically a "consent regime," but subject to a qualification
which is incapable of ready application under any procedure for
third party dispute settlement. While the right of the coastal state
to participate in the research and the requirement of publication are
intended to make possible the verification of the purely scientific
character of the research and to provide a quid pro quo for the
coastal state, 0 the benefits of the two requirements may be specula-
tive. The coastal state may lack qualified personnel to participate
in the research, and a duty to publish what may be unpublishable
for scientific reasons or what the coastal state may not want to have
published" may in itself be detrimental to the interests of the
coastal state, the state conducting the research, and the interna-
tional scientific community.
Scientists have complained that the consent regime leads to
costly delays in the scheduling and conduct of scientific research.2
They also fear that permission for research may be withheld through
ignorance or through a desire to maintain secrecy. The ambiguity
of many of the terms employed in article 5, paragraph 8 of the
Continental Shelf Convention can provide plausible bases for denial
of the right to conduct research.
Article 5 is not one of the articles of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention which is declaratory of customary international law. 3 It is
Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 6.
Kildow, supra note 5, at 14.
10 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 6, art. 5, para. 8.
Research in the Black Sea was not allowed in 1969 because of concern about the "availa-
bility of data to other countries." Kildow, supra note 5, at 15.
" Wooster & Bradley, Access Requirements of Oceanic Research: The Scientists'
Perspective in FREEDOM OF OCEANIC RESEARCH 29 (W. Wooster ed. 1973).
" North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 39.
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not easy to say what the state of the law is with respect to those
states, which constitute a majority of the international community,
that are not parties to the Convention. Coastal states not parties to
the Convention may very well lay down the same requirement as in
the Convention in order to protect their coastal interests. And if the
statement of article 2, paragraph 1, that "[t]he coastal State exer-
cises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources"14 fairly reflects the
state of customary international law, then research with respect to
natural resources may be an interference with the "sovereign rights"
of the coastal state. Such research would be subject to the permis-
sion of the coastal state. In this respect, article 21 of part III, Marine
Scientific Research, of the Informal Single Negotiating Text,' pre-
sented by the chairman of the Third Committee at the conclusion
of the Geneva session of the Law of the Sea Conference, may be, in
so far as it applies to the Continental Shelf, no more than declara-
tory of customary international law. The article calls for the consent
of the coastal state with respect to "[any research project related
to the living and non-living resources of the economic zone and the
continental shelf . ... ,,1 However, as observed subsequently in
this paper, the standard may require further elaboration.
In the high seas, including the high seas over the Continental
Shelf, there is presently no restraint placed upon scientific research
in the water column or, beyond the limits of the Continental Shelf,
in the seabed or subsoil. The right to conduct scientific research is
not specifically adverted to in the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas of 1958,11 but the list of freedoms comprehended within the
freedom of the seas in article 2 is not exhaustive.
III. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
Two polar extremes may be discerned in the attitudes toward
scientific research shown at the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. With regard to the Continental Shelf, the economic
zone, and the seabed and subsoil, one point of view is that research
should be subject to a consent regime, whether the area concerned
is under the jurisdiction of the coastal state or the international
authority. At the other extreme, there would be freedom of scientific
Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 6, art. 2, para. 1.
' THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIAT-
ING TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATING TEXT].
" Id. pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, art. 21.
,7 Note 6 supra.
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research in these three areas, subject to compliance with a number
of conditions such as notification and the sharing of research results.
It is common ground that the consent of the coastal state will be
required for research in internal waters and in the territorial sea.
The developing countries of the Group of 77 generally favor a
consent regime in the economic zone,"8 although the landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states among them adopt a more lib-
eral view toward scientific research. The developing coastal coun-
tries generally share the view that coastal states should exercise a
wide measure of control over an economic zone of 200 miles and, to
the extent that the Continental Shelf allocated to coastal states
extends beyond that zone, over that area as well. Control is power,
which has both political and economic value. Beyond this, develop-
ing countries fear that scientific research will be used as a cover for
exploration and prospecting for the resources of the seabed and
water column or for military purposes.
The conditions that would be imposed under the position taken
by the Group of 77, when consent is given, are so onerous as to
discourage any scientific research at all. There would have to be
active participation and representation by the coastal state. Assis-
tance, as requested by the coastal state, would have to be furnished
in the assessment of the data generated. Publication of the results
of research could not be accomplished without the consent of the
coastal state. 9
The negotiating position of the United States" has exactly the
opposite approach. There would be freedom of scientific research in
the economic zone, subject to the requirements of (1) advance noti-
fication; (2) certification that the research would be "purely
scientific" and conducted by a "qualified institution"; (3) oppor-
tunity for the coastal state to participate or be represented; (4)
sharing of data and samples with the coastal state; (5) publication
of the results of the research; (6) assistance to the coastal state in
assessing the data; and (7) compliance with international environ-
mental standards.2' A possible intermediate position that was put
forward at the end of the Caracas session of the Law of the Sea
11 Iraq: Draft Articles on Scientific Research, April 25, 1975, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.3/L.13/Rev.2 [hereinafter cited as Iraq: Draft Articles].
" Id. item 2(b), para. 1.
United States: Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research, July 20, 1973,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIIIL.44 [hereinafter cited as United States: Draft Articles].
21 Id.
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Conference22 was built about the formula of article 5, paragraph 8
of the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958.23 Consent would be
required, but would not be normally withheld if certain information
were provided to the coastal state and if there were an undertaking
to provide for participation by and sharing of information with the
coastal state. It was suggested at that time that a formula like that
of the United States might define "marine scientific research" in
such a way as to exclude "industrial exploration and other activities
aimed directly at the exploitation of marine resources,"" or that a
regime of freedom of research in the economic zone might be defined
to exclude "research concerned with the exploration or exploitation
of the living and non-living resources" of the zone, which would be
subject to a consent regime. 6
The Informal Single Negotiating Text plots a middle course with
respect to the economic zone. A research project of "a fundamental
nature" would not be subject to coastal state consent; 7 but a "re-
search project related to the living and non-living resources of the
economic zone and the continental shelf' would require the explicit
consent of the coastal state.28 It is understood that this formula owes
much to a proposal made by Bulgaria and eight other states (includ-
ing the U.S.S.R.) which makes this same distinction.2 The land-
locked and geographically disadvantaged states look to a similar
formula, according freedom to "marine scientific research" to the
exclusion of "industrial exploration and other activities aimed di-
rectly at the exploitation of marine resources. '3°
The middle positions reflect a grouping towards a distinction be-
tween research which is related to exploration and exploitation of
natural resources and that which is not. A variety of terminology has
been employed to express this distinction, and it may be useful to
I Texts on Items 13 and 14 (Marine Scientific Research and Development and Transfer of
Technology): Texts Agreed upon in the Informal Meetings, Aug. 23, 1974, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.3/L.17 (alternative B) [hereinafter cited as Informal Texts].
Note 6 supra.
' Informal Texts, supra note 22, at 7.
z5 Id.
Id. at 8.
NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 15, pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, art. 18, para. 1.
Id. pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, art. 21.
Bulgaria, et al.: Draft Articles for a Convention on Scientific Research in the World
Ocean, Apr. 3, 1975, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.26.
" Austria, et al.: Draft Articles on Marine Scientific Research, Aug. 23, 1974, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.19, as amended, Netherlands: Draft Amendments to the Draft Arti-
cles on Marine Scientific Research Contained in Document A/CONF.62/C.3/L.19, April 24,
1975, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.28.
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record some of these forms of words here. These include "purely
scientific research"; "designed to increase man's knowledge and
conducted for peaceful purposes"; "of a fundamental nature"; as
contrasted with "industrial exploration and other activities aimed
directly at the exploitation of marine resources"; "related to the
exploration and exploitation of the living and non-living resources
of the economic zone"; and "[directly] related to the living and
nonliving resources of the economic zone."
It should be possible to produce a text which would be acceptable
to both the U.S.S.R. and the United States and which also would
elicit substantial support from other countries on the basis of the
distinction implicit in the above terminology. If freedom of scientific
research is to be favored in the 36 percent of the oceans which would
be comprehended within economic zones, it might be well to take
freedom of scientific research as a starting point, and then to
exclude from permissible scientific research exploration directed to
the exploitation of the natural resources of the economic zone or
Continental Shelf or research which may be expected to cause mate-
rial harm to these resources. The Single Negotiating Text certainly
incorporates a good basis for an acceptable formula'.3
In further stages of the work of the Law of the Sea Conference, it
is important that the text on scientific research in the economic
zone be formulated in the Third Committee. The chairman of the
Second Committee submitted a text which provided for a consent
regime in this area, 3 without the more detailed elaboration to be
found in the articles submitted by the chairman of the Third Com-
mittee. 33 But even within the Third Committee text, there is incon-
sistent terminology that must be harmonized.
The United States has shown no sympathy for the idea that in the
area of the seabed and subsoil that would be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the international authority or some like entity, scientific
research, like other activities, should be under the control of the
authority. The developing countries have put forward the view that
scientific research activities in the international area should be con-
ducted directly by the international authority or by individuals 34
under the direct and effective control of the authority. An ominous
note is struck by the provision of the Informal Single Negotiating
3, Negotiating Text, supra note 15, pt. III, Marine Scientific Research.
32 Id. pt. II, art. 49.
3 Id. pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, arts. 13-26.
1 Iraq; Draft Articles, supra note 18, item 2(a), para. 2.
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Text put forward by the First Committee that dissemination of the
results of research is to be made "through the Authority,"3" which
would seem to give a controlling role to that entity in determining
what information should be made available to the scientific com-
munity.
This restrictive view of the freedom to conduct scientific research
in the oceans is not shared by landlocked states, whether developing
or developed. It is not the view of the United States or of most of
the other developed countries of the West, nor is it the view, there
is reason to suppose, of the Soviet Union or the socialist states of
Eastern Europe. Again, freedom of scientific research should be the
dominant theme. The Infori-nal Single Negotiating Text produced
in the Third Committee recognizes that all states have a right to
conduct scientific research in the international seabed area, subject
to notification to an "International Sea-bed Authority, '3 and that
there is an unfettered right to conduct such research in the high seas
beyond the limits of the economic zone. 7 The only limits that one
might envisage as being placed on research would be directed to the
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources which would be
placed under the supervision of the international authority. The
criteria that may be developed for the economic zone and for the
Continental Shelf may be useful here as well, but only with respect
to the natural resources of the bed of the sea.
There seems to be general agreement that no scientific research
may be undertaken in the territorial sea of a state without that
state's permission. The United States ventures the hope that
''coastal states .. .shall cooperate in facilitating the conduct of
scientific research in their territorial sea, .. ."3 but it is clear that
permission must be obtained from the coastal states.
It is to be hoped that in subsequent sessions of the Law of the Sea
Conference recognition will be given to the priority that should be
enjoyed by the Third Committee in drawing up texts on scientific
research. Simultaneous and differing approaches in the First, Sec-
ond, and Third Committees can only lead to confusion. Moreover,
the real expertise and the more reasonable approach to these prob-
lems seem to lie in the Third Committee, the chairman of which has
produced a text that can serve as the basis for ultimate agreement.
• NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 15, pt. I, art. 10.
' Id. pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, art. 25, para. 2.
31 Id. pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, art. 26.
11 United States: Draft Articles, supra note 20, art. 6.
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It is essential, however, that the terms in that text be sharpened and
that internally consistent terminology be employed.
If the permissible scope of scientific research is agreed upon, it
appears that questions of responsibility and liability and of develop-
ment and transfer of technology will fall into place rather readily.
In all probability only technical refinements are called for in the
Informal Single Negotiating Text of the Third Committee.
If there is to be any form of "consent regime," it would be impor-
tant that the conditions to be satisfied be kept as simple as possible
and the maximum flexibility be assured. Onerous requirements,
long delays in processing of applications, and inflexibility on the
part of the coastal state or the international authority can be effec-
tive restraints on freedom of scientific research and can be ex-
tremely costly to the states or institutions conducting the research.
IV. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
As has been observed, the two main lines in the Law of the Sea
Conference are the recognition of freedom to conduct certain forms
of research and a requirement that permission be obtained from a
state or an international authority in order to carry on that form of
activity. Disputes may well arise with respect to the permissibility
or impermissibility of a particular research project under a regime
of qualified freedom. Even if consent must be obtained in order to
perform research, there might well be differences with respect to
whether research falls within the terms of the permission granted or
whether obligations imposed on the researcher have been satisfied.
Questions of responsibility for harm done under either contingency
may also be envisaged.
Both the dispute settlement procedure "of a general nature"39 and
that based on a "functional" approach,40 as presented by the co-
chairmen of the informal working group on the settlement of dis-
putes, happily contemplate compulsory third party settlement of
disputes arising with respect to scientific research. It is understood
that the first is favored by the United States and the second by the
Soviet Union. It is not clear whether the special functional proce-
dure for the settlement of disputes about scientific research would
be of a binding character. The settlement under the "general" ap-
proach, would be binding, of course. Another respect in which the
two formulations differ is that under the "general" approach, indi-
1' THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, TEXT ON SETLEMENT OF
DISPUTES, annex I, U.N. Doc. SD.Gp/2d Session/No.1/Rev. 5 (1975).
40 Id. annex II.
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viduals under some circumstances would have access to a "Law of
the Sea Tribunal" in order to seek redress for the detention of a
vessel,4' or perhaps under other circumstances as well.42 This latter
provision would be of particular importance to the United States,
because oceanographic research is often carried on by private insti-
tutions.
V. THE LAW OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE ABSENCE OF NEW LAW
OF THE SEA CONVENTIONS
The prospect must be faced that there may be: (1) no conventions
on the law of the sea; (2) conventions applicable only to certain
areas and uses of the oceans; or (3) conventions to which the great
majority of states will not become parties. Thus the existing Geneva
Conventions of 195813 or customary international law may continue
to be applicable to all or part of the states comprising the interna-
tional community. Of course, the problems that have arisen under
the existing law will continue and will in all probability be exacer-
bated. Who is to know whether research in a part of the continental
margin is research in the Continental Shelf of the coastal state,
subject to a consent regime, or whether it is research in the seabed
and subsoil, which is not now regulated by treaty? If the coastal
state and the state carrying on research are not mutually bound by
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of
1958,"4 their relationships will be governed by customary interna-
tional law. There is a degree of uncertainty about the exact state of
customary international law with respect even to research on what
is mutually understood to be the Continental Shelf.
In the absence of any treaty, it would appear to be to the mutual
advantage of the Soviet Union and the United States to claim an
unfettered right to conduct scientific research in the water column
and the seabed and subsoil of the high seas.
Even if there are no new treaties, most coastal states will lay
claim to a 200-mile economic zone of one sort or another. Further-
more, existing rights in the Continental Shelf will be retained. It
seems probable that coastal states claiming economic zones will
impose a "consent regime," at least with respect to research which
is oriented toward exploration and exploitation in the water column
(i.e., regarding fisheries) and in the seabed and subsoil (i.e., regard-
, Id. annex I, art. 15.
,2 Id. annex I, art. 13, para. 2.
, Note 6 supra.
14 Id.
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ing oil and hard minerals). Beyond that, it would be in the mutual
interest of the two countries to resist further inroads into freedom
of research. Disputes will probably arise because suspicious coastal
states will claim that the research is directed to prospecting or ex-
ploration for natural resources. There will be no dispute settlement
procedure for dealing with such differences. Attempts by coastal
states to deal with legitimate scientific research through the use of
force will have to be resisted by diplomatic and, if necessary,
stronger means. If here is normally to be cooperation, exchange of
data, and transfer of technology between the coastal state and the
state conducting the research, the suspension of such exchanges
may be employed as a sanction.
Although the United States has asserted that it will be prepared
to move to recognition of a 12-mile territorial sea only if that limit
is widely accepted by treaty, the United States will probably be
faced with almost universal acceptance of that limit and will be
forced to yield, even if there is no treaty. The customary interna-
tional law will remain; the state or institution desiring to carry on
research will be able to do so only if the coastal state consents.
There will be every reason to promote regional cooperation in
scientific research through multilateral arrangements and to con-
clude bilateral agreements regulating the circumstances under
which research can be conducted.
On balance, states with a strong interest in scientific research in
the oceans may have more to lose through new treaty regulation of
scientific research than they have to gain. Everything depends on
how the new conventions finally look.
Scientific research is one of those areas in which it is possible that
customary international law will develop through the interaction of
states so that at some future time the law may be codified by treaty.
It would be highly desirable if coastal states could be persuaded to
accept approval and certification of research by an international
body such as the International Oceanographic Commission, as an
alternative to a cumbersome consent procedure. A bilateral
licensing procedure could thereby be replaced by a multilateral one.
VI. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS CONNECTED WITH DEFENSE
It is well known that one of the strongest guarantees against the
use of nuclear weapons is provided by the invulnerability of the sea-
based nuclear deterrent in the form of the missile-carrying submar-
ines of the Soviet Union and the United States. A dramatic im-
provement in the capabilities for antisubmarine warfare of either
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power would have a profoundly destabilizing effect. It has been
suggested that one way to preserve the invulnerability of the sea-
based deterrent would be to create sanctuaries in which one state's
missile-carrying submarines might conceal themselves and in which
detection and tracking by the other state would be prohibited.45 The
establishment of any such zones in the oceans might call for a sus-
pension of scientific research in those areas, on the ground that such
research might be used as a cover for the detection and tracking of
submarines. Thus the prospect may be faced that the day might
come when it would be necessary for both powers to adopt a rule of
mutual self-denial with respect to scientific research in certain areas
of the oceans. This contingency is remote at the moment and the
subject a complex one. No more can be done here than to call
attention to it.
15 See Garwin, The Interaction of Anti-Submarine Warfare with the Submarine-Based
Deterrent, in THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-BASED DETERRENT 87, 116-17 (W. Cahn, B. Feld, & K.
Tsipis eds. 1973); Baxter, Legal Aspects of Arms Control Measures Concerning the Missile
Carrying Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare, in id. at 209, 220-24.
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RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR HARM TO THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT
Robert E. Stein*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this paper to review some of the ways the
international community has decided to assign and apportion re-
sponsibility for harm to the marine environment, as well as liability
for that harm for which a particular group is considered responsible.
This review leads to the conclusion that the increased uses of the
oceans for a variety of activities thus far have outstripped the capac-
ity of the international community to deal with them. For this rea-
son, new ways of looking at responsibility and liability are needed
-and a healthy mixture of global, regional, and domestic regulation
is proposed.
II. NATURE OF HARM
A range of activities, undertaken because of their real and poten-
tial benefit, goes on in the marine environment. Vessels transport,
discharge wastes, and occasionally have accidents; rigs produce,
and may leak; fish are caught, and may be depleted. On land the
range of activities considered necessary for modem industrial so-
ciety also has its by-products, many of which find their way into the
marine environment, from dumping, direct discharge, or precipita-
tion from the atmosphere. With these diverse sources, it is not sur-
prising that there has been considerable difficulty both in assessing
the damage and identifying the sources of pollution. A recent report
by the United States National Academy of Science states:
In practice, however, most estimates are based on inadequate
knowledge of emissions and environmental distribution and are
incorporated into the estimate at a very early stage. The first crude
estimate then suggests new measurements to make, and these
usually lead to modifications of the estimate. Prediction and verifi-
cation are achievable goals, although no estimates have yet been
subjected to rigorous evaluation.'
* Director, North American Office, International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment; Senior Research Manager and former Acting Director of Studies, American Society of
International Law; Adjunct Professor of Environmental Law, American University Law
School. B.A., Brandeis University, 1960; LL.B., Columbia University, 1963.
1 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ASSESSING POTENTIAL OCEAN POLLUTANTS 18 (1975) (report
of the Study Panel on Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants).
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It will not be the purpose of this paper to quantify the magnitude
of harm to the marine environment. Nor can we simply paraphrase
a United States Supreme Court Justice's definition of obscenity, by
saying "I may not be able to define it, but I know it when I see
it."2 Suffice it to say that these are gross examples of pollution
which have captured the attention of the mass media and which
have led to attempts at international regulation. There are also
many insidious emissions into the marine environment which accu-
mulate, leaving a victim or victims who do not know who caused the
harm or how they can be compensated for the damage.
III. RESPONSIBILITY
In considering questions of responsibility for harm to the marine
environment, there are, of course, a number of analogies which can
be considered. Foremost among them is the discussion and
Declaration on the Human Environment' (Stockholm Declaration)
agreed to at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Environ-
ment in Stockholm and subsequently endorsed by the United Na-
tions General Assembly.4 In the following discussion the Stockholm
Declaration first will be considered for its relevance to the marine
environment. Responsibility will be considered in two forms: (1)
responsibility for ensuring that activities which are about to take
place, or which are in the planning process, do not cause harm to
the marine environment; and (2) responsibility after the fact.
A. Anticipatory Responsibility
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states: "States have
• . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." At the
Stockholm Conference, a number of states indicated that this prin-
ciple reflected existing international law. One of the difficulties with
the Stockholm Declaration was, however, that it did not define its
terms. What is meant by "damage to the environment of other
States"? How far do states have to go to "ensure" that damage does
not occur? What are the situations to which the provision applies
or does not apply? Even if the principle is based on a generally
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring opinion).
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, REPORT, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as STOCKHOLM DECLARATION]. The Conference was
held in Stockholm from June 5 to June 16, 1972.
' G.A. Res. 2994-3004, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 42-48, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
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accepted rule of international law that states shall not engage in
activities which cause harm to others,5 there still is a need for fur-
ther definition. The Stockholm Declaration does refer to the marine
environment specifically. Principle 7 states: "States shall take all
possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources
and marine life, to damage amenities, or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea."
The Stockholm Conference also agreed to an Action Plan which
endorsed a number of principles "as guiding concepts"' for the
Caracas session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea in 1973. Those principles begin with the statement that
"[e]very State has a duty to protect and preserve the marine envi-
ronment and, in particular, to prevent pollution that may affect
areas where an internationally shared resource is located."7 The
principles continue with the statement that "[s]tates should as-
sume joint responsibility for the preservation of the marine environ-
ment beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"8 and that "[in
addition to its responsibility for environmental protection within
the limits of its territorial sea, a coastal State also has responsibility
to protect adjacent areas of the environment from damage that may
result from activities within its territory." 9 To what extent do these
principles as stated in the documents prepared for, during, and
following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment apply to the marine environment? Throughout the law of the
sea discussion there was acceptance of the general obligation to
preserve and protect the marine environment. 0 Accordingly, a num-
ber of states have submitted proposals to the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence which set forth the specific responsibility of states and other
entities. For example, the 1973 draft articles presented by the
United States" state: "A State has the responsibility to take appro-
I The general rule of sic utere has been referred to by the International Court of Justice in
the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22 and by the International Commission for the
Pyrenees in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 24 I.L.R. 101, 123 (1957).
' UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL
OF POLLUTANTS OF BROAD INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/8 (1972).
Id. para. 197, subpara. 1.
Id. subpara. 5.
' Id. subpara. 17.
See generally Birnie, The Basic Obligation to Protect the Marine Environment, in
CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (R. Stein ed. 1975).
" United States Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Prevention of Marine Pollution, July 13, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIIIL.40 [hereinafter
cited as United States Draft Articles].
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priate measures to ensure, in accordance with international law,
that activities under its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or to the marine environment
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."'" Similarly, the draft
articles submitted by Kenya"3 state: "States shall be responsible for
damage caused by their activities, those of their nationals, physical
or juridical, and others under their control ormregistration to any part
of the marine environment."
These articles do provide a general basis for activities in the mar-
ine environment. It is important to note that activities of the state
itself, as well as those of entities acting under its jurisdiction or
control, are covered, thus eliminating the question of attribution.
The United States draft articles are clearly anticipatory in nature,
while those of Kenya are less clear. The first fertile result of these
submissions appears in the Informal Single Negotiating Text"
which was issued following the Geneva session of the Conference,
which ended on May 10, 1975. At the request of the President of the
Conference, the three committee chairmen presented single texts.
Part III of the text, presented by the chairman of the Third Commit-
tee, deals with marine pollution. Article 41, which deals with the
subject of responsibility, states:
1. States have the responsibility to ensure that activities under
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to areas under the
jurisdiction of other States or to the marine environment of other
States and shall, in accordance with the principles of international
law be liable to other States for such damage.
2. States have the responsibility to ensure that activities under
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the marine
environment beyond areas where States exercise sovereign rights
in accordance with this Convention. 5
This language is clearly anticipatory in nature as well. Most con-
siderations of the Stockholm Declaration have concluded that the
j Id. art. XXII.
' Kenya: Draft Articles for the Preservation and the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment, July 23, 1974, U.N. Doc. AICONF.62/C.3/L.2 [hereinafter cited as Kenya: Draft Arti-
cles].
" THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIAT-
ING TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATING TEXT].
11 Id., pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 41. As will often
be emphasized before the next session of the Conference (scheduled for New York in March
1976), the Single Negotiating Text does not represent a compromise, but will "only provide
a basis for negotiation." Moreover it does not prejudice other proposals already made or the
right of any delegation to make new proposals. See id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of
the Marine Environment.
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best way to minimize environmental harm is to avoid it, and that
the responsibility to ensure that harm is not created certainly in-
volves the responsibility to plan to avoid the harm itself.'6
There are a number of activities that states might take to imple-
ment these principles. The first to consider is some form of environ-
mental assessment. In a number of legal systems, legislation has
been passed to provide for a planning mechanism which is designed
to take environmental factors into account and to make sure they
are adequately considered before an activity that might have some
harm to the environment takes place.
In the United States the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969'1 (NEPA), signed by the President in 1970, is designed to ac-
complish that purpose by a number of means including the issuance
of "environmental impact statements."'" In the context of the fol-
lowup to the Stockholm Conference, the General Asssembly consid-
ered the obligation to consult with other states in advance of under-
taking an activity. Because of the specific objection of Brazil, in part
resulting from Brazil's ongoing discussions with Argentina over the
planning for dams on the River Parana, the General Assembly reso-
lution was somewhat muted. 9 Nevertheless, consideration has been
given to a variety of aspects dealing with treatment in advance of
responsibility. Within the United States, for example, NEPA state-
ments have been prepared for projects affecting areas outside the
United States. Moreover, other interested governments have been
asked to participate in the NEPA process."0
A number of states have raised this question in the context of the
Law of the Sea Conference, and the United States introduced a
proposed article dealing with environmental assessment. The article
applies to activities under the jurisdiction or control of a state
"which may reasonably be expected to create a risk of significant
pollution of the marine environment."'" Under these circumstances
assessments would be prepared and provided to international organ-
izations, which would then provide them to other states. There
would also be an obligation to consult with states and international
" See, e.g., A. CHAVES & R. STEIN, THE AVOIDANCE AND ADJUSTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTES (1975) (special publication of the American Society of International Law).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
* The impact statement requirement is found in NEPA § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 433 2 (2)(c)
(1970).
G.A. Res. 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
, See 5 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 399-400 (1974).
" CRP/MP/7/Add.2, March 24, 1975 (informal document of the Third Committee).
1976]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
organizations in order to minimize adverse environmental conse-
quences and to provide assistance, especially to developing coun-
tries, concerning the preparation of environmental assessments.
Despite a number of objections to this proposal, on April 15, 1975,
the chairman of Committee III tabled a text on the subject of envi-
ronmental assessment.Y Paragraph 1 of article 15 of the Protection
of the Marine Environment portion of part III of the Single Negoti-
ating Text is identical to paragraph 1 of the environment assess-
ment article prepared by the chairman, but for some inexplicable
reason leaves out the second paragraph of the chairman's text which
contains a statement that "States shall, on request, provide appro-
priate assistance in particular to developing countries concerning
the preparation of such environmental assessments. '24
Despite the disclaimer language in the introductory note25 to the
Single Negotiating Text, article 15 is obviously a compromise. It
does not contain a requirement that adequate information be pro-
vided to other states, but merely calls for "reports" of the results of
the assessments which shall be communicated to the interested
states. Unless they contain sufficient information for the interested
states to make a judgment, these reports merely would be warning
to states in advance of an activity which indeed may cause harm to
the marine environment. Moreover, there is no indication at all of
the opportunity for the interested states to consult with the states
about to carry out an activity in order to raise questions about the
possible effects of the activity. At a minimum, it would seem that
there should be notification to interested parties that an activity is
about to be undertaken. This might well be followed by information
exchange and consultation. This is especially true if the Conference
succeeds in placing wider bands of the ocean under virtual domestic
jurisdiction. With increased activity in these areas the potential for
environmental harm, which will spill over, increases, and there is a
need to assure that the interests of adjacent states are protected.
The information provided should be complete enough to permit the
state reviewing the information to make a judgment whether further
consultation with the acting state is desired. It is submitted that the
international community should seriously consider, on a regional or
22 CRP/MP/18, April 15, 1975 (informal document of the Third Committee) [hereinafter
cited as CRP/MP/18].
23 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 14, pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, art. 15.
24 CRP/MP/18, supra note 22.
23 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 14, pt. IIn, note by the President.
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global basis, ways to provide for effective means of notification,
information exchange, and consultation, in order to carry out fully
a state's responsibility to avoid harm to the marine environment.
B. Responsibility for Harm which Has Already Occurred
The aforementioned discussion deals with responsibility for ac-
tion that has not yet taken place. It is somewhat speculative be-
cause of the lack of attention to the issue. More attention has been
paid to responsibility for damage that has already occurred. As
noted above, the Kenyan proposal heads in this direction." Addi-
tionally, the general obligation to protect the marine environment
as set forth, for example, in article 2 of the Protection and Preserva-
tion of the Marine Environment portion of part III of the Single
Negotiating Text confirms this responsibility.
Paragraph 1 and 2 of article 41 of the Protection and Preservation
of the Marine Environment portion of the Single Negotiating Text,
already discussed, are equally specific on this point. Moreover, it is
clear from article 41 that it makes no difference whether the harm
to the marine environment takes place in areas under the jurisdic-
tion of a state (i.e., the territorial sea or a special economic zone)
or in those areas of the high seas which are not subject to national
jurisdiction.
There is a precedent for this argument in the International Law
Association's Helsinki Rules.27 Article X of the Rules makes it clear
that the responsibility of the states applies equally to water pollu-
tion originating (1) within the territorial state or (2) outside the
territorial state if it is caused by the state's conduct. Comment (d)
of article X makes it clear that the article:
engages the responsibility of a State to take action with respect to
all pollution causing substantial injury in the territory of a co-
basin State regardless of whether the pollution results from public
activity of the State itself, within or outside its territory, or from
conduct of private parties within its territory.
The section of the Single Negotiating Text dealing with scientific
research"8 is also explicit on this point and extends as well to inter-
national organizations.
A brief review of some of the conventions considering responsibil-
ity is in order, since clearly, even if they are accepted, the provisions
* Kenya: Draft Articles, supra note 13.
* INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 477 (1966).
21 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 14, pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, arts. 34-36.
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of the Law of the Sea Convention accept the possibility of specific
obligations assumed by states in more specific agreements." The
Baltic Convention 30 unfortunately does not even go that far (al-
though it has the possibility of going further)'since its discussion of
responsibility for damage is an umbrella stating that "Itihe Con-
tracting Parties undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to develop
and accept rules concerning responsibility for damage resulting
from acts or omissions in contravention of the present Convention,
including inter alia, limits of responsibility, criteria and procedures
for the determination of liability and available remedies."3 ' It is not
known whether the parties to the Baltic Convention have further
advanced the consideration of this subject.
The 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention 3 also postpones the deter-
mination, stating:
In accordance with the principles of international law regarding
State responsibility for damage to the environment of other States
or to any other area of the environment, caused by dumping of
wastes and other matter of all kinds, the Contracting Parties un-
dertake to develop procedures for the assessment of liability and
the settlement of disputes regarding dumping.
33
There are a number of aspects of responsibility, therefore, which
seem clear from the jurisprudence today. These existing conclusions
can be stated as the following:
a. A state is responsible for actions that it carries out, or that
are carried out under its jurisdiction or control, which cause harm
to the marine environment.
b. The responsibility of the state includes the harm caused in
areas subject to the control of another state, or in areas under "in-
ternational jurisdiction."
c. Although there is a general principle of responsibility, the
degree to which it must be carried out and the circumstances under
which it is brought into play are not as clear as they might be. For
these reasons specific conventions have dealt with this subject and
, Id., pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 45.
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, done
March 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 546 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Baltic
Convention].
Id. art. 17.
" Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, adopted Nov. 13, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 626 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention].
11 Id. art. X.
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even in such conventions, the results are not explicit. The general
rule in the absence of these conventions is even less clear.
d. The Single Negotiating Text of the Law of the Sea Conference
does deal with the question of responsibility but needs implementa-
tion in a number of specific circumstances. Moreover, as pointed out
in the paper by Richard Frank,3" questions of enforcement are not
carefully drawn in the text and are in need of further clarification.
e. One way of minimizing harm is to provide for an effective
system of reporting after an accident. This factor is recognized in
the 1973 IMCO Convention on Pollution from Ships35 and the Single
Negotiating Text." Neither document, however, contains a penalty
for failure to report, something which is found in domestic legisla-
tion.
IV. LIABILITY
It remains to be considered how the international community has
attempted to implement responsibility by providing a mechanism
or sets of mechanisms for liability, both in terms of types and
amounts.
If we return to the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, the discussion of liability is even less satisfactory than that
of responsibility. Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration 7 states:
"States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution
and other environmental damage caused by the activities within the
jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdic-
tion." This principle, like the general principles which apply to
liability for damage to the marine environment, leaves open the
questions of the amount of pollution necessary to make a state liable
and the type or types of liability which would apply. Since the
principle says "develop further," it can be interpreted as admitting
some bases for liability, but what they are remains uncertain. In-
deed, it is possible that given the magnitude of a potential disaster
from, for example, a supertanker carrying oil or liquified natural
gas, this form of liability could prove inadequate. As will be dis-
11 See page 73 infra.
13 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973,
art. 8, protocol I, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1319 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
IMCO Pollution Convention]. .
11 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 14, pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, art. 7.
31 Note 3 supra.
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cussed below, perhaps alternative methods to liability itself might
be considered. What do the various conventions say? The bulk of
the conventions, typified by the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention,
38
postpone the issue. Article 17 of the Baltic Convention39 includes
"the determination of liability and available remedies" in the areas
of subjects to be developed by the parties.
At the law of the sea discussions a number of states drafted liabil-
ity provisions for submission to the Conference. The United States
draft reiterates the Stockholm Principles by stating: "States shall
undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to develop international law
regarding liability and compensation for pollution damage includ-
ing, inter alia, procedures and criteria for the determination of lia-
bility, the limit of liability and available defenses."40 The draft of
the Soviet Union states: "Each State shall be held liable for pollu-
tion causing damage to the marine environment whenever such pol-
lution results from activities carried out by official organs of that
State or by its physical and juridical persons."4' Other states have
submitted articles as well.2 The Single Negotiating Text seems to
retreat from the proposals put forward by the United States and the
Soviet Union, as well as by some of the others, by again going back
to the Stockholm type of formulation in stating: "When necessary,
States shall co-operate in the development of international law re-
lating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment
in establishing inter alia criteria and procedures for the determina-
tion of liability, the assessment of damage, the payment of compen-
sation and the settlement of related disputes."43
The section of the Single Negotiating Text dealing with liability
for scientific research does go into more detail. It contains a mix of
"liability in conformity with international law" and provision for
liability for damage within areas under national jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with the laws of the coastal state, "taking into account the
relevant principles of international law."44
" Note 32 supra.
" Note 30 supra.
,0 United States: Draft Articles, supra note 11, art. XXII, para. 2.
" Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Articles for a Convention on General Princi-
ples for the Preservation of the Marine Environment, March 15, 1973, art. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.lII/L.32.
" See, e.g., Trinidad and Tobago: Draft Articles on Responsibility and Liability, Aug. 15,
1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L. 54 [hereinafter cited as Trinidad and Tobago: Draft
Articles].
' NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 14, pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, art. 41, para. 3.
" Id. pt. III, Marine Scientific Research, arts. 34-36.
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With this background it seems clear that even if the New York
session of the Law of the Sea Conference were to work out an agree-
ment, there would be a great deal of discretion left to states as to
the kinds of liability that will apply to activities which have caused
damage to the marine environment. Indeed, there is a hint in a
footnote to the United States draft articles which states that "[tihe
Committee may wish to consider whether or to what extent the law
of the sea negotiations provide the appropriate forum to address the
details of this issue. 4 5 For this reason, the next section of this paper
will consider in turn (1) the types of situations to which liability
might apply; (2) the type of liability which might apply; (3) the
actors who conceivably are involved and who might be held respon-
sible or assessed with liability; and (4) possible alternatives to lia-
bility which might be considered.
The types of activities to which liability might apply are basically
those set forth in the second paragraph of the paper. Of the various
types of situations noted, the one which is already most subject to
agreement is pollution from vessels. Yet, there are gaps in the
existing fabric since many of the conventions dealing with vessel
source pollution are not yet in force,47 and those that are in force
depend upon flag states for enforcement, which is likely to be an
ineffective means.
The largest source of pollution entering the marine environment
is that from land-based sources. A source which is diffuse and hard
to quantify, it is unlikely that more than lip service will be paid to
solution of land-based marine pollution by the international com-
munity as a whole. Indeed, the thrust of most of the consideration
given to the subject, both by the Single Negotiating Text,4" the
" United States: Draft Articles, supra note 11, art. XXII, para. 2n.
", For a more thorough discussion of the problem of pollution from vessels see the paper
by Richard Frank, page 73 infra. See generally R. HALLMAN, TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY
SOUND LAW OF THE SEA (1974); Sandbrook & Yurchyshyn, Marine Pollution from Vessels, in
CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 19 (R. Stein ed. 1975).
" The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, T.I.A.S. No. 8068 (effective for United States Feb. 5,
1974), reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 471 (1970), entered into force on May 6, 1975. The
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29, 1969,
reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Civil Liability Conven-
tion] entered into force on June 19, 1975. Conventions which have not entered into force
include: 1973 IMCO Pollution Convention, supra note 35; 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention,
supra note 32; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
712 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1971 International Fund Convention].
11 NEGOTIATINc. TEXT, supra note 14, pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, art. 16.
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Baltic Convention,49 and the Paris Convention on Land-Based
Sources " is to refer to the need for domestic legislation.
A discussion of the forms of liability which might apply usually
contains two parts: (1) whether the liability should be strict, or
absolute, or whether it should rely on some measure of fault; and
(2) whether the liability should be limited in terms of the amount
that a claimant can recover for injury from a particular incident.
With respect to the first part it is difficult to generalize, since the
particular kinds of activities may deserve differing treatment. One
of the objects of establishing a kind of liability should be to provide
a sufficient deterrent to prevent harm from occurring. For this rea-
son, a number of suggestions have been made to apply strict liability
or absolute liability. Another difficulty arises when the source of the
environmental harm is not known, as several or a large number of
factors may be responsible for the pollutant. In this case, as will be
discussed below, liability, whether strict or absolute, is hard to im-
plement. The second aspect of this problem is also difficult to solve.
The 1969 Civil Liability Convention5 contained a rather low limit,
largely felt to be inadequate, if a supertanker were to run aground
or split up. For this reason a supplementary convention52 was
opened for signature in 1971 to establish an international fund for
compensation for oil pollution damage. But, even this fund has a
limit of US$30 million, with the possibility of doubling that to
US$60 million. Given the range of activities which are now engaged
in, is this amount sufficient? The fund covers pollution from oil, but
what of the other hazardous cargoes which are carried in increasing
quantities? There are many long-lived toxic substances which are
shipped around the world in containers or on vessels which are not
especially suited for their transport. And even if they are, a super-
tanker full of liquified natural gas can cause considerable damage
which is far in excess of a limit such as US$60 million per incident.53
Without having answered the previous question, the next aspects
of liability are the actor or actors who are involved and who might
, Note 30 supra.
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, adopted
Feb. 21, 1974, art. 4, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 352 (1974) (not yet in force)
[hereinafter cited as Land-Based Source Convention].
5, Note 47 supra.
52 1971 International Fund Convention, supra note 47.
s' In an incident in 1944 in Cleveland, Ohio, a ruptured liquified natural gas storage tank
was ignited, pouring burning gas into sewers, where it vaporized and exploded. Flames
reached one half mile into the air; over 100 people were killed, 300 were injured, and a large
amount of property was damaged. See A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND &
RESOURCES ch. 19, at 100 (1974).
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be held responsible. The various passages from conventions and
from the Single Negotiating Text noted above indicate that actors,
corporations, and juridical persons are to be considered responsible
for their activities. The Trinidad and Tobago rules 4 indicate that
an off-shore operator should be primarily responsible for seabed
activities, and the vessel for pollution from that source. A difficulty
with this approach is that if these entities are primarily responsible
to the exclusion of the state of nationality, then it becomes difficult
to obtain adequate satisfaction of a single vessel corporation or a
single platform operation corporation is established. As the interna-
tional community develops ways of piercing through such a corpo-
rate veil, it should be recalled that in the case of the Torrey Canyon,
which triggered international concern for oil pollution, considerable
difficulty was encountered because the Torrey Canyon was the only
asset of the corporation, at least on the primary level. Only by
finding a "sister ship" in another port which belonged to the parent
corporation was some sort of satisfaction obtained. For this reason
it is clear that a state which permits an activity to go forward must
itself be held liable for the results of that activity. The portion of
the Single Negotiating Text dealing with scientific research55 is the
only place wherein the possible responsibility and liability of inter-
national organizations is mentioned. However, it would be useful to
consider a situation where an activity is licensed by an international
seabed authority which had conducted some form of environmental
assessment, and where this activity, as a result of a miscalculation
by the international organization, causes environmental harm.
Should the international organization be immune from liability or
should it, as a juridical person, be sued? What if an international
organization provides funding for a particular activity and the state
involved relies upon the assessment by the international organiza-
tion of the viability of the project? If this results in some form of
environmental harm to the marine environment, should the interna-
tional organization be considered responsible? These are questions
which the Law of the Sea Conference will obviously be unable to
answer, yet which should remain in the minds of those with a con-
tinuing interest in the preservation of the marine environment and
an evolving law of the sea.
The final alternatives to be considered are ways to provide com-
pensation to victims of marine pollution other than by the assess-
Trinidad and Tobago: Draft Articles, supra note 42.
55 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 14, pt. III, Marine Scientific Research.
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ment of liability. There may be a number of circumstances in which
an alternative to assessment of liability is important. One circum-
stance, which has been mentioned above, occurs when there are a
number of sources of pollution, and the single actor responsible
cannot be found. A second occurs when an activity is considered
worthwhile, yet charged with risk, and a means such as insurance
is sought to avoid a strict liability situation. If the objective of the
system is to make whole the victim of pollution then the interna-
tional community has a good deal of work to do to consider alterna-
tives to the liability system. It should be noted that while the 1971
International Fund Convention" was not in force, the major oil pol-
lution carriers, seeking to establish some limit to their own liability,
set up a voluntary agreement concerning liability for oil pollution57
(TOVALOP). This agreement includes a maximum of US$10 mil-
lion for cleanup expenses undertaken by the ship owners. It does not
pay damage claims, but is restricted to governmental cleanup ex-
penses. 8 With the increased uses of the deep seabed for both oil
drilling and the possible taking of manganese nodules, consideration
should be given to the possible establishment of a fund governing
these activities. Drilling for oil most likely will be conducted within
the economic zone of a particular state, but the effects may go well
beyond that. It is difficult at this time to assess completely what the
effects will be, from an environmemtal point of view, of mining
manganese on the deep seabed. In this context one must consider
the shore-based effects as well as the effects on the deep ocean floor
and the effects in the water column above it. However, the funds
themselves may prove inadequate and the question of liability must
revert to the question of advanced planning and assessment of a
particular kind of activity before it is undertaken. At the same time,
the international community will have to move faster than it has
moved if it is to establish acceptable and effective international
standards to govern carriage and exploitation. As will be discussed
in the next section, this must be done both on a regional and domes-
tic level, in addition to the broader international considerations.
V. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC REGULATION
Given the inability, to date, of regulation on a global front to
" Note 47 supra.
" Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, (TO-
VALOP), signed Jan. 7, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 497 (1969).
11 Id. at 500. TOVALOP is supplemented by CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim
Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution) which will provide payments to individuals
on a basis similar to that of the 1971 International Fund Convention, supra note 47.
[VOL. 6:41
CONFERENCE-HARM TO MARINE ENVIRONMENT
achieve effective control of pollution of the marine environment, a
combination of the "umbrella" of the general international com-
munity must be coupled with effective management on a regional
and domestic level." Recognizing this, there have been a small num-
ber of agreements in the past few years which have dealt with prob-
lems on a regional level which thus far have not been treated effec-
tively on a global level. These are the agreements of the northeast
Atlantic states on ocean dumping" and land-based pollution6 and
that of the Baltic states on pollution of that area generally.2 Addi-
tionally, the recent meeting held by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP) on pollution of the Mediterranean Sea
gives hope that the countries directly interested in that region will
recognize their primary responsibility to conclude a system to re-
duce the pollution of that body of water. 3
But even these agreements do not carry effective regulatory
weight, but, in and of themselves, may be considered "mini unbrel-
las." This puts the task of regulating where it most often should be,
namely, within the domestic legal and political processes of states.
That does not mean that states should not act in concert or other-
wise be subject to international standards, but there is a recognition
that the most effective place for enforcement of environmental regu-
lations is on the national level. In the United States, for example,
marine pollution has been considered as part of the control of water
pollution, and the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments 4 included questions of discharges and pollutants into
navigable waters which include the territorial sea and continguous
zones. A National Pollution Discharge Elimimation System 5 cre-
ated under that legislation will be administered by the Environmen-
59 See Stein, The Potential of Regional Arrangements in Managing Man's Environment,
in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
do Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,
done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 262 (1972).
1, Land-Based Source Convention, supra note 50.
62 Baltic Convention, supra note 30.
'3 UNEP sponsored a meeting of all littoral states in Barcelona from January 28 to Febru-
ary 4, 1975. For a discussion of the meeting see UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETING ON THE PROTECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN,
UNEP Doc. UNEP/WG.2/5 (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 464 (1975).
44 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. HI, 1973). It should be noted that on March 26, 1975,
Senator Muskie introduced proposed legislstion to the Senate to extend the concept of naviga-
ble waters to 200 miles by amending the FWPCA and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. Ill, 1973). Muskie stated: "The Law of the Sea negotiations thus
far have pointed to the fact that a Law of the Sea Treaty will not adequately resolve the
pollution problem." 121 CONG. REC. S5069 (daily ed. March 26, 1975).
82 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 11, 1973).
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tal Protection Agency. The Environmental Protection Agency has
issued regulations for discharges under that system.6 Additionally,
prior to the conclusion of the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention,"7
Congress passed the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 197266 which requires permits for transporting and dumping
waste in ocean waters.6 In order to conform certain minor jurisdic-
tional questions to the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention, the Mar-
ine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act was amended in 1974
to incorporate those provisions of the Convention."° Included in this
federal legislation are the costs for federal clean-up of oil pollution
spills." But is this sufficient?
In a suit brought in the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida, a group of shipping owners challenged a
Florida statute" which was designed to complement the federal leg-
islation by assessing strict liability for clean-up costs to the State
of Florida itself, as well as providing compensation to persons in the
State of Florida who might be injured because of oil pollution spills.
The State of Florida with its long Atlantic and Gulf shorelines is
favored both by shipping and tanker traffic, as well as by tourists
and retired persons, who provide a large portion of Florida's income.
In a decision in 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the State of Florida could adopt such legislation which was not
"preempted" by the federal government since indeed the Florida
legislation was to be complementary and was not designed to sup-
plant the standards set forth in the federal legislation." The import-
ance of this case is that in a federal system such as the United States
(which may well be mirrored in federal states in other parts of the
world) the national level is not the smallest level of regulation, but,
indeed, constituent entities within a particular country may have
their own requirments designed to protect themselves from the dan-
gers of pollution.
The action of the State of Florida is not unlike that of certain
states which have urged international fora such as the Law of the
Sea Conference to recognize the right of a coastal state to protect
40 C.F.R. pt. 125 (1975).
S Note 32 supra.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (Supp. II, 1972) and 33 U.S.C. § 1401-44 (Supp. II, 1972).
33 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. II, 1972).
70 33 U.S.C.A. § 1402 (1975) (Cumulative Pocket Part).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (Supp. III, 1973).
72 Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-.21
(1974).
11 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
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its own borders with standards which supplement or complement
those established by the international community.
A recent report of the Congressional Research Service of the
United States Library of Congress describes a number of actions
taken domestically by the Soviet Union to protect its coastal areas
and to improve the marine environment." It would be of interest to
learn whether there are situations involving the constituent entities
of the Soviet Union similar to the one which was raised by the
Askew decision in the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusion to a discussion of this subject necessarily must be
incomplete. Although a patchwork quilt of arrangements has been
developed, 5 questions of liability and responsibility are often left to
"further discussions." The Law of the Sea Conference, even if it
reaches agreement after the March 1976 session, will refer the sub-
ject on to later consideration as well. But despite this, there are
certain statements which can be made. States are responsible for
the harm which they, or those which act under them, permit to
occur to the marine environment. Whether that responsibility will
ever be translated into compensation for the victims of harm is a
more difficult question. However, the international community
must develop appropriate rules and guidelines for implementation
at more effective levels-such as those involving only those states
with a direct interest in the problem. This approach of a global
catalyst which urges on regional management with domestic en-
forcement is the most hopeful and perhaps the soundest approach
for the foreseeable future. The approach must be considered in
terms of what Wolfgang Friedmann called the "International Law
of Cooperation," moving on all levels-universal, regional, bilateral,
and unilateral to avoid further damage to the marine environment
while attempting to enhance its present quality through other posi-
tive channels."6
" A CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SOVIET OCEAN ACTIVITIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY
(1975). The study was prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Commerce (94th
Congress) and for the National Ocean Policy Study.
, See WHO PROTECTS THE OCEANS (J. Hargrove ed. 1975) (pocketpart) (chart).
" W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (1964).
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LIABILITY FOR MARINE ENVIRONMENT POLLUTION
DAMAGE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SEA LAW
A. L. Makovsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of compensation for damage caused by marine pol-
lution arose in international sea law at the close of the 1960's. Until
now the rules providing such compensation were contained in the
national laws of individual states. In most cases these were general
rules on civil liability for causing damage. Special rules of interna-
tional law relating to damage caused by pollution of the sea due to
shipping which were created at the end of the 1960's and at the
beginning of the 1970's, and which still have not come into force,
have greatly influenced the development of related national legisla-
tion in some countries.
Concurrent with the preparation and acceptance of certain
international agreements directly governing or providing for subse-
quent regulation of the liability for marine environment pollution
damage from different sources (such as ships, land-based sources,
etc.) has been a process of discussing and working out the basic
principles of such liability. This work is carried out now within the
framework of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, and its results may essentially influence the further devel-
opment of international and national laws in the field of liability for
marine environment pollution damage.
II. MARINE ENVIRONMENT POLLUTION CONVENTIONS
A. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage
Civil liability for damage caused by oil pollution from ships is
regulated in the most detailed manner in international law. The
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dam-
age' provides for liability "for any pollution damage caused by oil
which has escaped or been discharged from [a] ship"' which was
* Head, a department of the Institute Sojuzmorniiproekt. D.Sc.
[Ed. Note] Done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Oil Pollution Convention]. The Convention has not entered into force. The
parties include Algeria, Fiji, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Morocco and Senegal.
Id. art. III, para. 1.
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"caused on the territory including the territorial sea of a Contract-
ing State . . . . "I The liability for damage compensation is placed
upon the "owner of a ship."' The Convention practically excludes
the possibility of making the state directly responsible for such lia-
bility. The Convention does not apply "to warships or other ships
owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
Government non-commercial service." 5 As to the damage caused by
state commercial ships, the Convention permits the subjection of
each state to suit for such damage,' but this provision is evidently
of no great importance since, in all cases, when a ship owned by a
state is operated by an independent state company, the company
for the purposes of the Convention shall mean "the owner of a
ship."'
The Convention envisages liability as considerably strict on its
grounds and high in its amount. The lack of fault in pollution does
not exonerate the shipowner from his liability; he may be exoner-
ated from liability only in the cases exactly stated in the Conven-
tion, which are limited to acts of war, natural phenomena of an
exceptional character and intentional acts of third parties.' The
limit of liability for each ship is the product of 2000 "francs of
Poincar6" (about US$160) times the registered tonnage of the ship.'
However, it is stipulated that a second "ceiling" of liability, which
is of importance for ships with greater registered tonnage (super-
tankers), amounts to 210 million "francs of Poincar6" (about US$17
million).' 0 In the interest of victims, the Convention prescribes
maintenance of compulsory insurance or other financial security by
shipowners for their possible liability in the sums indicated above."1
The state of the ship's registry must attest to the existence of such
insurance by special certificate.' 2 The state shall not permit a ship
under its flag to trade, unless the ship has obtained the certificate.'"
The state also shall not permit any ship carrying more than 2000
Id. art. II (emphasis added).
Id. art. III, para. 1.
Id. art. XI, para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
Id. art. I, para. 3.
[Ed. Note] Id. art. III, para. 2.
[Ed. Note] Id. art. V, para. 1.
[Ed. Note] Id.
[Ed. Note] Id. art. VII, para. 1. This requirement applies only to ships carrying more
than 2,000 tons of oil. Id.
2 Id. para. 2.
Id. para. 10.
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tons of oil, irrespective of the ship's flag, to enter or leave its ports
without the certificate. 4
B. International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
To provide even greater compensation for oil pollution damage,
the International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 5 was pre-
pared and adopted by an Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) conference. The main provisions of this com-
plicated Convention, from a juridical point of view, concerning the
compensation of damage are as follows:
(1) a "Fund" is established through the contributions of receivers
of crude oil and fuel oil carried by sea-firms, companies, organiza-
tions, etc.;"6
(2) the Fund will compensate for oil pollution damage mainly in
cases where the amount of damage exceeds the limits of shipowner
liability,7 as provided in the 1969 Convention, 8 and also, in some
cases, where the shipowner under the 1969 Convention is exonerated
in general from liability (e.g., when the tanker incident occurred
from a natural phenomenon of an exceptional character);
(3) the aggregate amount of sums paid in the case of an incident
to the victims of oil pollution damage by the shipowner and the
Fund shall not exceed 450 million "francs of Poincar" (US$36 mil-
lion). 19
These Conventions apply only to oil pollution damage compensa-
tion (the 1969 Convention applies also to whale oil). It is possible,
however, to suppose with sufficient confidence that in the near fu-
ture the 1969 Convention will be extended to cover pollution dam-
age from agents other than oil. This issue is included in the work
programme of IMCO, and its discussion in the Legal Committee of
IMCO proved that such a proposal meets with great support.
C. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matters
Liability for pollution damage caused by the discharge of differ-
Id. para. 11.
[ [Ed. Note] Done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 66 Am. J. INT'L L. 712 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as 1971 Oil Pollution Convention]. The Convention has been ratified only by Liberia.
[Ed. Note] Id. art. 10.
[ [Ed. Note] Id. art. 4, para. 1.
[Ed. Note] 1969 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 1.
[ [Ed. Note] 1971 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 15, art. 4, para. 4.
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ent wastes into the sea for the purpose of their dumping is not
established today in international law. The Convention on the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mat-
ter 2 signed on December 29, 1972, in London, stipulates only that
parties are to elaborate "procedures for the assessment of liability 2'
in accordance with "the principles of international law regarding
State responsibility for damage to the environment of other States
or to any other area of the environment, caused by dumping of
wastes and other matter .... 122 The uncertainty of this wording
gives an opportunity to work out the "procedures for the assessment
of liability" in different directions. Obviously depending upon the
decisions of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
the cited text may be filled with different contents, since one of the
objects of the Conference is the revision and determination of the
indicated "principles of international law."
Mention may be made of two factors that will affect the contents
of future rules on liability, predetermined to a certain extent by
article X of the Convention. First, the Convention stipulates a num-
ber of cases where the discharge of wastes (irrespective of the person
responsible) is permissible;2 i.e., the factors exonerating liability
will be stipulated.24 Second, the Convention "shall not apply to
those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under in-
ternational law. ' 25
D. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area
With regard to liability for damage to the marine environment
caused by pollution from land-based sources'and exploration, ex-
ploitation and mining of the seabed, there are some regional inter-
national agreements which do not prescribe directly such liability,
but do provide for subsequent elaboration and adoption of special
provisions on such liability by the parties to the agreement. One
example of this type of regional agreement is the Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 6
signed by the Soviet Union, Denmark, Poland, the Federal Republic
of Germany and Sweden. It is interesting that the "rules concerning
2 [Ed. Note] Adopted Nov. 13, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 626 (1973).
21 [Ed. Note] Id. art. X.
2 Id.
2 [Ed. Note] Id. art. IV, para. 1, subparas. b-c, annex II.
1, [Ed. Note] Id. annex III.
" Id. art. VII, para. 4.
21 [Ed. Note] Done March 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 546 (1974).
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responsibility for damage resulting from acts or omissions in con-
travention of the present Convention," 7 which shall be elaborated
and accepted by the parties, will contain, among other things, "lim-
its of responsibility.""
E. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships
The provisions on the liability for nuclear damage have a particu-
lar place in international law. The existing international agreements
do not contain special rules on liability for pollution damage caused
by radioactive substances, but some cases of such damage are cov-
ered by these agreements.
The Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships29
signed at Brussels provides for liability for "nuclear damage
[which] means loss of life or personal injury and loss or damage to
property which arises out of or results from the radioactive proper-
ties or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive
or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel, radioactive products
or waste ... .30 The Convention shall apply when a nuclear ship
flying the flag of a contracting state is the source of an incident
causing nuclear damage, and when the location of the damage is of
no importance.3
As in other nuclear conventions, the problem of determining the
person liable for damage is worked out on the principles of so-called
"channeled liability." In all cases the "operator" of a nuclear ship
is liable. 2 If a state is the operator, liability for the damage will be
placed on it.3 It should be taken into consideration that the Conven-
tion applies to warships and "other State-owned or State-operated
ships on non-commercial service."34
The operator's liability is limited to the very high limit of 1,500
million "francs of Poincar6" (about US$120 million) for damage
caused by a nuclear incident. 35 The operator shall insure this liabil-
ity or maintain other financial security covering it. The amount,
type and terms of the insurance or security are specified by the state
giving the operator authorization (license) to operate the nuclear
" Id. art. 17.
[Ed. Note] Id.
[Ed. Note] Done May 25, 1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963).
30 Id. art. I, para. 7.
3, Id. art. XIII.
31 Id. art. II, paras. 1-2.
' Id. art. I, para. 4.
31 Id. art. X, para. 3.
35 Id. art. III, para. 1.
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ship.3" If the insurance or the financial security prove to be inade-
quate to compensate the damage, the state shall "ensure the pay-
ment of . . .compensation . . .by providing the necessary funds
'37
Although the Convention states that the operator "shall be abso-
lutely liable for any nuclear damage, ' 38 it nevertheless provides for
circumstances exonerating the operator from liability ("act of war,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection") .
The parties to the Convention are Zaire, the Malagasy Republic,
Portugal, the Netherlands and Syria. Before it may come into force,
it is necessary that at least one state operating a nuclear ship or
authorizing such operation under its flag participate." According to
available information the Federal Republic of Germany intends to
ratify the Convention.
F. The Solution in Contemporary International Law of the Marine
Environment Pollution Problem
The international agreements mentioned above differ in their ob-
jects, contents, period of coming into force and circle of partici-
pants. Moreover, they are not exhaustive of the existing rules of
international law concerning compensation for pollution damage.
Nevertheless, based upon the information given, one can draw cer-
tain conclusions about the solution in contemporary international
law of the problem of liability for damage caused by marine environ-
ment pollution.
First, the liability for pollution damage provided by existing in-
teitnational agreements is civil in nature for damage caused by non-
contractual infringement (tort). Liability comes only in cases of
specific property damage to certain persons who may be physical or
legal persons or a state. Responsibility for damage to the marine
environment as such (i.e., no damage to certain persons), or, in
other words, liability for infringement of obligations to protect the
marine environment which derive from relations between states is
not envisaged by these agreements.
Second, the liability is placed either on the harm doer or person
carrying out a certain kind of activity; e.g., the operator of a nuclear
ship. Generally, a physical or legal person is the subject of such
[Ed. Note] Id. para. 2.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. art. II, para. 1.
"Id. art. VIII.
Id. art. XXIV, para. 1.
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liability. In some cases the state may be liable, not as the subject
of international law, but only because it either caused damage or
directly carried out the appropriate activity. Furthermore, there is
a trend in international agreements to avoid application of general
rules concerning liability for pollution damage to the state, particu-
larly by accepting the immunity of warships and other state owned
ships on noncommercial service.
Third, the place where the damage occurred is of no importance
with regard to the harm doer's responsibility for compensating this
damage. Under the Convention on the Liability of Operators of
Nuclear Ships," the damage is subject to compensation whether it
is caused in the territorial sea or on the high seas. The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage" provides
for compensation for damage caused only in the territory (including
the territorial sea) of the contracting state. 3 This limitation does
not derive from the substance of liability prescribed by the Conven-
tion, but from reasons of appropriateness."
Fourth, the limits to liability for pollution damage stipulated by
existing international agreements are high in comparison with other
cases of civil liability known to international law.
Fifth, this liability is considerably more strict than common civil
liability founded on fault, but, as a rule, it is not absolute.
III. THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
MARINE ENVIRONMENT POLLUTION
While discussing the problems of marine environment pollution
prevention in the course of preparation for the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (in the Subcommittee on the
Seabed) and at the Conference itself (at its second session in Cara-
cas) comparatively little attention was given to liability for damage
caused by such pollution. A number of states submitting their draft
articles regarding the prevention of marine environment pollution
did not include general provisions on such liability. Other states
restricted themselves in their drafts to mentioning the necessity to
work out these provisions. For the time being the Conference has not
[Ed. Note] Note 29 supra.
2 [Ed. Note] Note 1 supra.
,' [Ed. Note] Id. art. II.
The majority of participants in the Conference from which the Convention was adopted
believed that it was inappropriate to extend the Convention to the high seas because (1)
damage from pollution would not be as substantial as near the coast, and (2) such an exten-
sion of the scope of the Convention's application would impede solving a number of problems,
including, first, the problem of jurisdiction of disputes.
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yet begun to elaborate upon any agreed texts of articles concerning
such liability.
In the course of the work of Subcommittee III on the Seabed and
Committee III of the Conference, some states proposed a number of
draft articles on the liability for damage caused by marine environ-
ment pollution. Analysis of these draft articles is of essential inter-
est, since the principles of liability expressed in them differ consid-
erably from those on which the existing international agreements in
this field are based.
A. Draft Articles of the United States
The United States draft articles" provide only for state responsi-
bility to "undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to develop interna-
tional law regarding liability and compensation for pollution dam-
age including, inter alia, procedures and criteria for the determina-
tion of liability, the limits of liability and available defenses."4
Although this rule assumes various interpretations, the lack of men-
tion of state liability and compensation for damage caused to the
"marine environment" in general, and, at the same time, the direct
indication of the necessity for determining "the limits" of liability,
lead one to think that the draft is primarily concerned with the
subsequent development of the civil liability of physical and legal
persons for definite damage caused by pollution.
Furthermore, the United States draft articles envisage a duty of
a state with jurisdiction or control of the activities which cause
damage to the environment of other states "to provide recourse" for
these states and their nationals "to a domestic forum empowered:
(a) to require the abatement of continuing sources of pollution of the
marine environment, and (b) to award compensation for dam-
ages."47
Such a possibility of making a claim by a state, its organizations,
or its nationals in the courts of another state exists also in the
legislation of most countries. In this respect the United States draft
does not propose anything new. At the same time this rule witnesses
the definite aspiration for transferring the problem of liability for
pollution damage to the plane of a general civil claim.
The draft articles on responsibility proposed by the United States
" United States: Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Prevention of Marine Pollution, July 13, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.40.
Id. art. XXH, para. 2 (emphasis added).
,7 Id. para. 3 (emphasis added).
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thus supposes less cardinal changes of the existing regime of liability
for pollution damage when compared with other drafts.
B. Draft Articles of Australia and Norway
In the draft articles of Australia" and Norway,4" as in a number
of other states' draft articles,'" a distinction is made between liabil-
ity for damage caused to areas under the jurisdiction of another
state and liability for damage to the environment beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.
The draft articles of Australia envisage that "[i]f activities under
the jurisdiction or control of one State cause damage to areas under
the jurisdiction of another State . . . the first-mentioned State [is]
internationally liable to the second State and shall pay compensa-
tion accordingly." 5' This rule is reproduced verbatim in the draft
articles of Norway with the difference being: "the first-mentioned
State shall, in accordance with the principles of international law,
be internationally liable ... ."I' Both drafts, although they do not
recognize it directly, give the opportunity of compensation for dam-
age caused not only to particular persons, but also to the "marine
environment" as such.13
Another important feature of both drafts is that the state, under
whose jurisdiction or control the activities which caused the damage
were carried out, is considered liable. However, both drafts deal
with "international responsibility of the State," and the draft of
Norway also deals with responsibility "in accordance with the prin-
ciples of international law." Apparently this must mean that the
responsibility may be incurred only for activities carried out by the
state itself, its bodies and officials. As regards the activities of so-
called "private persons" (nationals and legal persons), the state
shall be internationally liable for damage caused by such activities
,1 Australia: Working Paper on Preservation of the Marine Environment, March 6, 1973,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.27 [hereinafter cited as Australia: Working Paper].
,1 Working Paper-Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine Environment Against
Pollution Submitted by Norway, July 19, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.43 [hereinafter
cited as Norwegian Working Paper].
[ Ed. Note] See, e.g., Draft Articles on Prevention and Control of Pollution in the
Marine Environment Presented by Kenya, July 16, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.41;
Malta: Draft Articles on the Preservation of the Marine Environment, March 16, 1973, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIIIL.33; Draft Articles for a Comprehensive Marine Pollution Convention
Submitted by the Delegation of Canada, March 9, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIIIL.28
[hereinafter cited as Canadian Draft Articles].
5, Australia: Working Paper, supra note 48, principle (e)(i) (emphasis added).
52 Norwegian Working Paper, supra note 49, art. XX, para. 1 (emphasis added).
[ Ed. Note] Id. para. 2; Australia: Working Paper, supra note 48, principle (e)(ii).
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only when there was an omission of the corresponding state contra-
dicting its responsibility to ensure the prevention of the marine
environment pollution of another state.
As to the liability for damage caused to the environment in areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, both drafts provide only
for a responsibility of states to "co-operate to develop effective pro-
cedures for making reparation or paying compensation in respect of
damage. "54
C. Draft Articles of the Federal Republic of Germany
The draft articles of the Federal Republic of Germany5 contain a
specific rule concerning international state liability. The draft arti-
cles provide that if a ship which the flag state has certified as being
in compliance with the requirements of the Convention (obviously
meaning requirements relating to ship design, equipment, crew,
etc.) does not comply with these requirements and pollutes the mar-
ine environment as a result, then the state issuing such certificate
shall be internationally liable for the damage caused to other states
and their nationals and must pay compensation accordingly.56
D. Draft Articles of Canada
The draft articles of Canada57 are identical to those of Australia"
and Norway 9 with regard to liability for damage caused in areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,0 but the Canadian draft
articles go further in deciding the question of liability for damage
caused "in the areas or to the areas under jurisdiction of any State
including the environment of that State."'" In principle, the other
state is responsible only when such damage may be "attributed"
directly to the state.12 In other cases, when nationals of the state
caused the damage, the state is required to "provide recourse with
a view to ensuring equitable compensation for the victims of marine
pollution." 3
"' Norwegian Working Paper, supra note 49, art. XX, para. 2; Australia: Working Paper,
supra note 48, principle (e)(ii).
11 Federal Republic of Germany: Draft Articles-Enforcement of Regulations Concerning
the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Vessel-Source Pollution, Aug. 1, 1974,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.7.
Id. art. I, para. 3.
[ fEd. Note] Canadian Draft Articles, supra note 50.
[Ed. Note] Australia: Working Paper, supra note 48.
[Ed. Note] Norwegian Working Paper, supra note 49.
0 [Ed. Note] Canadian Draft Articles, supra note 50, art. VII, para. 1.
[1 Ed. Note] Id. para. 2 (emphasis added).
11 Id. para. 1.
63 Id. para. 2, subpara. a.
[VOL. 6:59
1976] CONFERENCE-DAMAGE TO MARINE ENVIRONMENT 69
However, in the case when such local remedies are exhausted or
are absent, the state of the victim may present a claim for indemni-
fication to the state which has jurisdiction over the person or per-
sons responsible for the damage. When agreement on the claim to
be settled is unachievable, either state may submit the dispute to
arbitration or to a court in accordance with the procedure fixed by
themselves or a third party designated by them. 4
Thus, this concept of the Canadian draft articles differs in princi-
ple from other draft articles in that general civil liability of "private
persons" for pollution damage under certain conditions can "de-
velop" into that of the state exercising jurisdiction over these per-
sons, and civil law relations respecting such damage can be substi-
tuted for those of international law. Such substitution of one theory
of liability for another is a dangerous (and lame) point of this
concept. In substance, any rejection of damage compensation may
be considered as the situation under which all remedies are
exhausted.
E. Joint Draft Articles of Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru and
Uruguay, and Draft Articles of Kenya
The most laconic and, at the same time, strict rule concerning
liability for pollution damage is contained in the joint draft articles
of Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay, 5 in which it is said that
"[s]tates shall be responsible for any damage caused to the marine
environment of other States or to the international sea by discharges
from their territory, waters subject to their sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion and vessels flying their flag.""6 The draft articles generally ex-
clude the liability of physical and legal persons for pollution dam-
age, and transfer the problem of such damage compensation to the
plane of state relations. Moreover, it involves a number of questions
regarding compensation for damage caused to the "international
sea":
(1) How and by whom is the amount of this damage to be deter-
mined?
(2) Who has the right to claim the damages?
(3) To whom shall the appropriate funds be paid and for what are
they intended?
The draft articles do not answer these questions. They also leave
Id. subpara. b.
'5 Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay: Working Paper-Preservation of the Marine
Environment, July 24, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.Hh/L.47.
" Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
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unclear the priorities of claims of one state against another, who
shall settle controversies among them, and who shall determine the
required procedures.
An identical rule, on its merits, is proposed in the draft articles
of Kenya,"7 in which it is said that "[s]tates shall be responsible
for damage caused by their activities, those of their nationals, physi-
cal or juridical, and others under their control or registration to any
part of the marine environment."6
IV. CONCLUSION
From the above analysis it is clear that pollution damage reme-
dies in international (and national) law are achieved mainly by
means of the establishment, regulation and expansion of civil liabil-
ity of persons who directly cause the damage, namely, physical or
legal persons. In the course of preparation for the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and at the Conference
itself, a number of proposals were suggested regarding the defining
of rules on state liability for damage where the state exercises juris-
diction or causes the damage itself.
There is no opposition, in principle, to proposals which would
make the state responsible for the compensation of damage caused
by the state itself, its bodies, or its officials. But it is necessary to
consider that this may be realized by establishment of "the interna-
tional liability" of the state, by extension to the state of the same
rules of civil liability which apply to its nationals and legal persons
for the same damage, but with the retaining of the jurisdictional
immunity of the "state-respondent." The practical consequences in
both cases may be profoundly different. The first remedy appar-
ently is proposed in the draft articles of Norway"9 and Australia. ' "
The model of the second remedy may be the liability of the state
operator under the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nu-
clear Ships."
Introduction of state liability for pollution damage caused by its
bodies and nationals does not seem well-founded. The system of
rules concerning civil liability of persons causing damage resulting
from pollution is only taking shape in the international law. The
1, Kenya: Draft Articles for the Preservation and the Protection of the Marine Environment
for Inclusion in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, July 23, 1974, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.3/L.2.
Id. art. 29.
[Ed. Note] Norwegian Working Paper, supra note 49.
70 [Ed. Note] Australia: Working Paper, supra note 48.
11 [Ed. Note] Note 29 supra.
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agreements which have been approved already and which will soon
come into force7" ensure the payment of compensation for damages
covered by the agreements. Of course, it is necessary that the scope
of these agreements be expanded and that identical agreements be
concluded to compensate for marine pollution damage from other
sources (i.e., from land based sources, from the exploitation of the
seabed, etc.). Substitution of this liability for that of the state may
result in the state's becoming a permanent defendant in many court
and arbitration cases.
The practical consequences of the development, under certain
conditions, of the concept of the liability of physical and legal per-
sons into that of the state exercising its jurisdiction over them73 will
depend on the content of these Conventions. It should be reasonable
to place such liability on a state only as a sanction of international
law if the state does not provide adequate remedial legal processes
(i.e., publication of the necessary legislation, opportunity to bring
claims in court, etc.) for the setting of certain minimum levels of
liability of its nationals and governmental bodies for pollution dam-
age.
There is a definite trend revealed in the draft articles submitted
to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
which seeks to introduce into international law the rule of "compen-
sation of damage caused to the marine environment." It is necessary
to note that there is a certain contradiction in this concept as stated.
When such a measure of liability as "the compensation of damage"
is used, the damage is compensated so as to rehabilitate the prop-
erty status of the subject suffering this damage. With regard to the
damage caused to the marine environment within the territorial sea,
one may say the damage was suffered by the corresponding state;
but regarding the damage caused to the marine environment on the
high seas, it is impossible to find such a specific victim.
72 [Ed. Note] 1969 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 1; 1971 Oil Pollution Convention,
supra note 15.
71 Canadian Draft Articles, supra note 50.
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PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT FROM
POLLUTION
Richard A. Frank*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the following six issues relating to the protec-
tion of the marine environment from pollution in the context of the
Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea: (1) vessel-
source pollution; (2) environmental control of deep seabed mining;
(3) land-based sources of pollution; (4) pollution from resource ac-
tivities in the economic zone; (5) environmental monitoring and
assessment; and (6) the double standard. The paper describes what
happened with respect to these issues at the Spring 1975 Conference
session at Geneva, and then identifies and discusses what problems
relating to them will arise in a state of affairs existing after the
conclusion of the Law of the Sea negotiations.
II. VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION
A. Issues at the Geneva Session
At the Law of the Sea Conference, the basic conflict concerning
vessel-source pollution has been between those states desiring to
protect maritime interests and those desiring to protect environ-
mental interests. Three alternative schemes have been proposed
and debated. The first scheme, favored by maritime countries,
would continue to vest primary enforcement responsibility in the
flag state and standard-setting responsibility in an international
organization as well as the flag state. A second, proposed by coastal
states with a primary interest in environmental protection, also
entails standard-setting by an international organization, but would
place primary standard-setting and enforcement responsibility in
coastal states with respect to pollution occurring within a specified
distance from the coastline. A third proposal is intended to be a
middle ground. It would also depend upon standard-setting by in-
ternational organizations but would give port states primary
standard-setting responsibilities with respect to vessels using their
* Director, International Project, Center for Law and Social Policy; Member, Secretary of
State's Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea. A.B., Harvard University, 1958; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1962. While working in the Department of State from 1962 until 1969,
the author was Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs and Assistant Legal Ad-
viser for Economic Affairs.
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ports, and enforcement powers for violations which may have oc-
curred both inside and outside the port area and indeed anywhere.
Vessel-source pollution control has been the most controversial
environmental issue discussed during the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. Because Committee III, which handles environmental and
scientific research matters, had been unable to resolve the problem,
it was delegated at the Geneva session to the Evensen Group (a
representative group of delegations under the direction of the head
of the Norwegian delegation). The Evensen Group produced several
revisions of draft articles' dealing with the regulation of pollution
from vessels, the most recent of which was a sixth revision dated
April 16, 1975. The Evensen Group did not complete its negotia-
tions, particularly with regard to enforcement issues, and will con-
tinue them in intersessional meetings.
The first issue discussed by the Evensen Group was whether flag
states should be required to apply international measures to their
vessels. Several countries (including Greece, Spain, and some devel-
oping countries) strongly opposed any such obligation. The United
States, Canada, and other maritime powers supported a flag state
obligation.
The next problem related to the nature and extent of the rights
of coastal states to establish pollution control regulations for vessels
in the territorial sea. Maritime states and military interests argued
for strict limitations on such rights. They urged that coastal states
should only be able to establish regulations relating to discharge of
pollutants, with some adding that such regulations must not affect
the construction, design, equipment, or manning requirements of
vessels. The Soviet Union advocated this approach in draft articles'
which would permit coastal states to establish regulations, in addi-
tion to international regulations, on vessel-source pollution within
the territorial sea, but with the proviso that such regulations would
be "in conformity with international regulations and may not deal
with the design, construction, equipment, operation, or manning of
a foreign ship . . . ."
The prevailing view is probably the one which was vigorously
advocated by many developing countries, Canada, and Australia, to
the effect that coastal states should have standard-setting and regu-
I The Evensen Group's draft articles were informal documents of limited distribution
which were not given official United Nations document numbers.
2 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Addition Draft Articles on Prevention of Pollution
of the Marine Environment, March 25, 1975, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.25.
' Id. art. 2, para. 1.
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latory authority over vessels in the territorial sea. The approach
reflected in the most recent Evenson text involves broad coastal
state rights, with international straits excepted and the innocent
passage doctrine maintained.
With regard to coastal state rights to establish pollution control
standards and regulations for vessels in areas beyond the territorial
sea within an economic resource zone, the latest Evensen draft con-
tains three basic alternatives: (1) full standard-setting rights; (2)
standard-setting rights restricted to discharge standards; and (3)
standard-setting rights restricted to vulnerable and/or special areas.
However, meaningful negotiations were not conducted on this mat-
ter.
While the Group of 77 has not yet been able to reach a formal
position on this issue, some developing countries have indicated
that they are less interested in securing a broad right to set stan-
dards for vessels in wide zones off their coasts than in securing broad
rights in "special areas." One reason for the waning interest of some
developing countries in coastal state standard-setting power ap-
pears to be the fear that developed countries would use such author-
ity to impose economic burdens on the vessels of developing coun-
tries. Developing countries, especially those with aspirations for siz-
able merchant marines, believe that they most often will have "last
year's models" which will not be equipped with the best pollution
control equipment.
Many countries continue to oppose any blanket standard-setting
authority for coastal states over areas outside the territorial seas,
but some of these countries have not opposed special areas concepts
which, for example, could provide Canada and the Soviet Union
with authority to protect Arctic waters from vessel-source pollution.
At Geneva the United States continued to advocate port state
standard-setting rights with some but not substantial support.
In the enforcement area, maritime powers continued to insist
upon perpetuating the flag state system, while offering as a "com-
promise" a regime under which port states would have enforcement
authority over narrowly defined types of violations (e.g., those
which may cause significant damage to the port state), unless the
flag state preempts the port state by initiating prior enforcement
proceedings. The Soviet Union draft articles provide for coastal
state enforcement responsibility in the territorial sea,4 and enforce-
ment authority beyond that to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate seri-
I Id. art. 2.
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ous imminent pollution of the coastline or related interests if there
is reasonable expectation of "major harmful consequences" from an
"incident."5
As noted above, developing countries appear to have shifted their
focus to securing broad enforcement rights. They strongly favor
coastal state enforcement of violations of international standards
within broad areas off their coasts. Insistence upon such rights in
an economic resource zone is fully consistent, of course, with their
conception of the zone, and if granted, would satisfy in large part
their "sovereignty" claims for this area. Several countries have sug-
gested that a new enforcement zone could be less extensive, includ-
ing, for example, the territorial sea plus a relatively small "contig-
uous" zone beyond.' India has proposed a 30-mile enforcement zone
including a 12-mile territorial sea and an 18-mile contiguous zone.7
Some maritime powers have indicated interest in a coastal state
enforcement regime provided that there are either very limited or
no standard-setting rights for coastal states beyond the territorial
sea. They have argued that coastal state enforcement should be
limited to international discharge standards. Obviously the willing-
ness of maritime powers to accept full enforcement rights will in-
crease if the enforcement zone is relatively small.
The United States continued to advocate port state enforcement
without flag state preemption, including enforcement by the port
state of violations of international requirements wherever such vio-
lations occur. As yet, the United States has had little success in
securing strong support for this position from maritime powers.
Regulation of vessel-source pollution in straits is being dealt with
primarily in Committee II of the Conference. Major maritime and
military powers continue to resist any attempts to secure coastal
state standard-setting rights within straits, and remain cool to any
coastal state enforcement rights. However, the maritime powers
may be willing to accept a very narrow coastal state standard-
setting right; i.e., designation of traffic lanes and limited coastal
state enforcement rights (e.g., for violation of internationally estab-
lished traffic separation schemes). A group of 14 states (chaired by
Fiji), including the major straits states, privately surfaced a set of
I d. art. 4.
See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of Nat'l Jurisdiction, Report, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, vol. 4, at 1, 47, U.N. Doc. A/9021
(1973).
' Statement of Mr. Frazer (India) before the Second Committee of the Third U.N. Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 9, 1974, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.31.
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proposed articles8 which provide for some control by straits states
over vessels and which appear to have the support of the United
Kingdom.' These articles require vessels in transit to comply with
international safety and pollution regulations. The straits state is
allowed to prescribe both traffic separation rules, with the approval
of the competent international organization, and rules "giving ef-
fect" to international pollution rules. Under such a proposal straits
states would have no enforcement rights. The Informal Single Nego-
tiating Text'0 prepared by Committee II" followed this regime in
articles 34-44.
Vessel-source pollution is covered in articles 20, 26-39, and 42 of
the Committee III Single Negotiating Text." With respect to
standard-setting, (1) flag states must adopt "effective laws and reg-
ulations" which shall be "no less effective than generally accepted
international rules and standards";'" (2) coastal state authority in
the territorial sea is unclear because coastal states may establish
laws "more effective" than international measures, but these na-
tional laws must "conform" with the international measures"
(under the Committee II Single Negotiating Text, coastal states
may establish environmental laws relating to the territorial sea,' 5
but not for design, construction, manning, or equipment of foreign
ships, or other matters covered by international treaties unless the
treaty specifically authorizes coastal state standards);'6 and (3)
coastal states may adopt measures for special circumstances if the
appropriate international organization approves" and may unilater-
ally adopt such measures "where particularly severe climactic con-
ditions create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation,
and where pollution of the marine environment, according to ac-
cepted scientific criteria, could cause major harm to or irreversible
These also were informal documents of limited distribution which were not given official
United Nations document numbers.
I Compare the articles formally submitted by the United Kingdom at Caracas, found in
United Kingdom: Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and Straits, July 3, 1974, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3.
"* THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIAT-
ING TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATING TEXT].
Single negotiating texts were prepared by each committee at the request of the Conference
chairman.
Id. pt. II.
2 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment.
13 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 20, para. 2.
1' Id. pt. I1, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 20, para. 3.
,1 Id. pt. II, art. 18, para. 1.
Id. pt. II, art. 18, para. 2.
,7 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 20, para. 4.
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disturbance of the ecological balance."'" Port state standard-setting
authority is not mentioned.
The Committee III Single Negotiating Text provided for enforce-
ment as follows: (1) flag states must enforce international standards
wherever violations occur; 9 (2) port states may enforce violations of
international discharge standards occurring within a distance from
the coast (such distance to be decided later)," except that the flag
state may preempt this right;' (3) coastal states may enforce inter-
national discharge and construction standards for vessels passing
through their territorial sea,22 subject also to flag state preemption2 3
(this right appears to be inconsistent with or to be limited by the
Committee II Single Negotiating Text which provides that passage
through the territorial sea is innocent24 unless, with respect to the
environment, there is an "act of wilful pollution, contrary to the
provisions of the present Convention") ;25 and (4) coastal states may
enforce an illegal discharge off another state's coast at the request
of that state, 6 subject to the same preemption." The only penalties
that can be imposed by coastal states are monetary. 8
B. Issues for the Future
Under the new treaty, coastal states will be empowered to exercise
standard-setting and enforcement powers in the territorial sea and
probably in the economic zone. Coastal states may have been enti-
tled to exercise some of this authority in the past, but they have not
been inclined to do so. The very fact that a new international con-
vention on the law of the sea reiterates a right and extends it further
seaward is likely to mean that many coastal states now will choose
to exercise these standard-setting and enforcement rights. This ex-
ercise should be both effective and reasonable. There is in reality
no standard-setting norm in the convention. The norm that should
be applied is that of the best available pollution prevention technol-
ogy. By the same token, efforts should be made to assure that stan-
dards are set and enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion; that
" Id. pt. Il, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 20, para. 5.
' Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 25, para. (b).
21 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 27, para. 3.
21 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 28, para. 5.
2 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 28, para. 1.
23 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 28, para. 5.
2, Id. pt. II, art. 16, para. 1.
I Id. pt. II, art. 16, para. 2, subpara. (h).
" Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 28, para. 2.
2' Id. pt. I1, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 28, para. 5.
21 Id. pt. Ill, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 28, para. 9.
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standards achieve an environmental purpose and are not merely
subterfuge for other objectives; and that states do not set higher
standards for foreign vessels than for domestic vessels or, without
good reason, for vessels passing the coast as opposed to vessels enter-
ing the port.
Flag states have been notorious in the past for their failure to
establish adequate vessel pollution control standards and to enforce
those standards. To a great extent, the responsibility for the preven-
tion of vessel-source pollution, especially in international areas, will
be placed on flag states. Measures such as publicizing noncompli-
ance will need to be taken within those jurisdictions and by other
governments or nationals of other governments to assure that the
flag states will comply with the environmental requirements in the
convention.
The convention may not clarify whether a passage which threat-
ens pollution of the territorial sea is innocent. Domestic regulations
on this subject are likely to be promulgated, and the issue at some
point may be the subject of dispute settlement.
Although it would not be in the environmental interest to include
a provision in the convention permitting a flag state to preempt
coastal state enforcement, such a provision in some form may re-
main. This could result in a new wave of scrutiny by one state of
the administrative or judicial processes of another state, since
preempted coastal states will want to assure that violators doing
damage to their zones or coastal areas are prosecuted.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL OF DEEP-SEABED MINING
A. Issues at the Geneva Session
During the deep seabed negotiations thus far, the central environ-
mental issues have involved the nature and extent of the pollution
control powers of the seabed authority and the nature and composi-
tion of the environmental regulatory body within the seabed author-
ity.
The Single Negotiating Text for Committee I contains provisions
relating to the marine environment which probably accurately re-
flect to a substantial extent a general consensus of the delegations.
Article 12, entitled Protection of the Marine Environment, directs
a seabed authority, with respect to activities in the international
area, to take appropriate measures for the adoption and implemen-
tation of international rules for, inter alia:
(a) The prevention of pollution and contamination, and other
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and
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of interference with the ecological balance of the marine environ-
ment, particular attention being paid to the need for protection
from the consequences of such activities as drilling, dredging, exca-
vation, disposal of waste, construction and operation or mainte-
nance of installations, pipelines and other devices related to such
activities;
(b) The protection and conservation of the natural resources of
the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of
the marine environment. 9
One of the commissions within the seabed authority is the "Tech-
nical Commission" established in article 31. The Technical Com-
mission must include individuals with qualifications, inter alia,
with respect to "ocean and environmental sciences and maritime
safety ... ."I' The Technical Commission is required to formulate
and submit environmental rules and regulations3 to a "Council"3
and to "[p]repare assessments of the environmental implications
of activities in the area and consider and evaluate these implica-
tions before recommending the rules, regulations and procedures"
under which deep seabed mining will be conducted. While article
31 requires environmental assessments which must be considered
before the recommendation of rules, regulations and procedures,
there is no express requirement for the preparation of environmental
assessments prior to the granting of licenses or prior to opening
particular areas to exploitation.
Finally, Committee I's Single Negotiating Text includes annex I,
entitled Basic Conditions of General Survey Exploration and
Exploitation. Article 12, paragraph 17, of the annex, with respect to
the rules, regulations, and procedures, states:
The Authority shall take into account in adopting rules and regula-
tions for the protection of the marine environment the extent to
which activities in the Area such as drilling, dredging, coring and
excavation, as well as disposal, dumping and discharge in the Area
of sediment or wastes and other matters will have a harmful effect
on the marine environment."
The annex provides further, with regard to unique areas of environ-
mental importance, that "the Authority may refuse to open any
I Id. pt. I, art. 12.
30 Id. pt. I, art. 31, para. 1.
1, Id. pt. I, art. 31, para. 2, subpara. (i).
11 The Council is the executive organ of the seabed authority to be established by the
convention. Id. pt. I, art. 27.
' Id. pt. I, art. 31, para. 2, subpara. (v).
' Id. annex I, art. 12, para. 17.
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part or parts of the Area . . .when the available data indicates the
risk of irreparable harm to a unique environment or unjustifiable
interference with other uses of the Area.""
B. Issues for the Future
Assuming that an environmental regime approximating the above
is in fact adopted in the convention, the following problems will
arise with respect to the environment and deep seabed mining after
the conclusion of the convention.
Deep sea mining may commence and may be authorized during
provisional application of the convention (that is, after the conven-
tion is concluded and signed, but before it receives adequate ratifi-
cations to come into force) and after it enters into force, but before
the authority is established and before it prepares environmental
regulations. Some of that unregulated deep sea mining could well
create adverse environmental effects. Furthermore, techniques and
equipment will be developed without benefit of international envi-
ronmental criteria, and the subsequent imposition of environmental
requirements that would inhibit the use of those techniques or
equipment will be extremely difficult. Assuming environmental reg-
ulations are not included in the convention pending the adoption of
environmental regulations by the authority, the only effective envi-
ronmental controls will be exercised by individual governments over
their nationals or vessels. In order to assure that at least that degree
of environmental control takes place, efforts on a national level
should be undertaken to see that sound national environmental
regulations are adopted before a state's vessels or nationals engage
in deep sea mining.
One fundamental deficiency with the Single Negotiating Text is
that the seabed authority does not have an internal organ whose
primary function is environmental protection. The Technical Com-
mission, for example, will have both developmental and conserva-
tion and assessment responsibilities, thereby creating a conflict of
interest. This conflict will operate less to the detriment of the envi-
ronment if members of the Technical Commission have a strong
environmental interest. The Technical Commission must include
individuals who have backgrounds in "ocean and environmental
sciences, ' 36 and efforts should be made, following the conclusion of
the convention, to see that the Technical Commission does contain
a significant number of persons with an environmental perspective.
Id. annex I, art. 3, para. (b).
I' d. pt. I, art. 31, para. 1.
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The Technical Commission will propose rules and regulations for
the protection of the marine environment37 and, before doing so, will
prepare assessments of the environmental implications of deep
seabed activities.38 Every effort should be made to see: (a) that the
Technical Commission undertakes its environmental assessment
task immediately after it is established; (b) that the environmental
rules and regulations are adequately broad in scope (e.g., some dele-
gations have attempted to exclude processing at sea from the regula-
tory scope of the seabed authority) and effective; and (c) that the
Technical Commission continues to engage in environmental assess-
ments as necessary, whether or not such assessments are related to
the promulgation of rules and regulations (i.e., that the Technical
Commission prepare such assessments for new licensing or the open-
ing of new areas for development etc.).
The Technical Commission, unlike most multilateral entities,
will supervise activities in the area and thus will enforce environ-
mental regulations." Efforts should be undertaken to assure that
the Technical Commission actively pursues that function. If it does
so successfully, the concept of environmental enforcement by inter-
national bodies should be considered in other contexts, e.g., vessel-
source pollution.
The seabed authority undoubtedly will establish some formula for
relationships among nongovernmental organizations, like organiza-
tions interested in and with expertise in environmental protection.
Such organizations may have, for example, a form of consultative
or observer status similar to that utilized by specialized agencies.
The type of association ultimately formulated should provide for an
effective working relationship which permits such organizations to
contribute to the standard-setting and enforcement responsibilities
of the seabed authority.
IV. LAND-BASED POLLUTION
A. Issues at the Geneva Session
It has been generally assumed that the law of the sea convention
would treat the land-based pollution problem in vague terms, and
that assumption has turned out to be true. The informal working
group of Committee III has agreed on a text regarding obligations
of states to adopt measures for land-based sources of marine pollu-
31 Id. pt. I, art. 31, para. 2, subpara. (i).
31 Id. pt. I, art. 31, para. 2, subpara. (v).
3' Id. pt. I, art. 31, para. 2, subpara. (vi).
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tion, and this draft text has been adopted as article 16 of the Com-
mittee III Single Negotiating Text. It merely requires states to "es-
tablish national laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and con-
trol" such pollution.'" No norm is suggested. The provision does not
provide that such national rules conform to internationally estab-
lished rules and regulations; rather, states are obligated only to take
any internationally agreed measures "into account" in establishing
national plans."
Regarding establishment of international measures, states are
requested in vague language to "endeavour" to establish global and
regional rules and standards;" i.e., there is no firm obligation to do
so within a specific period of time, and the draft text leaves open
the question whether, if international measures are adopted, they
will be based on an economic double standard. With respect to the
double standard, article 16 states that international measures must
take into account "the economic capacity of developing countries
and their need for economic development." 3
B. Issues for the Future
Since the law of the sea convention apparently will not assign to
a specific international organization the responsibility for establish-
ing international standards for land-based sources of pollution and
since it does not establish a date by which a conference should be
convened to adopt such rules, it is quite possible that no organiza-
tion will take an initiative and that an international conference on
this subject may not be called in the near future. Efforts should be
undertaken to assure that some international agency, perhaps the
United Nations Environment Program, does assume that responsi-
bility, or at least that a state or group of states convenes an interna-
tional meeting to establish international land-based pollution stan-
dards and to establish some sort of ongoing international infrastruc-
ture in this area.
The text of the convention will be particularly vague about the
obligation of states to take actions to prevent, reduce, and control
land-based sources of pollution. Furthermore, there will be no re-
quirement that states should inform any international organization
or other states about their implementation of this obligation. Efforts
should be undertaken to assure that each country does in fact com-
" Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 16, para. 1.
I d.
,2 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 16, para. 3.
I d.
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ply with this albeit vague obligation in a good faith manner. Some
international organization should ultimately assume some responsi-
bility for playing a coordinating and information-disseminating role
concerning the environmental standards to be set and enforcement
measures to be taken.
V. POLLUTION FROM RESOURCE ACTIVITY IN THE ECONOMIC ZONE
A. Issues at the Geneva Session
Just as with land-based sources of pollution, it has been assumed
that the convention would obligate states to establish laws and regu-
lations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine envi-
ronment arising from activities concerning exploration and exploita-
tion of the seabed in the economic zone. Such a provision has been
negotiated in the working group of Committee III, and the provision
is included in article 17 of Committee III's Single Negotiating Text.
The key debate has revolved around the question of whether
states should be required to adhere to international measures with
respect to these activities. At the Geneva session a negotiating group
was established by the chairman of the working group of Committee
III to deal with this issue. Its efforts resulted in a proposed article
incorporating a binding international-measures concept. It provides
that coastal state laws, regulations, and measures designed to pre-
vent and control pollution from zonal activities "shall be no less
effective than generally accepted international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures."" Significantly, members
of the maritime powers, known as the Group of 17 (including the
United Kingdom, which previously had opposed this approach) in-
dicated that this text was acceptable. Their agreement was largely
based upon the incorporation of the phrase "generally accepted" to
modify "international rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures." These adjectives arguably give considerable dis-
cretion to states in determining which international measures they
must accept.
When the draft text was presented to the informal working group,
however, it was strenuously opposed by developing countries, led by
Brazil and India. All of the familiar arguments were made against
binding measures, including contentions that such an obligation
infringes on coastal state sovereignty over resources in the economic
" Proposals or Amendments Informally Introduced as Conference Room Papers but not
Agreed Upon by the Informal Sessions on Item 12 (Preservation of the Marine Environment)
during the Third Session of the Conference, May 6, 1975, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.3/L.30.
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resource zone. Brazil and India added a double standard argument,
noting that the proposal did not provide for differing obligations
based on stages of economic development and that binding interna-
tional measures could impose unfair economic burdens on develop-
ing countries.
Speaking in defense of the draft text, the Chairman of the infor-
mal working group stated that he had been informed by experts that
expenses for adequate pollution control equipment for offshore oil
and gas development would be relatively low, would be borne by
financially secure corporate bodies and, therefore, that the eco-
nomic impact of such a requirement should not be a major concern.
The United States was the only delegation which made a strong
statement in favor of the binding international-standard concept,
emphasizing the following points: (1) knowledge concerning pollu-
tion control mechanisms for Outer Continental Shelf development
is advanced and widespread, and relatively little time or effort
would be needed to develop a set of minimum international mea-
sures; (2) the economic costs of providing adequate protection, par-
ticularly from Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas development, are
not expected to be large; and (3) the concept of "generally ac-
cepted" international measures provides considerable flexibility for
states, is consistent with a scenario which would involve a subse-
quent conference to develop international measures, and implies
that widespread acceptance of measures is a precondition to an
obligation to conform to them.
Negotiations were also impeded by another major controversy
sparked by the draft text. This involved the nature of activities and
installations in an economic resource zone over which coastal states
will have pollution control jurisdiction. The developing countries,
led by Brazil, argued for language which in effect would give coastal
states authority over any activity or installation in areas under na-
tional jurisdiction. This, of course, is supportive of their general
approach that the economic resource zone is essentially an area of
sovereign rights. However, this jurisdictional issue is a basic issue
before Committee II (the draft text under discussion in effect
deferred this issue to Committee II) and many countries viewed
Brazil's obstinance on this issue in Committee III as simply a means
for delaying any progress until this jurisdictional issue was resolved
in favor of the developing countries in Committee II. The major
military powers wanted to avoid anything in any part of a treaty
implying that coastal states can take action with respect to any
military installations and were particularly sensitive to claims to
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
control environmental harm caused by cables, pipelines, or activi-
ties in the water column. On the other hand, from an environmental
point of view, it may well be important to ensure that coastal states
have pollution control jurisdiction over any activities or installa-
tions likely to result in harm to the marine environment and that
any international regulations which are applicable relate to all such
activities and installations.
One compromise, suggested by Colombia, would require that na-
tional measures to control pollution from zonal activities be "no less
effective" than generally accepted international measures. Article
17 of the negotiating text adopts the Colombian proposal and pro-
vides that national measures shall be "no less effective than gener-
ally accepted international rules . . . . I' The article defers to the
ultimate Committee II text the types of activities over which coastal
states will have pollution control jurisdiction in the zone.
B. Issues for the Future
The law of the sea convention will leave three residual issues
relating to control of pollution arising from activities concerning
exploration and exploitation in the economic zone. First, states will
be obligated to establish international laws and regulations to pre-
vent, reduce, and control such pollution." The international com-
munity will need to monitor these state laws to see that they are put
into effect, that they are adequate, and that they are implemented.
Secondly, states, acting through the appropriate international or-
ganization or by diplomatic conference, are to establish global and
regional rules, standards, and recommended practices and proce-
dures. 7 However, the convention will not establish a time frame for
doing this, nor will it vest responsibility in any particular intergov-
ernmental organization or in any state to convene a diplomatic con-
ference. Efforts should be undertaken promptly to see that some
international organization assumes jurisdiction over this issue and
to see that the international rules and standards are developed in a
timely fashion. Third, the standard describing the relationship be-
tween the national and international standards is ambiguous; the
national standards are to be "no less effective than generally ac-
cepted international rules . . . ."I Some procedure will need to be
developed to scrutinize national standards to see that, if they are
11 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 10, pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, art. 17, para. 1.
40 Id.
7 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 17, para. 3.
" Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 17, para. 1.
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not consistent with international standards, they are "no less effec-
tive." A burden should be placed on the coastal state to demon-
strate that its standards, if different from the international stan-
dards, are in fact "no less effective."
VI. MONITORING AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS
A. Issues at the Geneva Session
Both the monitoring of pollution and the preparation of environ-
mental assessments regarding pollution have been discussed at the
Law of the Sea Conference, and texts on these subjects have been
negotiated in the working group of Committee III. The working
group texts are incorporated into the Committee III Single Negoti-
ating Text as articles 13 and 14 in the case of monitoring, and as
article 15 in the case of environmental assessments.
The text on monitoring is rather weak, providing in pertinent part
that "[sitates shall, consistent with the rights of other States en-
deavour, as much as is practicable . . . to observe, measure, evalu-
ate and analyze . . . risks or effects of pollution of the marine envi-
ronment."49 Moreover, states are only obliged to make available
"reports of the results" of monitoring, not the actual data uncov-
ered, to the "United Nations Environment Programme or any other
competent international or regional organizations . "..."50 Unfor-
tunately, states could not see fit to accept an unqualified obligation
to undertake and disclose monitoring activities.
Shortly after the Geneva session commenced, the United States
introduced a quite comprehensive and strong environmental assess-
ment article.' It provided that states would be required, with re-
spect to activities under their jurisdiction or control "which may
reasonably be expected to create a risk of significant pollution of the
marine environment": (1) to "endeavor" to prepare assessments of
potential environmental implications of such activities; (2) to pro-
vide such environmental assessments to competent international
organizations, which in turn would be required to provide them to
other states; (3) to consult with other states and competent interna-
tional organizations with a view toward minimizing and preventing
adverse environmental consequences; and (4) to provide assistance
in particular to developing countries preparation of assessments.
The article proved quite controversial, with many countries
" Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 13, para. 1.
:0 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 14.
1' This was an informal document of limited distribution which was not given an official
United Nations document number.
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sharply attacking it. The major objections centered on two facets of
the proposal: (1) the requirement to consult with other states re-
garding proposed projects which might be environmentally harmful;
and (2) the requirement to provide detailed environmental assess-
ments of projects to other states. India and the Soviet Union ob-
jected to a consultation obligation. As regards communication of
environmental assessments, many countries objected for commer-
cial and political reasons to a requirement to provide detailed infor-
mation concerning major projects within their jurisdiction or control
to other countries. Several argued that the kind of detail required
in impact statements done in the United States under its National
Environmental Policy Act 52 was entirely inappropriate in the inter-
national area.
Article 15 of the Single Negotiating Text accommodates these
strongly held concerns. Essentially, it provides that states "shall, as
far as practicable, assess the potential effects of . . . [potentially
harmful] activities on the marine environment and shall communi-
cate reports of the results of such assessments"53 to competent inter-
national organizations, which in turn shall provide them to individ-
ual states. The text contains no obligation of consultation with re-
gard to potentially harmful activities, nor does it even mention the
desirability of consultation. States are only obliged to make avail-
able reports of assessments (which very likely will consist of watered
down, generalized summaries), rather than the environmental as-
sessments themselves.
B. Issues for the Future
Subsequent to the adoption of a convention with monitoring and
environmental assessment articles, the national focus should be
toward assuring that these articles are implemented so as to give the
greatest degree of analysis and disclosure. First, in many cases,
states will need to adopt national laws requiring monitoring and
preparation of environmental assessments and establishing the in-
stitutional framework within which these will be achieved. Second,
channels will have to be established so that monitoring reports and
environmental assessment reports will be made available on a regu-
lar basis to the relevant international organizations and thereafter
to concerned states. Third, these provisions of the convention
should be interpreted in the future in the broadest possible manner.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
S3 NEGOTIATINc. TEXT, supra note 10, pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, art. 15.
[VOL. 6:73
1976] CONFERENCE-PROTECTION OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT 89
States not desiring to prepare environmental assessments could
understate potential effects of potentially harmful activities and
claim they are not obligated to prepare assessments with respect to
these activities. The threshold or trigger point requiring an environ-
mental assessment should not be an unduly high one-any poten-
tially harmful activity should result in an assessment. Furthermore,
even though states are only obligated to provide reports and not
assessments, a trend could be developed under which some states
provide the full assessment in the hope that others will follow suit;
doing so will help assure that states are in fact complying with their
obligation to undertake adequate assessments and will also aid re-
cipient states in evaluating what actions should be taken.
VII. THE DOUBLE STANDARD
A. Issues at the Geneva Session
At the Geneva session developing countries insisted upon a dou-
ble standard which would subject them to less stringent require-
ments than those required of the developed countries with respect
to virtually every environmental protection obligation. Nothing but
restatements of hard positions occurred with respect to this question
during meetings of Committee III or of its informal working group.
As in the past, this problem was largely avoided in private negotia-
tions, primarily because it appears to be a major bargaining tool for
both sides and may not be finally resolved until other fundamental
questions (e.g., the nature of the economic resource zone, or rights
in straits) are resolved.
Some attempt was made to have the double standard dealt with
by the Evensen Group. That Group (during an intersessional meet-
ing prior to Geneva) received a suggestion to handle the double
standard question by imposing a general "due diligence" obligation
on states regarding their environmental protection duties. "Due dil-
igence" would not be expressly defined, except to provide that in
determining whether states were acting consistent with that stan-
dard, account would have to be taken of "differing capabilities."
This approach is questionable from an environmental point of view,
since, in effect, it amounts to a vague, open-ended invitation to
coastal states to define for themselves the nature and extent of
efforts they must make regarding pollution control.
A more acceptable approach involves placing clear, objective lim-
itations on any double standard. Various limitations which could be
set on the double standard include: (1) limiting a double standard
to land-based activities; (2) providing for objective criteria to be
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satisfied prior to invoking the double standard (e.g., by requiring a
case by case showing that substantial economic injury will result if
pollution controls of a certain kind are adopted, providing that the
double standard exception can only be employed when adverse eco-
nomic effects will result, and/or providing that developing countries
would have a longer time than others to meet certain pollution
control obligations); and (3) excluding toxic and hazardous sub-
stances. None of these proposals as yet have been reduced to draft
proposals or discussed in a meaningful or detailed manner with
developing countries.
The double standard issue is raised generally in articles 3 and 4
of the Single Negotiating Text of Committee III which provide that
states, in satisfying their environmental duties, shall "take into
account their economic needs and their programmes for economic
development" 54 and act "in accordance with their capabilities
''55
B. Issues for the Future
Some type of double standard will inevitably appear in the law
of the sea convention. That standard may be limited to only certain
types of pollution, e.g., land-based sources, or it may apply across
the board to all types of pollution. While it may be tied to a norm
and may have procedural conditions attached to its application, it
will most likely be simply a vague statement indicating that devel-
oping countries may be exempted from environmental standards. If
this is in fact the case, the real negotiation over double standards
will occur during subsequent conferences when specific standards
are articulated. Developing countries no doubt again will attempt
to insert a double standard provision in those subsequent conven-
tions, and at that time there will be a greater need to have a norma-
tive standard so that those negotiating will know when and under
what conditions developing countries need not apply a specific stan-
dard.
The existence of the double standard could create significant
problems for the development of international environmental law.
Developed countries may be unprepared to promote or accept high
international standards if they know that a high standard will auto-
matically result in an exemption for developing countries. The pres-
sure will thus be toward international standards with which "last
year's equipment" can comply, rather than standards which would
, Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 3.
5 Id. pt. III, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, art. 4.
[VOL. 6:73
1976] CONFERENCE-PROTECTION OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT 91
force the usage of the best available technology. In order to avoid
these potential consequences, efforts should be undertaken to assure
that every application of a double standard in a subsequent conven-
tion or by a developing country is questioned; only in those cases
where a double standard is in fact legitimate should it be allowed
to be put into effect, and it should remain in effect only for the
period of time it can be justified.
THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
POLLUTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
V. A. Kiselev*
I. INTRODucION
The international division of labour is one of the most important
factors for the development of the modern world. The requirements
for international trade result in intensive upgrowth of merchant
fleets, since the development of foreign trade is impossible without
maritime transport. For free realization of commerce, navigators
must come near the coasts, sail in the coastal waters and call at the
harbours and ports of the states with which they intend to trade.
From the legal point of view, the areas of the World Ocean are
divided into three principal categories: the internal waters, the ter-
ritorial seas and the high seas. Internal waters and the territorial
seas are parts of the territories and are under the sovereignty of the
appropriate coastal states. The distinction between these areas con-
sists of the fact that the internal waters are subject to the sover-
eignty of coastal states without any general exceptions, whereas in
the territorial sea, the coastal states may enjoy their sovereign rights
taking into account the universally recognized principles of interna-
tional law pertaining to innocent passage of foreign merchant ships.
As to the high seas, ships of all nations may enjoy freedom of naviga-
tion and, as a general rule, are under exclusive authority of the flag
state.
The achievements of the scientific and technical revolution per-
mitted mankind to begin a more intensive use of the World Ocean.
Traditional activities on the seas, namely, navigation and fishing,
are developing rapidly. New forms of human activity appear,
particularly the exploration and exploitation of natural resources of
the seabed and its subsoil. New problems have arisen side by side
with these achievements. One of these is the problem of pollution
of the World Ocean.
It is well known that land-based sources of pollution are responsi-
ble for the largest quantities of pollutants released into the marine
environment. In our opinion, this fact should always be borne in
* Senior Researcher, Department on Public International Law of the Sea, Institute
Sojuzmorniiproekt. D.Sc. (Law).
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mind when considering the problem of marine pollution from ships,
because even if this source of pollution were to be fully eradicated,
the problem of the preservation of the marine environment would
be neither fully nor even substantially settled.
But from the legal point of view, in the light of work of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the most compli-
cated problem at present is the prevention of marine pollution from
ships. This complication is the result of the fact that navigation is
a type of international activity: ships flying the flag of one state
navigate the high seas and find themselves in areas which are sub-
ject to the limited (territorial waters) or unlimited (internal waters)
sovereignty of other states.
It is the international nature of navigation that necessitates find-
ing ways for the delimitation and combination of measures which
would be used for prevention of pollution of the marine environment
from ships on the international level, on the national level by flag
states and on the national level by coastal states.
Pollutants enter the marine environment from ships in three prin-
cipal ways: (1) spillages during loading, unloading and bunkering
operations; (2) spillages due to maritime casualties and other inci-
dents; and (3) spillages due to intentional operational discharges.
Dumping into the seas of industrial and other wastes is a special
case. Dumping of such wastes should be considered as a specific
type of pollution from land-based sources. Really, in this case, ships
are merely the means of transportation for such wastes and do not
present danger by themselves.
The problem of preventing pollution of the marine environment
is by nature a technical one and, in principle, owing to the progress
of science, it may be solved properly. But some important aspects
of the problem have a clearly legal nature.
From a number of legal issues which relate to the problem of
pollution of the marine environment from ships, two of the most
important might be indicated: (1) the issue concerning the nature
of norms and standards aimed at the prevention of pollution and (2)
the issue of the effective fulfillment of such norms and standards.
II. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS CONCERNING POLLUTION
OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
In international law there is a principle according to which a state
may neither use its territory nor permit its territory to be used in
such a manner that causes substantial damage, including damage
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which results from pollution, in the territory of another state. From
this principle obviously follows the prohibition against using areas
which are out of the state's territory, in this case, the high seas,
when it results in substantial damage in a foreign territory.
A. Pollution of the High Seas
1. The Applicable International Conventional Law
One may suppose that the pollution of the high seas is equally
prohibited under modern international law. This prohibition follows
from the principle of freedom of the high seas according to which
every state shall take into account "the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."' Pollution of the seas
by oil2 and radioactive wastes3 is directly forbidden under the provi-
sions of that Convention.
In principle, no state pretends to a "freedom of pollution." A
handsome majority of authorities in the field of international law
stick to a view that all states are obliged to take measures for pre-
vention of pollution of the seas under existing principles of interna-
tional law. As early as 1937, the Institute of International Law ex-
pressed the view that "a State would be failing of its international
obligations if it neglected to take all proper measures to prevent
practices which. . . are manifestly contrary to the exploitation and
rational protection of the wealth of the sea." Under such practices
the Institute meant in particular "uncontrolled emission of oil,
sewer water and other injurious substances." The Institute reaf-
firmed this standpoint in 1969: "[s]tates are obliged to take all
necessary measures to prevent pollution of the high sea in result of
any activity connected with their personal or territorial compe-
tence." In general terms this duty was formulated in the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment.'
It should be noted, however, that the waters of the World Ocean
are capable of assimilating, without detriment, a great number of
harmful substances, and it is quite obvious that this capability may
be used in the future. An absolute prohibition of the introduction
into the seas of all harmful substances is not realistic, since every
I [Ed. Note] 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1962] 2
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective for United States Sept. 30, 1962).
2 [Ed. Note] Id. art. 24.
[Ed. Note] Id. art. 25.
[Ed. Note] UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, REPORT, art. II,
prin. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972).
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kind of activity in the sea is connected with the introduction into
the marine environment of some quantities of alien substances.
Naturally, for solution of the problem of pollution of the marine
environment as a whole, there is a requirement for the establish-
ment of norms and standards determining the maximum quantities
of pollutants which might be discharged from every concrete source,
taking into account all of the sources of pollution, both marine and
land-based. Proceeding from the global nature of the problem and
the complexity of its technical solution, the requirements of such
norms and standards should be established on the international
level, with the exception that a state may impose higher or addi-
tional norms and standards for any source of pollution which is
under its jurisdiction or control, for example, control over land-
based sources, control over exploitation and exploration of the conti-
nental shelf and control over ships flying its flag. But until recently
all efforts taken on the international level were directed in fact
towards the prevention of marine pollution from ships in connection
with which there are already established some proper norms and
standards.
Thus, the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil5 (as amended in 19621), the parties to
which at present are 50 States, including all the principal maritime
powers, prohibits intentional discharge from ships of oil and oily
mixtures of a certain concentration, namely, more than one part of
oil per 10,000 of the mixture,7 within the so-called "prohibited
zones," 8 which extend from 501 to 15010 miles from the coasts, and
anywhere at sea from ships with a gross weight of more than 20,000
tons."
The efficiency of the 1954 Convention shall be considerably in-
creased due to the 1969 amendments 2 which are expected to be in
[Ed. Note] May 12, 1954, [19611 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 4
(effective for United States Dec. 8, 1961).
, [Ed. Note] Apr. 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332
(effective for United States May 18, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Amended 1954 Oil Pollution
Convention].
[Ed. Note] Id. art. I, para. (1).
[Ed. Note] Id. annex A.
[Ed. Note] Id. annex A, para. (1).
[Ed. Note] Id. annex A, para. (2).
"[Ed. Note] Id. art. III, para. (c).
" [Ed. Note] Done Oct. 21, 1969, IMCO Doc. A VI/Res.175 (1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 1 (1970). These amendments were adopted by the assembly of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization and will come into force 12 months after
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force in the very near future. In particular, these amendments will
limit to a considerable extent the allowed contents of oil which may
be discharged from a ship during a voyage.' 3
The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships" is to some degree a code of juridicial and technical rules
which, being widely adopted, shall, as it is referred to in the pream-
ble, result in "the complete elimination of intentional pollution of
the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and
the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances.' 3 The
Convention contains the universal norms and standards aimed at
limiting the operational discharge of wastes from ships, e.g., oils,
noxious substances, sewage and garbage," and those discharges
having to do with construction and equipment." This Convention
is expected to enter into force in 1976 or 1977.
The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and other Matter'8 (which is not yet in force)
provides for practically an absolute prohibition of dumping of highly
toxic substances at sea," and establishes a system for controlling the
dumping of all other wastes.20
The 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on
the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,2' which appar-
ently has already entered into force this year, authorizes coastal
states to take measures on the high seas in respect to foreign ships
to prevent oil pollution of the coasts and coastal waters, 2 with the
proviso that any measures taken be in proportion to the actual or
threatened danger of oil pollution to the coasts and to the coastal
ratification by two-thirds of the Governments which are parties to the original 1954 Conven-
tion. Amended 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 7, art. 16, para. 4.
'1 [Ed. Note] Done Oct. 21, 1969, art. III, IMCO Doc. A V~LRes.175 (1970), reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1 (1970).
" [Ed. Note] Done Nov. 2, 1973, IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35 (1973), reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1319 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Pollution from Ships Convention].
[Ed. Note] Id. preamble.
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. annex I, ch. 11, regs. 9, 17.
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. annex I, ch. II, reg. 21.
[Ed. Note] Adopted Nov. 13, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 626 (1973). This
Convention was adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the
Dumping of Wastes at Sea, held in London, October 30 through November 13, 1972.
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. art. IV, para. 1, in conjunction with annexes I, II.
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. annex III.
2 [Ed. Note] Nov. 29, 1969, T.I.A.S. No. 8068 reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 471 (1970)
(effective for United States Feb. 5, 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Oil Pollution Casualties
Convention].
" [Ed. Note] Id. art. I.
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waters.3 The 1973 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other Than 0il24
extends the 1969 Intervention Convention to all other pollutants.2 1
Thus, there are already a number of international agreements
(many of which are not yet in force) stipulating, in our opinion, a
sufficient protection of the marine environnent from pollution from
ships. Norms and standards contained in these agreements apply,
in fact, to all possible cases of pollution from ships: (1) to the inten-
tional operational discharges (the 1954 Convention, as amended, 2
and the 1973 Convention 27) and (2) to pollution of the seas due to
casualties (the 1973 Convention, 28 the 1969 Intervention Conven-
tion, 29 as well as the 1973 Intervention Protocol 3 ).
As it appears, therefore, the main problem is that of getting these
conventions into effect as soon as possible and of controlling their
proper implementation.
2. Supplemental Regional Agreements
The system of universal international conventions is supple-
mented by a number of regional agreements aimed either toward an
earlier implementation of the provisions of such conventions (which
are not yet in force) for some regions, or towards the establishment
of some additional instruments for the prevention of marine pollu-
tion. Among such agreements in particular are the following: the
1969 Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the
North Sea by Oil;31 the 1972 Oslo Convention on the Control of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft; 32 the 1974
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area; 33 and the 1974 Paris Convention for the Prevention
of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources. 34
[Ed. Note] Id. art. V.
', [Ed. Note] Done Nov. 2, 1973, IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35 (1973) reprinted in 13
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 605 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Oil Pollution Casualties Protocol].
25 [Ed. Note] Id. art. I.
21 [Ed. Note] Amended 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 7, art. I, para. (1).
I [Ed. Note] 1973 Pollution from Ships Convention, supra note 15, preamble.
21 [Ed. Note] Id.
2 [Ed. Note] 1969 Oil Pollution Casualties Convention, supra note 22, art. I.
[Ed. Note] 1973 Oil Pollution Casualties Protocol, supra note 25, art. I.
3, [Ed. Note] 1969 Agreement Concerning Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, Done June
9, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 359 (1970).
12 [Ed. Note] Done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 262 (1972).
13 [Ed. Note] Done March 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 544 (1974).
3, [Ed. Note] Opened for signature June 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 352
(1974). The Convention was adopted by the Conference on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
from Land-Based Sources on February 21, 1974.
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B. Pollution of the Territorial Waters of Coastal States
Whereas the question concerning the nature of the norms and
standards for prevention of pollution from ships applicable to the
high seas seems to be clear to a certain extent, it is not so clear in
connection with those applicable to the sea waters that are a part
of a state's territory.
1. The Territorial Sea and Innocent Passage
As is generally known pursuant to the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 5 "[tihe sovereignty of a
State extends, beyond its land territory . , to a belt of sea adja-
cent to its coast, described as the territorial sea."3 But the sover-
eignty of a state in the territorial sea is limited by universally recog-
nized norms of international law which are based on the principle
of freedom of navigation concerning innocent passage of foreign
ships.37
In accordance with the provisions of the 1958 Convention, a
coastal state shall not lay obstacles to innocent passage through its
territorial waters,3" but at the same time it may establish the rules
of such a passage. 9 While exercising the right of innocent passage,
foreign ships are obliged to comply with the corresponding laws and
regulations of the coastal state.4 As was noted by the International
Law Commission of the United Nations in its comments to the draft
of that article,' such laws and regulations may be, for example, laws
and regulations dealing with protection of the coastal state's waters
from any pollution from ships."2
2. Innocent Passage in Relation to Pollution of Coastal Waters
In this connection a question arises whether a coastal state has a
right to impose within its territorial sea such norms and standards
with which the failure to comply would result in a foreign ship's
losing the opportunity to exercise a passage?
11 [Ed. Note] April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205
(effective for United States Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea and Contig-
uous Zone Convention].
[Ed. Note] Id. art. 1, para. 1.
[' [Ed. Note] Id. art. 14, paras. 1, 4.
[Ed. Note] Id. art. 15, para. 1.
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. art. 16, paras. 1, 2, 3, art. 17.
,0 [Ed. Note] Id. art. 19.
1 [Ed. Note] See, e.g., Report of the Int'l Law Commission to the Gen. Assembly Cover-
ing the Work of its 7th Session, [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 19, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.1 (1955).
12 [Ed. Note] Id. at 39, 40.
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a. National Legislation on Discharges in Territorial Waters.
Many years ago some states prescribed certain restrictions related
to disposal of wastes from ships into coastal waters. Thus, according
to the provisions of the regulations for skippers and others coming
on merchant ships into Russian ports of 1723, the discharge from
ships of ballast and garbage into the Russian coastal waters was
forbidden by the threat of a fine, and, in the event of recidivism,
by confiscation of the ship.
By the 1920's a number of countries, including Great Britain,43 the
United States,44 and some others, had adopted special legislation
prohibiting intentional discharge of oil from ships within the limits
of the territorial waters.
The 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, prescribing the quantities of
oil allowed to be discharged within the prohibited zones (less than
one part per 10,000 of the mixture),45 does not limit the right of a
coastal state to take stricter measures for prevention of pollution
within the limits of the territorial sea."
b. More Extensive National Regulation. At present the legisla-
tion of a number of countries not only prescribes stricter provisions
concerning the discharge of oil than those under the 1954 Conven-
tion, but also prohibits the discharge of other harmful substances,
and contains certain provisions regulating the behaviour of the ships
while in those waters. For example, under the laws of some coun-
tries, the transfer of oil at night to or from a ship is allowed only
with permission of port authorities;47 and the ship's masters are
obliged to report to the coastal authorities any spillage of oil and
other pollutants, etc.4" Obviously, performance of such requirements
cannot present any serious obstacle for navigation. Thus, the
practice of coastal states imposing appropriate norms and standards
with respect to a ship's behaviour within the limits of the territorial
seas may be considered as approved and universally recognized.
c. The Right of a Coastal State to Regulate a Ship's Construction
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 39, §
1.
" [Ed. Note] See, e.g., The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 13, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1970). The original section of the 1899 act is presently codified as part of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
41 [Ed. Note] Amended 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 7, art. I, para. (1).
41 [Ed. Note] Id. art. VI, paras. (1), (2).
" [Ed. Note] See, e.g., The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 39, §
2.
49 [Ed. Note] See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(Supp. III, 1973).
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and Equipment. More complicated is the question of the right of a
coastal state to impose norms and standards relating to a ship's
construction and equipment for ships operating within its territorial
waters, as well as norms and standards in respect to other factors
which could not be changed from case to case. Until recently this
question had not arisen at all since the coastal states had not pro-
mulgated any requirements in this respect. But now the solution of
this question has become of great importance.
Proceeding from the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which prescribes to foreign
ships, while exercising the right of innocent passage through terri-
torial waters, a duty to observe the laws and regulations of the
coastal state in regard to transportation and navigation,49 one may
come to the conclusion that a coastal state has some rights in this
respect, since such norms and standards are aimed towards the
prevention of pollution due to casualties and other maritime inci-
dents. Nevertheless, a conclusion that a coastal state has a right de
lege lata to impose arbitrarily any norms and standards in respect
of a ship's construction and equipment seems to be arguable. It is
impossible to keep from noting that there is some conflict between
such a right of a coastal state and the right of ships to innocent
passage.
If every coastal state were to have the right to impose national
standards regarding a ship's construction and equipment in the
rather narrow 12-mile belt of its coastal waters, serious obstacles to
international navigation might be created. It is of course unrealistic
to assume that every coastal state, which number more than 100,
would exercise this right without delay and would impose its abso-
lutely particular norms and standards within the limits of the terri-
torial waters. Rather, another development would be possible-
namely, the recognition of such a right would create an objective
possibility for substantial differences among such norms and
standards which could make their fulfillment practically impossi-
ble. Also it should be noted that, as was confirmed by the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization's (IMCO's)
experience, elaboration of scientifically well-grounded and techni-
cally correct norms and standards is a highly complex problem, the
solution of which may be rather difficult for any individual country.
Within the framework of IMCO, there were attempts made to
formulate clearly prescriptions relative to the nature of norms and
11 [Ed. Note] Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention, supra note 36, art. 17.
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standards while working out the 1973 Convention.501 In one article of
a draft of this Convention, it was provided that a state should not
impose stricter requirements regarding a ship's construction, equip-
ment, and manning (excluding, of course, ships flying under the
state's own flag) within its own jurisdiction than those provided for
by the Convention. However, this provision was not included in the
Convention. Nevertheless, the absence of any clear prohibition in
this respect in the 1973 Convention cannot be a cogent argument
that the coastal states should dispose of such a right.
In our opinion, the right of a coastal state to impose national
norms and standards regarding a ship's construction, etc. within the
limits of its territorial waters-even when there are as of yet no
international ones-should be secondary to their duty to take mea-
sures for the elaboration of such norms and standards on the inter-
national level, e.g., through IMCO.
d. The Coastal State Receives Other Protection. It should be
noted also that, as a rule, the available international agreements
take into account the special interests of coastal states in preventing
the pollution of their coasts and coastal waters.
Thus, for the protection of the coasts and coastal waters, the 1954
Convention established a system of prohibited zones which ex-
tended to a distance of 50 to 150 miles.51
In accordance with the 1973 Convention, the discharge of practi-
cally all pollutants, with the exception of disinfected sewage and
comminuted garbage, at the distance of 12 miles from the coasts is
completely prohibited. Furthermore, the discharge of certain sorts
of garbage is prohibited at the distance of 25 miles and the discharge
of oil from tankers is prohibited at the distance of 50 miles from the
coasts.5
2
The special interests of the coastal states in compensation of
damages caused by oil pollution are taken into account by the 1969
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dam-
age13 and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Dam-
age.
5 4
[Ed. Note] 1973 Pollution from Ships Convention, supra note 15.
[Ed. Note] Amended 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 7, annex A.
52 [Ed. Note] 1973 Pollution from Ships Convention, supra note 15, annex 1, ch. II, reg.
9.
[Ed. Note] Done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970).
[Ed. Note] Done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1972).
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS
A. Flag State Responsibility for Implementation
The 1954 Convention makes flag states responsible for implemen-
tation of its provisions.55 A coastal state may apply its legislation
regarding foreign ships only when an infringement is committed
within its territorial waters.5" But when infringement is committed
on the high seas, even in immediate proximity to the territorial
waters of a coastal state, this state may only inform the flag state
about the infringement. 51 Practically the only form of control re-
garding a foreign ship under the 1954 Convention is an inspection
of oil record books while the ship concerned is within a port of a
coastal state."
Practice in the application of the 1954 Convention shows that the
sole control by the flag state of implementation of the international
norms and standards is insufficient. It does not matter that a flag
state may have no interest in a strict implementation of the Conven-
tion by the ships flying its flag. The matter is rather that, between
a ship and a state whose flag the ship is flying, there is not often a
required tie. It happens that ships, especially in relation to ships
flying under "flags of convenience," do not enter for years the ports
of the state whose flag they are flying. Therefore, a flag state, even
when it desires to investigate and to punish a case of pollution, has
no opportunity to do it.
B. Coastal State Responsibility for Implementation
The rights of coastal states regarding the control of the. implemen-
tation of the international norms and standards by foreign ships are
extended to some extent by the 1973 Convention.59 This is ex-
pressed, in particular, in the following instances. First, in addition
to the right of a coastal state under the 1954 Convention to inspect
oil record books, the 1973 Convention provides for a right to inspect
oil record books and cargo record books at port or offshore terminal,
as well as a right to inspect proper international certificates"0 such
as the oil pollution prevention certificate,' the pollution prevention
11 [Ed. Note] See, e.g., Amended 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 7, art. VI,
para. (1).
5' [Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. art. VI, para. (2).
57 [Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. art. X, para. (1).
[Ed. Note] See, e.g., id. art. IX, paras. (4), (5).
" [Ed. Note] 1973 Pollution from Ships Convention, supra note 15.
" [Ed. Note] Id. art. 5, para. (2).
," [Ed. Note] Id. annex I, ch. I, regs. 5-8, appendix II.
1976]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
certificate for the carriage of noxious liquid substances in bulk,62 and
the sewage pollution certificate . 3 If the ship does not have such
certificates, or if there are clear grounds for believing that the condi-
tion of the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially
with the particulars of the certificates, the coastal state authorities
may inspect the ship, and shall deny its proceeding to sea, if it turns
out that the ship may present a threat of harm to the marine envi-
ronment.64 Second, a coastal state has a right, on its own initiative
or upon a request of another state which is a party to the Conven-
tion, to inspect the foreign ship at its ports or offshore terminals for
the purpose of verifying whether the ship has discharged any harm-
ful substances beyond the limits of the coastal state's jurisdiction
which are in violation of the Convention. 5 If such an inspection
indicates a violation of the Convention, the coastal state shall
supply the flag state with the appropriate materials for investiga-
tion and punishment. 6 In the light of the discussion of the matter
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, it
seems quite probable that the coastal states will be provided with
some additional rights to control navigation for the prevention of
marine pollution. The matter concerns the rights of coastal states
at the zone of the high sea which borders-on the territorial waters,
which probably may extend to 200 miles from the land. In this case,
the limits of such a zone might coincide with limits of an economic
zone. But, in our opinion, it would be more correct to treat a pollu-
tion control zone as an independent category which is not connected
with an economic zone.
By what rights might coastal states be entitled, within such
zones, to exercise pollution prevention control over ships? It
seems quite probable that there would be recognition of the rights
of coastal states to investigate infringements of international norms
and standards relative to the discharge of pollutants within such a
zone. But it is hardly worthwhile to allow the authorities of the
coastal state to stop foreign ships within the zone. Proceeding from
the interests of navigation, a coastal state should be entitled to
exercise a right to investigate such infringements only in cases
where ships alleged to have discharged prohibited pollutants enter
ports or offshore terminals of the coastal state. Within the limits of
11 [Ed. Note] Id. annex II, regs. 11, 12, appendix V.
13 [Ed. Note] Id. annex IV, regs. 4-7, appendix.
11 [Ed. Note] Id. art. V, para. (2).
[Ed. Note] Id. art. VI, para. (2).
" [Ed. Note] Id.
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the zone itself, the coastal state's authorities might require foreign
ships alleged to have committed such infringements to supply them
with necessary information.
C. The Right of Coastal States to Bring Legal Proceedings and
Impose Penalties
Recognition of the right of a coastal state to bring proceedings in
respect to foreign ships discharging pollutants within the zone is a
logical consequence of the right to investigate the violations. But,
in our opinion, the flag state shall have preference in instituting
such proceedings. The coastal state may exercise such a right only
in the case where a flag state has not instituted proceedings within
some fixed period.
In connection with the possible recognition of the right of a coastal
state to institute proceedings in respect to prohibited discharges of
pollutants in sizable areas of the World Ocean, the question con-
cerning the kind of penalty which may be imposed regarding such
infringements acquires special significance. It should be noted that
there is a trend in the legislation of some countries toward more
severe sanctions against discharges of pollutants. Thus, in accord-
ance with the British Oil Pollution Prevention Act of 1971,"7 the
shipowner or shipmaster may be punished on summary conviction
by a fine up to £50,000;6s the amendments of 1972 to the Australian
Oil Pollution Prevention Act of 1960/65 increase the fine to up to
A$50,000;" the 1973 amendments to the French Oil Pollution Pre-
vention Act of 1964 increase the fine to up to Frl00,000, and, in the
case of recidivism, up to Fr200,O0O; the Prevention and Combating
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act, adopted in the Republic of South
Africa in 1971, provides for a fine of up to R$100,000;70 and under
the Canadian legislation (Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of
197071 and under the 1971 amendments to the Canadian Shipping
Act,712) discharge of pollutants may be fined up to Can$100,000.
Furthermore, the laws of many countries provide for imprisonment
apart from a fine as a type of penalty. Thus, the laws of Japan
, [Ed. Note] The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act of 1971, 19 & 20 Eliz. 2, c. 60, § 14.
[ Ed. Note] Id. § 14(4).
[Ed. Note] See Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act of 1960-65, cited in Nicholson v. Freman-
tie Port Authority, [1969] W.A.R. 27, 28, reprinted in THE AUSTRALIAN DICEsT 324 (J. Malor,
B. McPaul, J. Telbart eds. 1969 Supp.).
70 [Ed. Note] Act No. 67 of 1974, § 10(ii), STAT. OF THE REPUBLIc OF S. AFRICA, CLASSIFIED
& ANNOTATED 205, 207 (1973 Supp.).
71 [Ed. Note] [1970] REv. STATS. OF CANADA c. 2, § 18, paras. (1), (2) (Supp. I, 1971).
7 [Ed. Note] [1970] REv. STATS. OF CANADA c. 27, § 752 (Supp. II, 1972).
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provide for imprisonment up to 6 months; Sweden 73 and the United
States7" up to 1 year; France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
the Republic of South Africa,75 up to 2 years; and the Soviet Union,
up to 2 years (and, in case of substantial damage, up to 5 years).
In our opinion, a fine should be the only penalty which might be
imposed on foreign seamen in connection with the prohibited dis-
charge of pollutants within the zone. Furthermore, this principle
ought to be approved also in respect to infringements committed by
foreign ships in the internal and territorial seas of a coastal state as
well.
The laws and regulations on the prevention of marine pollution
from ships adopted by various coastal states are very different and
this situation creates some difficulties for navigation. Obviously, it
would be useful to attempt the unification of such laws and regula-
tions within the framework of some international forum, for exam-
ple, IMCO.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. Among the numerous sources of pollution of the marine
environment, ships are far from being a principal source. Norms and
standards for prevention of pollution from ships have already been
developed on the international level.
2. Norms and standards for prevention of pollution of the
marine environment concerning a ship's construction and equip-
ment must be adopted, as a general rule, on the international level.
At the same time, the coastal states may impose within the limits
of territorial waters national requirements relative to the behaviour
of the ships in addition to the international ones.
3. For the purpose of more effective implementation of interna-
tional norms and standards, coastal states might be provided with
some rights for combatting pollution within a zone of the high sea
bordering on the territorial waters.
4. Since the laws and regulations of coastal states regarding the
prevention of marine pollution from ships are very different, it
seems to be useful to unify such laws and regulations.
11 [Ed. Note] Law of Jan. 1, 1972, Marine Dumping Prohibition Act, § 5, [1971] SWEDISH
CODE OF STATUTES 1154, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1115 (1972).
[Ed. Note] Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
[Ed. Note] See reference cited note 71 supra.
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THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
William E. Butler*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Geneva session of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea' has adjourned, having produced an informal
negotiating text2 which is to be considered at a further session in the
spring of 1976. The frustration which has arisen from the inability
of the Conference to achieve tangible agreements more expedi-
tiously is natural. Such frustration is to be expected since it is the
largest conference of its kind which has been held within the United
Nations framework, and it is perhaps the first which has touched
upon such vital and immediate interests of the states concerned, all
within an intensely political framework. A total revision of the en-
tire body of the law of the sea is in prospect should the Conference
succeed-and perhaps if it does not. Even if a treaty draft is agreed
upon as early as mid-1976, it is possible that some years will pass
before a substantial number of states ratify the convention(s). It is
also conceivable that a draft text would not attract the number of
ratifications which would be sufficient to make a significant impact
upon the law of the sea, insofar as it would not be declaratory
thereof. It is equally conceivable that such a text would soon be
superseded by the pace of events in marine developments, a pheno-
menon which is not unknown with regard to the existing law of the
sea conventions. This is not to sound a pessimistic note about the
Conference, of which a nonparticipant can know little in any event,
but rather to suggest that a perspective detached from specific Con-
ference deliberations still has a useful place with regard to the mat-
ters under consideration, including the freedom of navigation.
Navigation on the high seas in recent centuries has been linked
inextricably with two principles. The first is that vessels of all
*Reader in Comparative Law, University of London. The author has published several
studies on Russian and Soviet approaches to international law, the most recent being an
English translation of G. I. Tunkin's Theory of International Law (1974). In 1971-72, he was
a Guest Senior Scholar at Moscow State University under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural ex-
change program.
The first session of the Conference was held in Caracas, Venezuela, in the summer of 1974.
The Geneva session was held in the spring of 1975.
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING
TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
states, whether coastal or not, enjoy the right to navigate on the high
seas; the second, the principle of flag state jurisdiction, places re-
sponsibility on each state for fixing the conditions under which a
ship may acquire its nationality and fly its flag. In its classic concep-
tion, then, the high seas are open to all for navigation, and each
state is to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over vessels
flying its flag.
Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 3 the provi-
sions of which are "generally declaratory of established principles
of international law," 4 no state may validly purport to subject any
portion of the high seas to its sovereignty. The freedom of the high
seas must be exercised with reasonable regard to the interests of
other states and under the conditions laid down by the Convention
and by other rules of international law.
The freedom of navigation is only one component of the freedom
of the seas, albeit to the layman or mariner, perhaps the most basic.
Nevertheless, although the Convention on the High Seas lists the
freedom of navigation first (in article 2), it establishes no hierarchy
among the four listed constituent elements of the freedom of the
seas,5 nor does it subordinate in any way other elements which may
be deemed part of the freedom of the seas. From a historical
perspective, it may be the case that the freedom of navigation
should possess precedence by virtue of its antiquity; high seas fish-
ing is probably a later phenomenon. In recent times, the "pressures"
from a variety of sources upon the freedom of navigation and upon
the concomitant principle of flag state jurisdiction have mounted to
such an extent that one must ask again which functions the freedom
is intended to serve, and how it can best do so.
Broadly speaking, one may say that the freedom of navigation is
to serve maritime traffic in its widest sense, including the disposi-
tion of naval forces. Despite the rapid development of air transport
and pipelines, the greatest percentage of tonnage moves by sea, and
larger powers rely to a substantial degree upon naval forces to pro-
tect their coasts and to pursue their national interests. The pres-
sures on the traditional notions of freedom of navigation and flag
state jurisdiction are manifested in such diverse ways as the follow-
' Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [19621 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective for United States Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as High Seas
Convention].
Id. preamble.
The four elements include: (1) freedom of navigation; (2) freedom of fishing; (3) freedom
to lay submarine cables and pipelines; and (4) freedom to fly over the high seas. Id. art. 2.
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ing: (1) increasing coastal state claims to jurisdiction over sea ex-
panses previously acknowledged as high seas; (2) newly emerging
components of the freedom of the seas which should be exercised
equally with other components; (3) national restrictions on the
kinds of vessels which may sail in particular places or at particular
times; and (4) assertions of international community interests in the
manners in which some flag states administer their vessels.
II. WHERE VESSELS MAY EXERCISE THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
The Convention on the High Seas provides simply that "high
seas" embrace "all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State."6 There are a
number of ambiguities and lacunae that article 1 glosses over, which
one hopes will be clarified and filled by a new convention: to wit,
(1) greater specificity on base lines; (2) definitions of historic and
archipelagic waters, including, perhaps, an exhaustive enumeration
thereof; and (3) an agreement on a breadth for the territorial sea. It
would appear at this point that the 12-mile territorial sea enjoys the
greatest support, although, if desired, states presumably could pre-
serve a lesser limit and retain contiguous zones. An agreement on
this basis would reflect prevailing state practice without materially
reducing the expanse of high seas, whereas a failure to achieve con-
sensus on this point in all probability would lead states to claim
territorial seas of up to 200 miles, materially reducing the area
within which the freedom of navigation could be exercised.
Nonetheless, there are certain traditional concepts of jurisdiction
which would appear to be the subject of considerable alteration if a
number of proposals presented at the Law of the Sea Conference
should be accepted, and it is far from clear whether careful delinea-
tions are being drawn with regard to the kinds of zonal jurisdiction
under contemplation. Should a 12-mile territorial sea, an additional
contiguous zone of up to 12 miles, and an economic zone of 200 miles
be accepted, then the question would arise as to what freedom of
navigation can possibly mean within such zones (for it is evidently
contemplated that the freedom of navigation should.be safeguarded
within these expanses).
Under the Convention's definition of high seas,7 the waters of a
contiguous zone are deemed part of the high seas; such expanses are
merely subject to particular jurisdictional rights of coastal states. It
*Id. art. 1.
See id. and accompanying text.
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is not at all evident why serious consideration should be given to a
new contiguous zone extending 12 to 24 miles from the coast, unless
it is felt that the speed of vessels somehow requires a broader juris-
dictional zone. One should suppose that the principle of hot pursuit
would be ample protection for the coastal state in this regard. The
economic or resource zone has for some time been distinguished
from the contiguous zone in doctrinal writings, especially with re-
gard to fishing. Inasmuch as property rights in a particular resource
or resources are asserted therein, the navigation or activities of cer-
tain classes of vessels are necessarily restricted or precluded. It is
to be hoped that the Law of the Sea Conference can successfully
separate resource jurisdiction from both navigational freedoms and
contiguous zone jurisdiction, while safeguarding navigational uses.
But the premise from which the Conference proceeds will have im-
portant consequences for the freedom of navigation in general: Is
primacy of the right to living and nonliving resources in an economic
zone to coexist with the freedom of navigation on the high seas in
the jurisdictional sense of a contiguous zone or would the inclusion
of a freedom of navigation clause in a future convention (as regards
an economic zone) in actuality signify a subordination of the free-
dom of the seas to a superior coastal state claim? Are navigational
rights in an economic zone to become more analogous to a freedom
of transit or innocent passage than to a freedom of navigation?
Even the acceptance of a 12-mile territorial sea would have a
substantial impact upon the freedom of navigation through interna-
tional straits. Over 100 straits which now include strips of high seas
would be overlapped by a territorial sea under a universal 12-mile
rule, and still others potentially would be affected if a 12-mile limit
were linked to a broader economic or other type of resource (non-
contiguous) zone. The doctrine of innocent passage would not seem
to be particularly advantageous under these circumstances (given
its still ambiguous and subjective nature) to either coastal states or
traversing powers; nor is the freedom of navigation fully responsive
to the interests of straits powers. A right of unimpeded transit
through international straits-on condition that the environmental,
navigational, and security interests of the coastal power were
guaranteed and respected-would be an appropriate balancing of
interests. This would be even more so if there were an agreed defini-
tion or list of international straits. Acceptance of such a "transit"
principle would represent a departure from the principle of freedom
of navigation; that is, it would represent an exception or modifica-
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tion predicated upon the special functional purpose which these
straits have for international navigation. Failure of the Law of the
Sea Conference to reach agreement on the matter of a broader terri-
torial sea linked with a right of transit through straits would mean
retention of the status quo, and coastal state attempts to restrict
freedom of navigation through straits without doubt would give rise
to serious international complications, if based on a territorial sea
or zonal claim not generally recognized in international law.
III. REGULATION OF How VESSELS NAVIGATE
With rather few exceptions and pursuant to the principle of flag
state jurisdiction laid down in the Convention on the High Seas,8
each individual state has responsibility for determining the condi-
tions under which a ship may acquire its nationality and fly its flag.
In addition, each state must exercise effective jurisdiction and con-
trol in administrative, technical, and social matters over its flag
vessels in order to provide evidence of a genuine link between state
and ship.
Vessels on the high seas are essentially regulated in three ways.
The first and chief means is through national legislation, following
the flag state principle. In recent years, however, there has been
increasing dissatisfaction with the extent of reliance upon flag state
jurisdiction. National legislation is far from uniform in maritime
matters, and although the international system tolerates an extraor-
dinary diversity of municipal legal rules governing behavior at sea,
there are instances in which the divergences of national standards
are both socially and morally unacceptable. There are also instances
in which they have caused harm to third states. Proposals to meet
these shortcomings approach the matter in two different ways.
While some urge that the principle of flag state jurisdiction be
strengthened, others urge that the principle be attenuated. Adher-
ents of the former approach argue that the international community
accepts too weak a "link" between state and vessel and allows
shipowners from one country to register vessels in other states where
safety standards may be lower or poorly enforced, or where wage
rates and labor conditions may be substandard. Without doubt, the
provision of the Convention on the High Seas stipulating the
existence of a genuine link between the flag state and its vessels9
could be augmented usefully in a new convention which would elab-
Id. art. 5, para. 1.
Id.
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orate further the international standard of genuine link.
The second means, also an extension of the flag state principle,
is the conclusion of multilateral or bilateral treaties and agreements
between states obliging the parties to take certain measures regard-
ing their own flag vessels; e.g., technical specifications, navigational
standards, labor conditions, and rescue operations. Some of these
are expressly mentioned in the Convention on the High Seas. 0 The
principal difficulty at the moment, particularly with regard to envi-
ronmental standards for navigation, is securing a sufficient number
of ratifications for conventions which genuinely require a high stan-
dard of performance from states-parties. Agreements concluded in
the past decade within the framework of the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization" have repeatedly encountered
this difficulty.
It is not easy to evaluate the contribution of bilateral treaties to
the development of freedom of navigation. The patterns of state
practice reflected in national legislation seem to have attracted a
higher degree of attention and generalization than has the immense
network of bilateral arrangements concluded by states. A compara-
tive inquiry into the consistency and depth of bilateral regulation
of navigation would be a useful and perhaps surprising undertaking.
The third method of regulating the freedom of navigation on the
high seas, and one favored by those skeptical of a purely flag state
approach, is through nonflag state jurisdiction. Certain exceptions
to flag state jurisdiction are a part of customary international law,
while others have been established by bilateral and multilateral
conventions. Particularly in recent years, states have been amena-
ble to allowing officials of vessels of other contracting powers to
board their ships in order to check compliance with fishing regula-
tions; some urge that compliance with environmental standards be
similarly enforced.
The classic exception to flag state jurisdiction is piracy, which has
long been an offense against the law of nations and a crime in many
countries. Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention on the High Seas are
an attempt to encourage uniformity and consistency in defining
piracy. Many are concerned, however, that the definition of piracy
under international law does not also embrace acts of "state piracy"
committed by government vessels in violation of international law.
I d.
E.g., International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2,
1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1319 (1973).
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Acts of submarine warfare during the First World War and the late
1930's are especially recalled in this connection.
The principal question must be whether the concept of state pir-
acy would add anything to existing international legal concepts of
aggression, armed attack, and prohibition against the use of force.
All of these acts, when committed intentionally, are invariably done
for political purposes, which are said to be the principal constituent
element of state piracy. Nor, if confronted again with a situation
similar to that which existed in the Mediterranean during the
1930's, would recourse to a Nyon-type arrangement 2 appear to be
precluded by international law. It is noteworthy, however, that high
American officials were quoted in the foreign press as describing the
recent seizure of an American merchant ship by Cambodian naval
vessels as state piracy. If the notion of state piracy is to be pursued
in the law of the sea negotiations or elsewhere, proper consideration
must be given to admissible sanctions, collective or individual,
bearing in mind that warships would come within this concept.
The Definition of Aggression, 3 adopted without vote on December
14, 1974, by the United Nations General Assembly, makes no men-
tion of state piracy. Article 4 of the Definition requires that a deter-
mination be made by the Security Council as to whether a particu-
lar act would fall within the concept of aggression.
The right of hot pursuit seems to be satisfactorily treated in the
Convention on the High Seas. 4 However, clarification in a new con-
vention as to whether the vessel commencing pursuit must complete
the exercise or may be replaced in the chase by other vessels would
be useful.
Other exceptions to flag state jurisdiction originate in multilat-
eral conventions, including among others: the nearly dormant 1882
Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries;"
the 1884 Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables;" the
1887 Convention on the Prohibition of Trade in Spirits in the North
Sea; 7 the 1959 Convention on the North-East Atlantic Fisheries;,
1 The Nyon Arrangement was an agreement between nine major European nations to take
collective forceful actions against "piratical acts by submarines" in the course of the Spanish
Civil War. Nyon Arrangement, done Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 135.
G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
High Seas Convention, supra note 3, art. 23.
" Convention internationale pour rdgler Ia police de la p~che dans la mer du Nord en
dehors des eaux territoriales, done May 6, 1882, 9 Martens Nouveau Recueil 556 (ser. 2).
"1 March 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989 (1885), T.S. No. 380 (effective for United States May 1,
1888).
'7 79 GREAT BRITAIN FOREIGN OFFIcE, BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 894 (1887).
" Done Jan. 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S. 157.
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the 1969 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Case of Oil Pollution Casualties; 9 and the 1973 International Con-
vention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.'" The latter two
conventions have yet to secure extensive acceptance on the part of
states.
Some of the conventional exceptions to flag state jurisdiction
have emerged because other freedoms of the sea required protection;
e.g., fisheries and protection of submarine cables. Other exceptions
emanate from the need of coastal states to ensure compliance with
navigational and sanitary standards; e.g., prevention of oil pollu-
tion. In the near future competing uses of what is now the high seas
may become so intense that the principle of flag state jurisdiction
must give way to a new order of high seas regulation, perhaps by
international institutions, and the extent of immunity for state ves-
sels must be reconsidered.
The traditional conflict over immunities for state vessels perform-
ing acts of a "commercial" nature, as opposed to functions of a
"public" nature, has centered around the unfairness (as viewed by
most western powers) inherent in a state owned vessel being able to
resist arrest or detention pursuant to civil law remedies, vis-A-vis
the unfairness (as viewed by the socialist countries) in distinguish-
ing between the functional uses of state ownership. In fact, the
socialist countries have worked out bilateral arrangements with sev-
eral western powers granting reciprocal immunities against civil
arrest of vessels in their respective territories. The functional im-
munity theory laid down in article 9 of the Convention on the High
Seas seems in practice to have imposed little burden on those states
owning commercial vessels. Has the time come to reconsider the
immunities which vessels performing public functions enjoy? Is
there any reason, for example, why the international community
should exempt warships, in peacetime, from the enforcement of
environmental standards imposed upon other classes of vessels? If
there is a special case to be made for warships, is the same case as
persuasive when applied to other classes of public vessels? In the
instance of naval vessels, should the particular functions of the
vessels (e.g., research) have a bearing on the extent of immunities
to be granted?
" Nov. 29, 1969, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 25 (1970).
Done Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1319 (1973).
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IV. MILITARY NAVIGATION
In the modern era the law of nations must be, insofar as is hu-
manly possible, a law of peace. Nonetheless, military armaments
are very much a part of our lives and the object of regulation by
international law, including on the high seas. The highest category
of state vessel is generally considered to be the warship, defined in
the Convention on the High Seas as a "ship belonging to the naval
forces of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing war-
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly com-
missioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy
List, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval disci-
pline.'I Warships possess complete immunity on the high seas from
the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state.
Warships enjoy the special prerogative under international law of
being empowered to stop and board foreign merchant ships in the
following situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for sus-
picion that the latter ships are engaged in piracy or the slave trade;
(2) when there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that the ships
are of the same nationality as the warship, although flying a foreign
flag or refusing to show their flags; or (3) in other instances where
such powers are conferred by treaty. Warships may also engage in
the hot pursuit of foreign ships when such action is justified.
International law imposes special duties and limitations upon the
operations of warships on the high seas as well. In addition to the
normal legal constraints on the use of force, the international com-
munity has accepted widely the following obligations which, al-
though admittedly wider in scope and effect, have an import upon
the operation of warships: (1) to refrain from involvement in nuclear
testing (except for peaceful purposes) on the high seas;22 (2) to avoid
any military operations, maneuvers, or weapons testing in the zone
governed by the treaty on the Antarctica;23 (3) to refrain from em-
placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on
the deep seabed or subsoil thereof;24 and (4) to observe the provi-
sions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 25
21 High Seas Convention, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 2.
22 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective for
United States Oct. 10, 1963).
2' Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71 (effective for United States June 23, 1961).
1, Convention on Seabed Arms Control, Feb. 11, 1971, [1972] 1 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No.
7337 (effective for United States May 18, 1972).
July 1, 1968, [1970] 1 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (effective for
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In the case of the world's two largest naval powers, these multilat-
eral obligations are augmented by recent bilateral agreements to
prevent incidents at sea,' 2 to limit strategic armaments," and to
reduce the danger of a nuclear war.2"
The law governing military navigation is far from perfected. The
definition of warship quoted above" has many variants in municipal
legislation, and these variants are complicated by the constantly
expanding number of vessel types which are joining modern naval
fleets. The extent to which warships will enjoy a genuine right of
transit through international straits, if at all, may come to depend
on consensus as to whether transit is a modification of the freedom
of navigation or a privilege granted by coastal states. Definition of
a warship also can affect the immunities accorded to it. Should
military icebreakers or intelligence-gathering vessels, for example,
be accorded full immunity if they are not easily identifiable as such?
Also, there is neither an adequate delineation of the right to conduct
military operations and maneuvers on the high seas, nor an ade-
quate delineation of the rights of other vessels to exercise their free-
dom of navigation. Advances in modern weapons technology ought
to raise serious questions among legal advisers as to their legal im-
plications for concepts of self-defense and armed attack. In fact,
these matters receive very little attention in doctrinal writings,
which base their treatment either on the experience of the last la-
mented war or on a meaningless level of abstraction divorced from
United States March 5, 1970).
2 Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the High Seas, May 25, 1972, [1972] 1 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. No. 7379 (effective
May 25, 1972).
27 Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, [1972] 4 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (effective Oct. 3,
1972); Interim Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, [1972] 4 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (effective
Oct. 3, 1972); Memorandum of Understanding with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitations, Dec. 21, 1972, [1973] 1
U.S.T. 238, T.I.A.S. No. 7545 (effective Dec. 21, 1972); Protocol with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation, May 30,
1973, [1973] 1 U.S.T. 1124, T.I.A.S. No. 7637 (effective May 30, 1973); Agreement with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Basic
Principles of Negotiation, June 21* 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1472, T.I.A.S. No. 7653 (effective
June 21, 1973).
29 Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Measures to Reduce the
Risk of Nuclear War Outbreak, Sept. 30, 1971, [1971] 2 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186
(effective Sept. 30, 1971); Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, [19731 2 U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S. No. 7654 (effective
June 22, 1973).
2 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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the needs of those who require guidance in their disposition. Per-
haps the state of international relations has advanced to a sufficient
level of civility and concern over the failure of international law to
address these matters more directly that the expertise of those im-
mediately concerned can be discussed and explored in appropriate
conferences or forums. If the great powers can discuss intimate de-
tails of strategic arms limitation, it should be possible to find a way
of bringing reality to the doctrinal development of these matters in
international law. On the western side, a personage such as the
Stockton Professor of International Law at the United States Naval
War College, or similar worthies in other countries, might assume
the responsibility of organizing discussion on an international
plane; a society of international law might also assume that respon-
sibility. The aim ought to be to discuss these aspects of navigation
initially rather than to produce agreed upon texts.
V. CONCLUSION
It would be as speculative to forecast the fate of freedom of navi-
gation, should the law of the sea negotiations fail, as it would be to
predict the ultimate content of a draft treaty produced by the Con-
ference, notwithstanding the achievement of a negotiating text.
Under one extreme scenario, the collapse of negotiations would be
attended by a deluge of coastal state claims, ultimately leading to
a division of the oceans and an end to freedom of navigation. Al-
though most maritime powers are restraining internal pressures for
unilateral action pending the Conference deliberations, that scena-
rio seems unlikely. So too does the likelihood that the present re-
gime for navigation on the high seas can survive a failure to reach
an agreement. There will be extensive coastal claims by some states.
The inability to rationalize the resource zone concept will give rise
to jurisdictional conflicts of some magnitude.
In any event, as the types of ocean use expand, it will become
essential to be explicit about the relationships of respective uses,
with some loss of flexibility, and perhaps to be more precise about
prohibited uses. All components of the freedom of the sea cannot
enjoy a coequal relationship indefinitely; some hierarchy may have
to be developed. If environmental protection is to become an inter-
est at sea in itself, it seems farfetched to link oil pollution with
violations of the freedom of navigation. Adequate technical mea-
sures to ensure that vessels do not breach environmental standards,
although a condition precedent for exercising the freedom of naviga-
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tion, ought to be defensible in their own right, rather than as a weak
adjunct to that freedom.
The rapidity of technological advance in vessel design and con-
struction and the enormous increases in marine traffic will require
a continuing review of international standards for navigational
safety. There seems to be an increasing disposition to seek interna-
tional solutions for these matters, and due account of recent devel-
opments should be taken in formulating or reformulating article 10
of the Convention on the High Seas.
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT WITHOUT
GLOBAL AGREEMENT: UNITED STATES POLICIES AND
THEIR IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION
H. Gary Knight*
I. INTRODUCTION
A strong case can be made concerning the international legal right
of a coastal state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over fishing to a
distance of at least 12 nautical miles from its coast.' Within that
area the coastal state is possessed of absolute jurisdiction concern-
ing if, by whom, when, where, and how fishing activities may be
undertaken. Existing international law also recognizes the exclusive
jurisdiction of the coastal state over sedentary species of living re-
sources within the legally defined Continental Shelf.' However, sub-
stantial stocks of living marine resources remain beyond the reach
of these two concepts of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction. As a
result, a conflict has developed concerning the precise relationship
between coastal states' interests in fish stocks off their coasts, on the
one hand, and distant water fishing nations' assertions of the right
of the high seas freedom of fishing, on the other.' If the doctrine of
* Campanile Charities Professor of Marine Resources Law, Louisiana State University Law
Center; Member, the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea (National Security Council
Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force); Executive Board of the Law of the Sea Institute
(University of Rhode Island); Board of Editors of the Journal of Ocean Development and
International Law; Board of Review and Development of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law. A.B., Stanford University, 1961; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1964.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3, 23. Some
judges felt that there was insufficient evidence to declare a maximum limit to exclusive
fishing zones. See Churchill, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the Inter-
national Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal States' Fisheries Rights, 24 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 82, 87-92 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Churchill].
As of February 1, 1974, only 18 nations claimed fishing jurisdiction zones of less than 12
miles, while 67 claimed 12 miles and an additional 34 claimed in excess of 12 miles. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 36, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS (rev. ed.
1974).
' Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, art. 2, para. 4, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective for United States June 10, 1964). Articles 1-3
of the Convention are generally regarded as being declaratory of customary international law.
See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 4, 39.
' Two of the major conflicts have been the "tuna war" between the United States and
certain Latin American nations (see, e.g., Loring, The United States-Peruvian "Fisheries"
Dispute, 23 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1971)) and the "cod war" between Iceland and nations fishing
off its coast (see, e.g., Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 37
[hereinafter cited as Bilder]).
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freedom of the high seas4 were to prevail in absolute form beyond
the 12-mile limit, then coastal states would have no special rights
vis-i-vis distant water nations, and the open access principle of
"first come, first served" would be applicable.' If coastal states are
possessed of some special rights with respect to fish in adjacent
waters, then this right constitutes a derogation from the norm of
freedom of the high seas which must receive international com-
munity sanction either through the customary law development
process or by international agreement.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the international legal
validity of unilaterally established 200-mile exclusive fishing zones.
Although the existing law of the sea provides for reasonable exercise
of the freedom of fishing beyond a relatively narrow band of terri-
torial waters, the international community is engaged in a process
of changing that legal regime. In that context it is the purpose of
this paper to suggest that the attempt to reach a new international
agreement concerning fisheries management on a global basis will
not succeed in a timely fashion, that the current development of
customary international law on the subject is so vague and ill-
defined as to be of little assistance in determining national policies,
and that the process of claim-response (centering about unilateral
claims to exclusive or preferential fishing zones to substantial dist-
ances from the coast) will be determinative, over the next decade
or two, of new emerging norms concerning fishery rights in coastal
waters. The paper further examines likely United States legislation
with respect to fisheries off its coasts with emphasis on the effect of
such legislation on fishing activities of the Soviet Union.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TO RESOLVE THE FISHERIES PROBLEM
A. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
The issue of fisheries management is one of the most complex on
the agenda of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
4 This doctrine posits that no nation may validly purport to subject any part of the high
seas to its sovereignty, but that the freedoms of the high seas (including the freedom of
fishing) are to be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the interests of other states
in their exercise of freedoms of the high seas. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958,
art. 2, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective for United States
Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].
Excellent arguments have been advanced that this "open access" character of the high
seas may not only result in overfishing and stock depletion, but also will almost inevitably
lead to overcapitalization, gear congestion, and other forms of inefficiency. See, e.g., T.
CHRISTY, JR. & E. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES passim (1965).
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the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the Third Conference). Some
nations have supported in that forum a global agreement for the
management of marine fisheries based on a rational biological basis
rather than on politically motivated assertions of national sover-
eignty over large ocean areas.' The Caracas and Geneva sessions of
the Third Conference gave little assurance, however, that a timely,
comprehensive, and widely accepted law of the sea treaty can be
adopted.7 The agenda is too large, the participating nations too
numerous, and the Conference orientation much too political to
produce soon the desired agreement on scores of technical law of the
sea issues. In reporting to Congress on the Geneva session, a United
States representative noted that "[iut is now clear that the negotia-
tions cannot be completed before mid-1976 at the earliest, and at
this time it is not clear whether or not a treaty can be completed
during 1976."1 A target date to conclude a treaty was not agreed to
by the Conference. Further, it will be extremely difficult following
the Geneva session to stem the tide of unilateral action in the
ocean-many developed and developing nations alike are now
strongly inclined to protect their perceived ocean interests without
further delay. In my opinion, even the production of the Informal
Single Negotiating Text' (hereinafter referred to as Single Negotiat-
ing Text) at the Geneva session does not represent such a watershed
development as to have a marked influence on this trend toward
unilateral action, and such acts could conceivably rob the Third
' See, e.g., United States: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf, Aug. 8, 1974, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 [hereinafter cited as United
States: Draft Articles]; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [and others]: Draft Articles on
the Economic Zone, Aug. 5, 1974, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38.
' For discussions of the Caracas session see H. KNIGHT, THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW OF
THE SEA CONFERENCE: CARACAS (18 Am. Universities Fieldstaff R.: East Coast South America
Series No. 1, 1974); Hollick, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
Caracas Review, Feb. 1975 (paper delivered at the Joint Am. Enterprise Institute-Treasury
Dep't Conference); Knight, Treaty and Non-Treaty Approaches to Order in the World Ocean,
in PERSPECTIVES ON OCEAN POLICY 251 (C. Osgood ed. 1975); Miles, An Interpretation of the
.Caracas Proceedings, in LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 39 (T. Christy, Jr., T. Clingan,
Jr., J. Gamble, Jr., H. Knight, E. Miles eds. 1975); Alexander, Dead Ahead Toward a
Bounded Main, FORTUNE, Oct. 1974, at 129. But see Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1975).
Statement of John Morton Moore, May 19, 1975, Hearings on the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence Briefing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife, Conservation and the Environ-
ment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6,
pt. 1, at 134 [hereinafter cited as Statement of John Norton Moore].
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING
TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATING TEXT].
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Conference of its authoritative posture with respect to law of the sea
issues.
Even if an agreement were reached, the trends in the negotiations
make it clear that, at least with respect to fisheries, such an agree-
ment would constitute little more than a validation of unilateral
claims to broad fishing zones which might be expected in the wake
of a Third Conference failure. Although the Single Negotiating Text
is not an end product of the Third Conference, its economic zone
provisions concerning fisheries constitute, in the words of a United
States law of the sea negotiator reporting to Congress after the Ge-
neva session, "an indication of an overall package necessary for a
satisfactory treaty," and reflect "areas of broad support negotiated
within informal working groups."'" In short, the fishery articles in
the Single Negotiating Text represent a relatively high level of nego-
tiation and compromise, such that final treaty articles might differ
little from the present text. On the fishery articles, United States
negotiators noted further that the text "strongly confirms coastal
State conservation and management jurisdiction over coastal spec-
ies of fish out to 200 miles,"' and has "a strong tilt in the direction
of advancing the interests of coastal states."'2
Thus, whether the Third Conference fails entirely, or whether it
reaches agreement on fisheries issues by validating extensive coastal
state control, it appears that the future of international fisheries
management will almost assuredly develop in detail through the
customary international law process, with interactions among af-
fected states determining the ultimate outcome of that process.
B. The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases
On July 25, 1974, the International Court of Justice delivered its
opinion on the merits in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases. 3 The fac-
tual background of fishing practices off the coast of Iceland and the
long-standing dispute between Iceland and various distant water
fishing nations are well known. 4 The specific ruling of the Court was
that Iceland's 50-mile exclusive fishery zone was not opposable to
" Statement of John Norton Moore, supra note 8, at 135.
" Id. at 136.
11 Statement of Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., May 19, 1975, see reference cited supra note 8, at
138.
13 (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (Federal
Republic of Germany v. Iceland) [1974] I.C.J. 175. Subsequent citations are to the United
Kingdom case only; in most cases identical or quite similar language can be found in the
Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland opinion.
" The best and most thorough background article on the subject is Bilder, supra note 3.
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the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.', The
Court went beyond this technical holding, however, to assert the
existence of a new rule of customary international law concerning
preferential rights of coastal states in fisheries off their coasts. Ac-
cording to the opinion, such rights do not exist ab initio, as in the
case of Continental Shelf resource rights, but rather must be proven
according to several criteria set forth in the opinion. First, there
must be a special dependence of the coastal state on the fishery
resources.'6 Second, there must exist a scientifically demonstrated
need to limit the catch in a given fishery to a level below that taken
by all states fishing in the area." Third, the Court stated that such
preferential rights should not be implemented unilaterally but must
be developed through agreement between the states concerned and,
in case of disagreement,through the means for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes provided for in article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations.' Fourth, the Court noted that the concept of pref-
erential rights was not static and that since such rights are a func-
tion of dependence they may vary as the extent of the dependence
changes.'"
The Court went on to recognize the rights of states other than the
coastal state by observing:
A coastal State entitled to preferential rights is not free, unilater-
ally and according to its own uncontrolled discretion, to determine
the extent of those rights. . . . The coastal State has to take into
account and pay regard to the position of such other States, partic-
ularly when they have established an economic dependence on the
same fishing grounds.
Considerations similar to those which have prompted recogni-
tion of the preferential rights of the coastal State in a special
situation apply when coastal populations in other fishing States
are also dependent on certain fishing grounds. 0
If what the court says is a new rule of customary international law
is in fact a rule of customary international law, then this framework
must be the basis governing relations between coastal and distant
water fishing nations in the future. Even if the rule is as the Court
,1 [1974] I.C.J. at 29.
16 Id. at 24.
17 Id.
" Id. at 26.
" Id. at 30.
20 Id. at 27-28, 29.
1976]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
says it is, however, the vagueness of the criteria for establishing the
various elements leading to preferential and established rights leave
so many questions unanswered that it is difficult to derive much real
guidance from the opinion. The words of an earlier arbitration opin-
ion dealing with the Continental Shelf during the formative stages
of that legal doctrine are most appropriate here:
I am of [the] opinion that there are in this field so many ragged
ends and unfilled blanks, so much that is merely tentative and
exploratory, that in no form can a doctrine claim as yet to have
assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or the definitive status of an
established rule of international law.21
Probably the better interpretation of the cases is that the concept
described by the Court is, in fact, not a rule of customary interna-
tional law at all. This view is presented most forcefully by Robin R.
Churchill in a recent issue of the International and Comparative
Law Quarterly.22 Churchill argues persuasively that there is no ana-
lytic evidence in the opinion to support the Court's conclusion that
a new rule of customary international law has arisen along the lines
it suggests-there is a lack of opinio juris, and the Court clearly has
ventured into the field of lex ferenda rather than rendering an opin-
ion lex lata. Although evidence shows some practice in the direction
of preferential rights, there does not as yet exist any evidence that
nations being granted preferential rights off their coasts in bilateral
or multilateral arrangements are being accorded those favors as a
matter of right; rather the favors are merely a matter of expediency
or comity.n If this analysis is correct, or even if the Court's holding
is considered valid but ineffective because of its "ragged ends and
unfilled blanks," the actual legal status of marine fisheries beyond
the 12-mile limit is yet to be finally determined.
III. SOME LIKELY FUTURE FISHERIES PRACTICES
If in fact both the Third Conference and the I.C.J. have failed so
far to give concrete guidance concerning the international legal sta-
tus of high seas fisheries, then it is up to nations, through their
actions and reactions, to develop a new normative structure. The
remainder of this paper is directed to some general and specific
thoughts along these lines.
22 Petroleum Dev. (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247,
256 (1952) (Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, Umpire).
22 Churchill, supra note 1. See also Note, Law of the Sea-Exclusive Economic Zone, 16
HARV. INT'L L.J. 474, 482 (1975).
23 Churchill, supra note 1, at 94-98.
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A. Range of Expected Unilateral Fishery Actions
It is not particularly difficult to predict the types of unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral actions which are likely to be taken with
respect to the management of marine fisheries. This is so because
the voluminous record of proposals and statements made in the
United Nations Seabed Committee from 1968 through 1973, coupled
with the proposals and statements made during the Third Confer-
ence sessions in Caracas and Geneva, indicate clearly the probable
course of events. What can be expected then is a combination of the
following types of activities.
1. Broad Exclusive Fishing Zone Claims
Many nations, principally developing coastal states but also in-
cluding some developed nations, will unilaterally assert jurisdiction
over 200-mile (or, perhaps, broader) exclusive fishing zones. The
juridical nature of such zones, as asserted by these states, will be
such as to preclude any distant water fishing effort as a matter of
right. No fishing in such zones may be undertaken without the
express consent of the coastal state, and then only pursuant to its
regulations and licensing arrangements. Responses to this type of
claim will probably fall into one of the following four classes: (1)
abandonment of any attempts to fish in such zones by the distant
water state with attendant economic dislocation; (2) refusal to ac-
cept the legal validity of such zones by the distant water state and
ensuing conflict (either physical or juridical) as a result of continued
fishing activity; (3) negotiation of a bilateral treaty governing access
by the distant water state upon specified condictions; or (4) devel-
opment of business arrangements between the fishing enterprise
and the coastal state.
2. Broad Preferential Fishing Zone Claims
Coastal states may establish 200-mile (or, perhaps, broader)
preferential fishing zones. In such zones the rights of distant water
states having access to the zone would be set forth in the unilateral
proclamation and might contain preferences based on historic fish-
ing rights, geographical proximity, dependence, and so forth. In any
case, however, these recognized distant water fishing rights could be
exercised only (1) if the coastal state did not exploit all of the allow-
able catch of a stock, (2) pursuant to the regulations imposed on the
zone by the coastal state, and (3) upon compliance with licensing
arrangements. The anticipated responses to such preferential zone
19761
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claims include the range of options mentioned above for exclusive
zones, although the potential for conflict is much less since the legal
right of the distant water state, albeit less than a right of high seas
freedom of fishing, would be recognized in this type of claim.
3. Anadromous Species Claims
Unilateral assertions by "host" states can be expected for anad-
romous species. The claim will be for management control through-
out the migratory cycle of the species. Such a claim would conflict
with high seas freedom of fishing even beyond broad exclusive fish-
ery zones. Responses to such claims would likely include the follow-
ing: (1) acquiescence in the claim by nations fishing anadromous
species on the high seas, with attendant economic dislocation; (2)
refusal to recognize the validity of such host state claims and ensu-
ing conflict should the host state seek to enforce its claims beyond
any economic resource or fishery zone; or (3) negotiation of a bilat-
eral or multilateral treaty among the affected states providing for
rational (biologically oriented) management of anadromous species
and an appropriate allocation of the benefits of the exploitation
thereof.
4. Adverse Effects on Existing Multilateral and Bilateral
Arrangements
Existing fishery commissions may be adversely affected where
their jurisdictional reaches (whether area or stock oriented) overlap
with unilaterally claimed exclusive or preferential fishing zones or
in situations where states withdraw their support from such institu-
tions because of conflict between distant water and coastal state
fishing rights. Such conventions and commissions may have to be
restructured to take into consideration the new geographical reach
of exclusive and preferential fishing zones.
Likewise, bilateral arrangements may be vitiated when an exclu-
sive fishing zone claim encompasses the area subject to the earlier
bilateral treaty. Three basic options are available in this situation:
(1) the unilateral claim might supersede the earlier arrangement,
terminating it short of its full term, possibly with resulting conflict;
(2) the unilateral claim could permit the continuation of existing
bilateral arrangements, but terminate them at their conclusion; or
(3) the unilateral claim could provide for continuation of bilateral
or multilateral arrangements within some framework set out in the
coastal state's law or proclamation.
Though not exhaustive, the above enumeration gives some idea
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of the range of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral activities with
respect to marine fisheries which may be expected in the relatively
near future. It is from such actions and reactions that the new
international law of high seas fishery management will likely evolve.
B. United States Fisheries Policy-Executive and Legislative
In order to provide a background to the likely congressional initia-
tives with respect to a broad exclusive United States fishery zone,
the major facets of United States fishery policy to date will be
briefly reviewed.
1. The "Second" Truman Proclamation
Modern United States high seas fishery policy began with the
"second" Truman Proclamation of 1954.24 That document provided
that the United States Government regarded as proper the estab-
lishment of "explicitly bounded" conservation zones in high seas
areas, but that where fishing activities involved nationals of other
countries such zones were to be established only pursuant to agree-
ments between the United States and the other affected states.
Similar rights were recognized for other nations, provided the inter-
ests of United States fishermen operating off their coasts were simi-
larly recognized. This policy was entirely consistent with the obliga-
tions later assumed by the United States when it became a party
to the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas. 5 Although the United States has put
forward more sophisticated proposals in the current law of the sea
negotiations, the Truman Proclamation remains the cornerstone of
United States fishery policy, viz., that areas more than 12 miles
from the coast are high seas and therefore subject to freedom of
fishing as one of the recognized freedoms of the high seas; that
management and conservation systems on the high seas are proper
only if they are the product of agreement among all affected nations;
and that no nation has the right to unilaterally exclude other na-
tions from fishing beyond the 12-mile limit.
" Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High
Seas, Pres. Procl. No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Comp.), reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.
486 (1945). This should not be confused with the more well-known "Truman Proclamation"
dealing with Continental Shelf Resources, namely, Policy of the United States with Respect
to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Pres. Procl.
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Comp.), reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (1945).
25 April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective for
United States March 20, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion]. The Soviet Union is not a party to the treaty.
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2. The 12-Mile Exclusive Fishing Zone
In 1966 the United States adopted a 12-mile exclusive fishing
zone."6 As noted above, it seems fairly clear today that zones of that
limit are recognized as valid in international law.Y Considering the
trend of the law of the sea negotiations toward ever broader fishery
zones, it is not likely that any future domestic or international de-
velopments will affect the 12-mile zone. The importance of the 1966
legislation for future fisheries policy is that the United States did
not automatically terminate all foreign fishing in the zone when it
was promulgated.
The first section of the act provides that the claimed exclusive
fishing rights are "subject to the continuation of traditional fishing
by foreign states within this zone as may be recognized by the
United States. 128 The United States subsequently recognized tradi-
tional fishing rights in agreements with Canada 29 and Mexico."0
Other agreements, providing access to the zone but without recog-
nizing traditional rights per se, were negotiated with Japan,3' Po-
land, 2 Romania, 33 South Korea, 3 and the Soviet Union. 5 Since, as
will be noted in more detail shortly, the notion of historic fishing
rights is embodied in both executive and legislative branch fishery
" Exclusive Fisheries Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1094 (1970). The act establishes a
fisheries zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States in which that nation
exercises "the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries .. as it has in its territorial sea
. ... " Id. § 1091.
7 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3.
- 16 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970).
2 Agreement with Canada on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges in Certain Areas off their
Coasts, June 15, 1973, [19731 2 U.S.T. 1729, T.I.A.S. No. 7676 (effective June 16, 1973).
30 Agreement with Mexico on Traditional Fishing in the Exclusive Fishery Zones Contig-
uous to the Territorial Seas of Both Countries, Oct. 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2724, T.I.A.S.
No. 6359 (effective Jan. 1, 1968). This agreement is no longer in force.
31 See, e.g., Agreement with Japan Concerning Certain Fisheries off the Coast of the United
States, Dec. 24, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 7986 (effective Dec. 24, 1974).
32 See, e.g., Agreement with Poland Regarding Fisheries in the Western Region of the
Middle Atlantic Ocean, June 2, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1519, T.I.A.S. No. 7659 (effective July
1, 1973).
33 See, e.g., Agreement with Romania Regarding Fisheries in the Western Region of the
Middle Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 4, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 2366, T.I.A.S. No. 7761 (effective Dec.
4, 1973).
See, e.g., Agreement with Korea Concerning Cooperation in Fisheries, Nov. 24, 1972,
[1972] 4 U.S.T. 3702, T.I.A.S. No. 7517 (effective Dec. 12, 1972).
See, e.g., Agreement with the Soviet Union on Certain Fishery Problems on the High
Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 11, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2664,
T.I.A.S. No. 7009 (effective Jan. 1, 1971). See generally Fidell, Ten Years Under the Bartlett
Act: A Status Report on the Prohibition of Foreign Fishing, 54 B.U.L. REv. 703, 708-13 (1974);
Windley, International Practice Regarding Traditional Fishing Privileges of Foreign
Fishermen in Zones of Extended Maritime Jurisdiction, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 490 (1969).
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policies, it may be expected-based on the 12-mile zone experi-
ence-that no total economic dislocation would occur in the event
the United States adopts a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone.
3. Sedentary Species Protection Regulations of December, 1974
Effective December 5, 1974, the United States Government
adopted a new policy with respect to Continental Shelf fishery re-
sources, providing for the arrest and seizure of vessels taking such
resources (except as provided in bilateral agreements) in cases
where either fishing on the high seas involved gear designed specifi-
cally to catch Continental Shelf fishery resources, or high seas fish-
ing could be expected to result in the catch of Continental Shelf
fishery resources .3 The provision for exceptions in cases of bilateral
agreements would appear to permit some flexibility in the imple-
mentation of the policy in situations where agreements with a dis-
tant water state permit the catch of sedentary species or specifically
permit the use of gear which might otherwise be suspect.
4. Position in the Third Conference: Fishery Provision of the
Informal Single Negotiating Text
a. United States Position. The most current proposal of the
United States Government with respect to high seas fisheries (hav-
ing abandoned the "species approach" for coastal fisheries which it
introduced earlier in the negotiations) 7 is predicated on coastal
state exercise of exclusive regulatory rights within an established
economic zone, subject to the requirement that the coastal state
ensure the "full utilization" of renewable resources within such
zone. 38 The United States proposal provides that:
[Tihe coastal State shall permit nationals of other States to fish
for that portion of the allowable catch of the renewable resources
not fully utilized by its nationals, subject to the conservation mea-
sures adopted pursuant to article 12, and on the basis of the follow-
ing priorities:
Guidelines for Enforcement of United States Rights to Continental Shelf Fishery Re-
sources, Dep't State Press'Release No. 363 (Sept. 12, 1974). See also Hearings on S. 1988
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 22-25, 48, 52, 68-69
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings]; Rovine,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 69 AM. J. INT'L
L. 141, 149 (1975).
" The "species approach" was set forth in United States Revised Fisheries Article, Aug.
4,1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III.9.
" See United States: Draft Articles, supra note 6. See also Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee Hearings, supra note 36, at 34-35, 39-40 (Statement of Ambassador John R. Steven-
son).
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(a) States that have normally fished for a resource, subject to
the conditions of paragraph 3 [of article 13];
(b) States in the region, particularly land-locked States and
States with limited access to living resources off their coast; and
(c) all other States.
The coastal State may establish reasonable regulations and re-
quire the payment of reasonable fees for this purpose.39
The historic fishing rights mentioned in subparagraph (a) of article
13, paragraph 2, "reasonably related to the extent of fishing by such
State." Article 13, paragraph 3 provides further that:
Whenever necessary to reduce such fishing in order to accommo-
date an increase in the harvesting capacity of a coastal State, such
reduction shall be without discrimination, and the coastal State
shall enter into consultations for this purpose at the request of the
State or States concerned. with a view to minimizing adverse eco-
nomic consequences of such reduction.40
With respect to anadromous species, the United States proposal
provides that only the host state shall have a right of fishing for
anadromous species beyond the limit of the territorial sea or eco-
nomic zone unless it authorizes exploitation by other states.4' With
respect to highly migratory species, regulation by the coastal state
within the economic zone and by the flag state beyond would be
conducted in accordance with regulations established by appropri-
ate international or regional fishing organizations.4 1
This policy position clearly evidences the willingness of the execu-
tive branch to accept foreign fishing within an extended fishery
zone, with limitations, though this position is largely predicated
upon the distant water fishing interests of the United States.
b. Fishery Provisions of the Single Negotiating Text. The gen-
eral rights of coastal states in an economic resource zone with re-
spect to fishery resources are set out in article 45 of the Single
Negotiating Text as follows:
1. In an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, de-
scribed as the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether re-
newable or non-renewable, of the bed and subsoil and the superja-
cent waters .... ,1
' United States: Draft Articles, supra note 6, art. 13, para. 2.
,0 Id. art. 13, para. 3.
' Id. art. 18.
" Id. art. 19.
" NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 9, pt. II, art. 45, para. 1.
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Articles 50 to 60 set forth details of the fisheries regime which may
be summarized as follows:
(1) Allowable catch within the economic zone is to be deter-
mined by the coastal state, which has a duty to manage properly
fishery stocks so as to avoid over exploitation.44
(2) A coastal state must promote "optimum utilization" of fish-
ery resources in the zone; to this end, it determines its own harvest
capacity and is obligated to give other states access to any surplus
through appropriate agreements and arrangements.4"
(3) Criteria to be considered in allocating surplus stocks to dis-
tant water fishing nations include "the significance of the renewable
resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned
and its other national interests,"" the interests of land-locked
states,4" geographical disadvantage coupled with dependence on
fishing in economic zones of neighboring states in a region or subre-
gion,48 and "the need to minimize economic dislocation in States
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have
made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks."49
(4) Distant water states exercising a right of access must comply
with the management regime established by the coastal state,
including licensing and enforcement procedures."
(5) Stocks migrating off the coasts of two or more states are to
be managed through systems agreed upon by the affected states. 5'
(6) Highly migratory species are to be managed on a cooperative
basis by the coastal state and states whose nationals fish such spec-
ies, either directly or through international organizations.52
(7) Host state management rights and catch preferences for an-
adromous species are established, except where a high seas ban
would "result in economic dislocation for a State other than the
State of origin . . . ." in which case the state of origin is required
to "co-operate in minimizing economic dislocation in such other
States fishing these stocks . . .,51
(8) Enforcement jurisdiction is accorded to the coastal state
" Id. pt. II, art. 50, para. 1, 2.
' Id. pt. II, art. 51, para. 1, 2.
" Id. pt. II, art. 51, para. 3.
" Id. pt. II, art. 57.
Id. pt. II, art. 58.
" Id. pt. II, art. 51, para. 3.
s' Id. pt. II, art. 51, para. 4.
s' Id. pt. II, art. 52.
" Id. pt. II, art. 53.
Id. pt. II, art. 54.
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within the economic zone, including the rights of boarding, inspec-
tion, arrest, and judicial proceedings necessary to ensure compli-
ance with its laws and regulations."
The Single Negotiating Text, then, provides in essence for a sys-
tem of coastal state preferential rights, with recognition of tradi-
tional fishing effort.
Although, as noted previously, it does not seem likely that the
Third Conference will produce a timely and widely accepted inter-
national agreement along these lines, the provisions are nonetheless
quite important because the law of the sea negotiators for the
United States Government, in their desire to see the Single Negoti-
ating Text system universally applied, are likely to press for adop-
tion of that system in any unilateral action taken by the United
States Congress during 1975. The impact of this position will be
discussed in the next section concerning the relationships between
the executive and legislative branches of government and the likely
timing and substance of United States unilateral action on fisheries.
5. The Executive-Legislative Dichotomy; The Future of
Cooperation
Until quite recently the executive and legislative branches of the
United States Government had substantially different views on
coastal fisheries management action, although the Caracas proposal
of the executive branch brought the positions relatively close to-
gether as far as substance is concerned." This variance stemmed in
part from the different governmental functions carried out by the
two branches. The executive branch is concerned with the conduct
of foreign relations, and must therefore take into consideration all
law of the sea (and other international relations) interests in deter-
mining its fisheries position, and is strongly affected by other do-
mestic policies (the "species approach," for example, was largely
dictated by the perceived needs of the Department of Defense and
its concern with "creeping jurisdiction"). Congress, on the other
hand, is more subject to constituent pressures," more apt to respond
, Id. pt. II, art. 60, para. 1.
See, e.g., the comparison between the United States Caracas Proposal and Senate Bill
1988 in Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., at 180 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings].
The public pressure for establishment of a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone should not be
underestimated. For some expressions of this public support see reference cited note 55 supra,
at 115-36, and articles on the following pages of the Congressional Record: 121 CONG. REC.
E213 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. E229 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1975); 121 CONG. REC.
E602 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1975); 121 CONG. REc. H1075 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1975); 121 CONG.
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in a manner which prefers some aspects of the fishing industry over
others (a dominance of coastal fishing representation over distant
water representation, for example), and is less subject to the per-
ceived needs of federal agencies.
The principal difference in approach between the two branches of
government has been with respect to timing. As noted above, the
United States finally came to support the economic resource zone
concept in Caracas-albeit with conditions, particularly the "full
utilization" or preferential rights concept for coastal fisheries-and
the Congress has long evidenced support for an extended fishing
zone off the United States coast. Because of the ongoing law of the
sea negotiations and the Third Conference, however, the executive
had opposed any unilateral congressional action on the subject on
the theory that enactment of such a law would adversely affect
United States interests in the negotiations. It now appears that even
this disagreement about timing will no longer stand between the two
branches of government in their mutual desire for protection and
proper management of United States coastal fisheries. Two factors
have contributed to the very recent revision of executive branch
policy on fisheries legislation.
First, Senate Bill 1988, which would have established a 200-mile
fishing zone, passed the United States Senate in December 1974 by
a 68-27 vote.5" This occurred in spite of a vigorous campaign on the
part of the executive branch to defeat the bill, including letters or
testimony in opposition from the President,"s the Secretary of
State,"9 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,6" the Deputy
Secretary of Defense,' the Deputy Secretary of State," and the
Acting Secretary of State . 3 The bill failed to pass in the House of
Representatives only because of tactical-not substantive-oppo-
REC. H1435 (daily ed. March 6, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. S3468 (daily ed. March 7, 1975); 121
CONG. REC. H1495 (daily ed. March 10, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. S3564 (daily ed. March 11,
1975); 121 CONG. REC. E1130 (daily ed. March 13, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. E1205 (daily ed.
March 17, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. E1498 (daily ed. March 26, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. E1696
(daily ed. April 10, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. E1746 (daily ed. April 15, 1975); 121 CONG. REC.
E1776 (daily ed. April 16, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. S6450 (daily ed. April 22, 1975); 121 CONG.
REC. E1994 (daily ed. April 24, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. E2113 (daily ed. April 30, 1975). Contra,
121 CONG. REC. E2121 (daily ed. May 1, 1975).
" The vote was nonpartisan, Democrats voting 42-12 in favor, Republicans voting 25-15 in
favor, and one Independent also voting in favor.
' Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, supra note 55, at 258.
"' Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 36, at 79.
"0 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, supra note 55, at 35.
" Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, supra note 36, at 77.
, S. REP. No. 93-1166, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
Id. at 2.
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sition. Although S. 1988 died with the closing of the 93d Congress,
new fishery management bills have been introduced in the 94th
Congress, including one identical to S. 1988. The obvious point is
that the executive branch can no longer be confident of staving
off congressional action.
Second, the Geneva session of the Third Conference did not pro-
duce sufficient progress to enable the executive branch to make a
strong case for holding off on unilateral action on the basis that a
treaty would be negotiated early in 1976. As noted above, United
States negotiators at Geneva reported to Congress that the negotia-
tions could not be completed before mid-1976 at the earliest and
that it was unclear whether a treaty could be completed during 1976
at all. 4 With little prospect of timely agreement, then, the executive
branch has poor credibility with a "wait on the Third Conference
outcome" approach to interim legislation.
Accordingly, in testimony before a subcommittee of the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on May 19, 1975, the
executive branch announced a new approach to unilateral fisheries
action:
[W]e are now conducting a thorough reevaluation of our in-
terim policy [which had been to oppose unilateral fisheries zone
extension legislation] to ensure the necessary balance is found
between our broad interest in a multilateral resolution of oceans'
problems and our more immediate needs, particularly the protec-
tion of coastal fisheries stocks. . . . This reevaluation will take
into account the strong preference of many members of Congress
for an extension of coastal fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles .... 1-
It should be noted that the reevaluation is not one of fundamental
law of the sea or fisheries policy, but rather of the executive branch's
prior opposition to domestic legislation before completion of a law
of the sea treaty. Thus one should not expect much, if any, substan-
tive alteration in United States fisheries policy, but there well may
be a change in the method by which that policy is effectuated.
This reevaluation will be undertaken in close cooperation with
members of Congress and their committee staffs, 6 and the testi-
' See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
e' Statement of John Norton Moore, supra note 8.
*6 Representative McCloskey of California made a strong appeal during the May 19, 1975,
hearing that staff members from the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee be
included in the internal deliberations of the executive branch on the revision of its interim
fisheries policy. See reference cited supra note 8, at 148. Discussions with various congres-
sional staff members lead me to the conclusion that Congress will insist on such a "joint"
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mony promised completion of the study and consultation "by, or
soon after, the August congressional recess" at which time recom-
mendations concerning interim legislation would be submitted as
well as an evaluation of the factors considered in reaching the new
position.t It is not likely, however, that Congress will wait until
September to proceed further on fisheries zone legislation. The more
likely scenario is that the Senate Commerce Committee, following
its June 5, 1975, hearing will proceed to revise the draft legislation
and have a bill acceptable to the full Senate ready by the end of July
or, at the latest, early September (Congress recesses during August).
The House will probably move even more expeditiously, possibly
having a marked up bill in hand by the end of June. Assuming that
any conflicts between the executive and legislative branches can be
worked out, the bill will very likely be passed by both houses and
signed by the President in September or October 1975.67 If in fact
the bill reflects executive-legislative compromises, then a presiden-
tial veto is unlikely since the executive position would presumably
be reflected in the law. However, it is conceivable that Congress
would not accept the executive position and enact a bill which
might force a veto. Whether such a veto could be overridden is
problematical, though recent indications are that Congress as pres-
ently constituted does not have sufficient votes to override impor-
tant legislative vetoes.
Senate Bill 9618 obviously reflects the consensus of the Senate on
what the bill ought to look like (though the management provisions
are likely to be somewhat revised). The executive, as noted above,
would like for the ultimate law to conform as nearly as possible to
the Single Negotiating Text provisions on fisheries in order that the
United States action (1) be consistent with negotiated articles and
(2) not require any substantial alteration of domestic law when such
a treaty is ultimately adopted. Because S. 961 does, by and large,
reflect the United States position taken in the Third Conference and
the fishery provisions of the Single Negotiating Text, it will be ana-
lyzed in the next section as a likely example of what United States
fishery zone legislation will look like when it becomes law in the fall
of 1975.
policy rather than awaiting a report by the Executive in the late summer or early fall on its
reassessment of fisheries policy.
t [Ed. Note] In fact, when the executive branch finally testified, it did not, as promised,
change its position, but remained adamantly opposed to enactment of the 200-mile fishery
zone bill.
" [Ed. Note] In fact, the bill was passed by the Congress in January of 1976.
68 S. 961, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
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6. Analysis of Proposed United States Fishery Zone Legislation
a. Description. Although a plethora of bills on fishery manage-
ment and fishery zones have been introduced in the 94th Congress,
only two will be described here since they represent two main trends
of thinking on the issue. The first is S. 961, authored by Senator
Magnuson and commonly known as the "Magnuson Bill," and the
other is H.R. 1070, authored by Representative Sullivan and com-
monly known as the "Sullivan Bill."69
The Magnuson bill has as its purpose the protection and conser-
vation of "threatened stocks of fish," and asserts "fishery manage-
ment responsibility and authority over fish" to a distance of 200
miles from the coast and beyond with respect to anadromous spec-
ies.7 The bill provides that it is not to contravene any treaty or
international agreement "other than that necessary to further the
purposes of the act."' Highly migratory species are not included
within the management responsibility unless they are not otherwise
managed.7 2 The bill carries forward the concept of preferential rights
for the coastal state, subject to recognized traditional fishing rights.
Traditional foreign fishing is defined as
longstanding, active, and continuous fishing for a particular stock
of fish by citizens of a particular foreign nation in compliance with
any applicable international fishery agreements and with the laws
of such foreign nation."
Pursuant to the bill, distant water fishing would be allowed in the
zone only for nations having traditionally engaged in such fishing
prior to the date of enactment of the new law and only as approved
by a combined recommendation of the Secretaries of State, Com-
merce, and Treasury.7" Further, the grant of access for foreign fish-
ing is conditioned upon reciprocity with respect to United States
fishing in the waters of that nation, and subject to fees to defer
administrative and management expenses.75
The Secretary of State is authorized to negotiate with distant
water states to effectuate the management objectives of the act with
respect to the conservation of coastal, anadromous, and highly mi-
" H.R. 1070, 94th Cong., lt Sess. (1975).
7 S. 961, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1975).
" Id. § 2(c)(2).
72 Id. § 4(a)(3).
73 Id. § 3(16).
7, Id. § 5(a).
"' Id. §§ 5(c), (d)(2).
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gratory species.7" Included in this authority is the power to review
existing conventions or fishery agreements to determine whether
they are consistent with the act, and to renegotiate them should
they be inconsistent with it." Finally, United States recognition of
other exclusive fishery zones extending beyond 12 miles is based
upon the recognition of the traditional fishing rights of United
States citizens in such zones.7" This last provision permits the
United States to continue to declare as violative of international law
the exclusive fishery zones of west coast Latin American nations
(and others) which deny any right of access to United States citi-
zens, thus permitting continued application of the Fishermen's Pro-
tective Act 79 pursuant to which fines and other charges levied
against United States fishing vessels seized on the high seas are
reimbursed to the fisherman by the United States Government.
Such an approach thus permits the United States to manage and
conserve fishery resources off its own coast without having to depart
from its support of tuna fishermen operating in the South Pacific.
The Sullivan bill would, in effect, implement the provisions of the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas. 0 The Secretary of Commerce would be authorized
to promulgate regulations affecting fishing activities in high seas
areas beyond the presently claimed 12-mile exclusive fishery zone
with respect either to United States citizens or to foreign vessels of
a state party to an international agreement with the United States
for the purposes of fishery management.8 ' No specific seaward limit
is specified for this authority, just as in the case of the "second"
Truman Proclamation.
It is the judgment of most observers that the Sullivan bill has
little chance of passage and that the Magnuson bill approach is
most likely to be reflected in the ultimately enacted law.
b. The Bargaining Position Factor. This and the subsequent sec-
tion assumes-with some justification in my opinion-(1) that the
Magnuson bill, or legislation similar thereto, will be enacted some-
time in 1975, (2) that no international fisheries agreement will have
been reached by that time, and (3) that the Soviet Union will desire
to maintain its current level of fishing activity off the Atlantic Coast
Id. § 7(a).
I7 d. § 7(b).
, Id. § 7(d).
" Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-77 (1970).
Supra note 25.
' H.R. 1070, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975).
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of the United States.82
The respective bargaining positions of the United States and the
Soviet Union concerning fishery resources within 200 miles of the
United States coast differ according to varying legal arrangements.
Under the concept of absolute freedom of the high seas, the Soviet
Union has a clear bargaining edge because of (1) the open access
character of high seas fisheries, and (2) its superior technology for
harvesting such resources." Under this legal concept the Soviet
Union may fish in waters beyond 12 miles from the coast without
submitting to any regulation or restriction except that which it vol-
untarily chooses to accept.84 In such a situation the United States
is at a considerable disadvantage unless it can find tradeoffs in
which the Soviet Union is sufficiently interested to accept some
limitations on its fishing effort. This has, of course, occurred in the
several bilateral fishing agreements between the two nations and a
multilateral agreement to which both were parties. 5
Under the concept of preferential rights as enunciated by the
International Court of Justice, 8 there is little doubt that Soviet
fishing activities would meet the test of "established rights" under
the criteria set forth in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases. It seems less
82 For an analysis of the level of Soviet foreign fishing, and an argument against any future
limitation of its expansion, see SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SOVIET
OCEAN ACTIvrrIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY 12 (Comm. Print 1975).
3 Id. at 9-16.
High Seas Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, [1957] 2
U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 (effective for United States Oct. 14, 1957);
Agreement with the Soviet Union Relating to Fishing Operations in the Northeastern Pacific
Ocean, Dec. 14, 1964, [19641 2 U.S.T. 2179, T.I.A.S. No. 5703 (effective Dec. 14, 1964);
Agreement with the Soviet Union Relating to Fishing for King Crab, Feb. 5, 1965, [1965] 1
U.S.T. 24, T.I.A.S. No. 5752 (effective Feb. 5, 1965); Agreement with the Soviet Union on
Certain Fishery Problems in the Northeastern Part of the Pacific Ocean off the Coast of the
United States, Feb. 13, 1967, [1967] 1 U.S.T. 190, T.I.A.S. No. 6218 (effective Feb. 13, 1967);
Agreement with the Soviet Union on Certain Fishery Problems on the High Seas in the
Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Oceans, Dec. 13, 1968, [1968] 6 U.S.T. 7661, T.I.A.S.
No. 6603 (effective Jan. 1, 1969); Agreement with the Soviet Union on Certain Fisheries
Problems in the Northeastern Part of the Pacific Ocean off the Coast of the United States,
Feb. 21, 1973, [1973] 1 U.S.T. 631, T.I.A.S. No. 7573 (effective Feb. 21, 1973); Agreement
with the Soviet Union Relating to Fishing Operations in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean, Feb.
21, 1973 [1973] 1 U.S.T. 617, T.I.A.S. No. 7572 (effective Feb. 21, 1973); Agreement with
the Soviet Union Relating to Fishing for King and Tanner Crab, Feb. 21, 1973, [19731 1
U.S.T. 603, T.I.A.S. No. 7571 (effective Feb. 21, 1973); Agreement with the Soviet Union on
Certain Fishery Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic
Ocean, Feb. 26, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8021 (effective Feb. 26, 1975, except for paragraphs 4 & 5;
effective April 1, 1975 for paragraphs 4 & 5); Agreement with the Soviet Union Extending
the Agreements of February 21, 1973, Feb. 26, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8020 (effective Feb. 26, 1975)
(renegotiated July 18, 1975).
"6 See notes 13-23 supra and accompanying text.
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sure, but still likely, that the United States could meet the test of
"preferential rights" under criteria also laid down in that opinion.
This being the case, the Court's decision implies that the two na-
tions would be under a duty to negotiate an acceptable allocation
of fishery resources off the Atlantic Coast of the United States. In
effect, this would put the two nations in a position of equal bargain-
ing strength from the standpoint of legal rights, since neither prefer-
ential nor established rights seems, in the Court's view, to have
precedence over the other.
Finally, under a 200-mile United States exclusive fishing zone,
assuming either its acceptance by the Soviet Union or its interna-
tional legal validity, the bargaining power would shift strongly to
the United States, since it would then possess the right to exclude
all foreign fishing efforts if it so chose. Although total exclusion is
not likely, it is the legal position from which future negotiations
could begin. How "historic" or "traditional" fishing effort is treated
in such negotiations raises a distinct issue.
c. Implementation of Historic Rights (Including the Status of
Existing Treaties). To analyze the Magnuson bill, the first inquiry
must be whether Soviet fishing activities would meet the definition
of "traditional foreign fishing" set forth in section 3(16) of the pro-
posed legislation (see text accompanying note 72, supra) because
section 5(a) provides that foreign fishing may only be authorized "if
such nation has traditionally engaged in such fishing prior to the
date of enactment of this Act.""7 That the Soviet Union's fishing
efforts off the United States coast meet the requirements of "long-
standing, active, and continuous fishing" is beyond doubt. It should
be noted, however, that the general level of effort would not result
in general historic rights, but rather that the test is "stock spe-
cific"-that is, the rights appertaining to a determination of "tradi-
tional foreign fishing" relate only to the "particular stock of fish"
upon which the historic effort has been expended."8 Anticipating
such a limitation, it is conceivable that the Soveit Union might
immediately begin fishing efforts with respect to heretofore unfished
stocks in order to establish historic rights under the bill. Such an
approach would be invalid, however, not only because it would vio-
late the spirit of the proposed legislation with respect to foreign
fishing (which is to avoid abrupt economic dislocation), but also
because it would be impossible in the short time remaining before
the bill becomes law (probably less than six months) to meet the
', S. 961, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (1975).
Id. § 3(16). See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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requirements of "longstanding, active, and continuous fishing."
It should be further noted that the definition is qualified by re-
quiring that such effort (1) be "in compliance with any applicable
international fishery agreements," and (2) in compliance "with the
laws of such foreign nation."" Thus, any breach of multilateral or
bilateral agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party relating
to fisheries off the United States coast would presumably be
grounds for denying the privileges attached to establishment of tra-
ditional fishing effort.
Even should the Soviet Union meet the definitional test of
"traditional foreign fishing," the bill further provides that such
rights shall not be recognized "unless any foreign nation claiming
such rights demonstrates that it grants similar traditional fishing
rights to citizens of the United States within the contiguous fishery
zone of such nation, if any exist, or with respect to anadromous
species which spawn in the fresh or estuarine waters of such na-
tions."90 It is unclear whether reference to the "contiguous fishery
zone of such nation" refers only to one of equal proportions with that
claimed by the United States under the bill, or would include pres-
ent 12-mile zones. "Contiguous fishery zone" is defined in the bill
as "a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States
within which the United States exercises exclusive fishery manage-
ment and conservation authority,"'" so it would appear not to be
limited to broad zones. Thus, the Soviet Union would be required
to demonstrate that it granted traditional fishing rights to United
States citizens in its claimed fishing zone. However, the qualifica-
tion in the definition of "contiguous fishery zone" that the area be
outside the territorial sea would at present make this a nonburden,
since the Soviet Union also claims a 12-mile territorial sea. It is
therefore my view that reciprocity would only have to be granted to
fishery zones claimed by the Soviet Union beyond twelve miles,
though the United States Government might take a different view
based on its adherence to a 3-mile maximum breadth for the terri-
torial sea.
Assuming that the tests so far discussed are met, there still re-
mains the requirement of section 5(d)(2) that nations exercising
foreign fishing rights must pay reasonable fees established by the
Secretary of Commerce. Such fees, according to the bill, are to be
set in an amount "sufficient to reimburse the United States for
S. 961, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (1975).
Id. § 5(c).
Id. § 3(4).
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adminstrative expenses incurred pursuant to this section and for an
equitable share of the management and conservation expenses in-
curred by the United States in accordance with this Act, including
the cost of regulation and enforcement.""2
As for existing United States-Soviet Union fishery treaties con-
cerning United States coastal stocks, the bill provides that the Sec-
retary of State in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce shall
review such agreements to "determine whether the provisions of
such agreements are consistent with the purposes, policy, and provi-
sions of this Act." 3 If a finding of inconsistency is made, the Secre-
tary of State is directed to "initiate negotiations to amend such
agreement." 4 However, the section contains a proviso, as follows:
[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to abrogate any duty
or responsibility of the United States under any lawful treaty,
convention, or other international agreement which is in effect on
the date of enactment of this Act. 5
That would seem clear enough on its face-current agreements be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union would be honored
until their expiration-except for the policy declaration in section
2(c)(2) of the bill which provides that:
It is further declared to [be] the policy of the Congress in this
Act-
(2) to authorize no action, activity, or assertion of jurisdiction
in contravention of any existing treaty or other international agree-
ment to which the United States is party other than that necessary
to further the purposes of this Act . . ..
Since the principal purpose of the bill is "to take emergency action
to protect and conserve threatened stocks of fish by asserting fishery
management responsibility and authority over fish in an extended
contiguous fishery zone," 97 it is arguable that, section 7(b) notwith-
standing, the protection of threatened stocks of fish may require
abrogation or modification of existing international agreements,
including bilateral treaties between the United States and the So-
viet Union. The purpose of the "other than necessary" provision,
however, relates primarily to the enforcement sections of the Act.
,2 Id. § 5(d)(2).
,3 Id. § 7(b).
" Id.
" Id.
Id. § 2(c)(2) (emphasis added).
I d. §2(b)(1).
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Section 10 provides for enforcement by the Coast Guard within the
200-mile area, including the rights to board and inspect vessels, to
arrest persons if reasonable cause exists to believe that such persons
have committed acts prohibited by law, and to seize fish and gear
found on vessels engaged in acts violative of the law. Enforcement
thus shifts from flag state (applicable under a high seas regime) to
coastal state because of the provision of section 9(a)(2) which makes
any violation of existing fishery agreements a violation of the new
law (provided they are reviewed as required by section 7(b)). The
provision modifying the nonabrogation language, then, reflects a de
facto change in those treaties utilizing flag state enforcement to
reflect the new regime of coastal state enforcement. Though such a
step does not affect the substance of existing fishery arrangements,
the change in enforcement procedures might result in a charge of
treaty violation by distant water fishing nations. However, such a
step does not seem likely in view of the bargaining position factor
discussed above-since any distant water fishing nation must essen-
tially come with "hat in hand" to negotiate for future access rights,
it is not likely to unduly ruffle the sensibilities of the coastal state
off whose coast it must seek those rights.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
a. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
is not likely to produce a timely, comprehensive, and widely ac-
cepted agreement on the law of the sea. Accordingly, no global
fishery management treaty can be expected in the near future.
b. The opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases is probably not an accurate reflection
of the customary international law rules applicable to high seas
fisheries and, in any event, is so lacking in detail and specificity as
to be relatively useless as a general guide to fisheries management
conflicts.
c. The United States is almost certain to adopt, by congres-
sional act, a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone in 1976. The most likely
form of that law is the current version of the "Magnuson Bill."
d. The "Magnuson Bill" approach will place the United States
in a superior bargaining position vis-i-vis the Soviet Union insofar
as coastal fisheries exploitation is concerned. It is unlikely to result
in exclusion of all foreign fishing effort, but rather to admit limited
amounts of distant water fishing subject to regulations and the pay-
ment of reasonable license fees. Current bilateral arrangements will
almost certainly be honored until their conclusion, save for the im-
position of coastal state enforcement of such treaty provisions.
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SOME BIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ACTS ON RATIONAL UTILIZATION OF THE LIVING
RESOURCES OF THE WORLD OCEAN
P. A. Moiseev*
Problems pertinent to the utilization of living resources of the
World Ocean have drawn world public attention. Peculiarly, the
World Ocean is indeed a granary for mankind. Notably rich crops
are harvested every year from its blue fields, reaching in recent years
70 million tons of fish, invertebrates and algae, which provide a
supply of about 20 percent of the animal protein in the food ration
of the world's population.
The rapid growth of population, as well as the aspirations of many
states, primarily developing countries, toward considerable im-
provement of the living conditions of their peoples, naturally leads
to an increasing demand for a greater volume and quality of food
products, including fish. This demand becomes ever more urgent,
regretfully, because of the gradual deterioration of the food supply
for the population of the world.
It is this circumstance that has been particularly essential in the
scope of problems discussed at many international conferences
bearing on the utilization of the living resources of the ocean. It has
been the leading factor in a number of practical decisions adopted
by many countries aimed, in fact, at dividing the World Ocean and
its biological resources into areas of interest. As is known, these
trends, and the legal acts that followed, maintain that many coastal
states find it necessary to establish wide 200 mile economic zones
off their coasts so that the local biological resources could be ex-
ploited within these limits solely by the fishermen of these coun-
tries.
This position is being adhered to by the overwhelming majority
of developing nations. Consideration of these positions has been the
major factor which is to turn the scale when decisions are made at
the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, the successive phases
of which were in Geneva (1973), Caracas (1974) and Geneva (1975).
In analysing this point of view it appears to me that it has been
*Professor of Biology; Deputy Director, All-Union Research Institute of Marine Fisheries
and Oceanography (VNIRO), Moscow. D.Sc.
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mostly political and economic factors that have been pressing in this
whole discussion, and have given birth to this position, without due
regard to the specific features of living resources. At the same time
it is clear enough that any recommendations and decisions made at
international conferences of this sort should be primarily aimed at
reasonable as well as effective utilization of the World Ocean's bio-
logical resources by mankind. It is therefore natural that such deci-
sions should first of all be based on substantial scientific data on the
biology, distribution, behaviour and abundance of the inhabitants
of the ocean.
I would dare say that the contemporary scientific knowledge of
oceanic biological resources and their peculiarities was not duly
taken into account at the international conferences which have
taken place. If the decision to establish the economic zones as men-
tioned above is adopted, humanity will have an instrument in its
hands which will weaken and, in the future, probably destroy the
living resources of the World Ocean, instead of protecting them.
As we know, many countries have estimated possible results of
the universal validation of such economic zones. Their finding is
that 38 percent of the entire water area of the World Ocean would
be closed to foreign fisheries. They assume that there will remain
about 60 million tons, or 70 to 80 percent of the world's potential
catch of fish and large invertebrates, within the limits of these
zones. Moreover, the fact that at present about 90 percent of the
total world catch is taken mostly from the coastal regions of the
World Ocean, i.e., roughly from within 20 percent of its water area,
undoubtedly enhanced the enticing side of these estimations for
future legal decisions. In other words, it appears to many that the
adoption of the decision to establish a 200 mile economic zone would
endow these areas of the World Ocean with special rights, thereby
not only facilitating the development of fisheries in the coastal
states, but also raising the world's fishing potential through a more
effective regulation of fisheries by each of these countries.
Conversely, such a decision could cause a grave imbalance of the
oceanic ecological system, followed by a sharp decline in the biologi-
cal productivity of the World Ocean, which I shall try to prove later.
It should be taken into account that the numerous ecological
systems of quite a variety of species which determine the biological
productivity of the World Ocean, as well as those oceanological
processes which also have a noticeable impact on this productivity,
are greatly interconnected, mutually very much dependent, and,
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taken as a whole, can be regarded as a uniform biological system of
the World Ocean.
Since the waters of the World Ocean are very mobile, especially
its surface layers of up to 500 to 1000 meters where the processes of
biological production are most extensive, pelagic food organisms
drift long distances; fish and other animals migrate for food and
spawning; eggs, larvae, young food and fishing objects are some-
times carried away for many hundreds and thousands of miles. The
populations of many commercial and food animals are closely inter-
connected, primarily by similar food resources, areas of reproduc-
tion, etc. At present we are not aware of any population of signifi-
cant size in the World Ocean which is absolutely local and indepen-
dent of the variations in the abundance of other populations of sea
inhabitants.
Some data have been accumulated during recent years, and more
are being obtained now, which corroborates relationships of this
kind, the exclusively great interdependence of separate ecological
systems of the World Ocean, and their great vulnerability when one
element only is utilized commercially.
Let us consider some examples of this kind. The extremely long
distances of migrations of such anadromous and catadromous fish
as the Atlantic and Pacific salmon and eel are known well enough.
Salmon migrate from the open areas of the northern Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans where they feed to the rivers in the north of Europe,
the northeast extremity of Asia, and the northwestern coast of
America. Eel migrate from European rivers to the Sargasso Sea,
located in the equatorial part of the Atlantic Ocean. These obvious
and well analysed migrations, running for many thousand kilome-
ters and crossing every zone existing or capable of being established
by man, constitute special characteristics of these fish. As we know,
there was a special discussion of a legal character at the above
mentioned conference concerning these fish. These migrations are
a classic example of the fact that animals do not know country
boundaries. This must be taken into account in determining the
legal background connected with the utilization of biological re-
sources inhabiting the World Ocean.
Other examples of a similar nature can be given which, in many
cases, have to do with populations of commercial species of greater
abundance.
The Pacific sardine (Ubacu-Ivasi) which spawns off southern
Japan is well known. During the peak period of its abundance, the
species penetrated far north, reaching the shores of Korea, Primorie,
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Hokkaido, Sakhalin and even Kamchatka. One may recall that dur-
ing the years of high abundance of its stocks, the total catch of this
small fish by Korean, Soviet and Japanese fishermen reached three
million tons, and that the period of depression is again being fol-
lowed by abundant growth. Undoubtedly in the coming years this
fish will be taken in the spacious areas of the northwestern Pacific
Ocean by fishermen of at least four countries.
As many specialists know, several species of saury have a vast
distribution area. Those species spawning in the northwestern Pa-
cific Ocean are utilized commercially more extensively. It turned
out that a great number of larvae and the young of this fish are
carried by the flow of Pacific currents to the northern and northeast-
ern parts of the ocean to be recruited into the populations off Can-
ada and the United States.
Hence, saury stocks are very widely scattered throughout the
northern Pacific Ocean from a few centers of reproduction, located,
as a rule, in the relative vicinity of the shores of some countries
(Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States). The rational
exploitation of this quite abundant species, whose biomass is esti-
mated to be many millions of tons, should naturally be carried out
with due regard to this peculiarity of its distribution.
When speaking of the northern Pacific Ocean, the Pacific halibut
also deserves mention. It migrates from the eastern coast of Kam-
chatka, across the Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska, to California,
i.e., within the coastal waters of the Soviet Union, the United States
and Canada. The migrations of black cod have quite a similar pat-
tern.
The northern Atlantic Ocean is another area inhabited by many
important commercial species with extensive migrations,
emphasizing their ignorance of the possible limits of 200 mile eco-
nomic zones. An example can be made of the Arctic-Norwegian cod
spawning close to the Lofoten Islands, leaving then for the Barents
Sea, coming close to Spitsbergen, and thus occupying a tremendous
area within the northeastern Atlantic Ocean.
Up to three million tons of cod of this population are, in fact,
taken by fishermen of all countries in some years, thus making this
species a most important object of sea fisheries.
The population of Scandinavian herring can be given similar
characteristics. This species also spawns in the vicinity of the Nor-
wegian coast, but leaves for feeding mainly in the Norwegian Sea,
and also in the Barents Sea, thus going far beyond the limits of the
probable economic zones of some countries.
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It should be remembered that the volume of catch of this herring
in some years reached three million tons, and it once was the most
important species in the total world yield of herring.
Another species which can be mentioned here is the redfish,
whose adults and larvae make extensive migrations through the
northern Atlantic Ocean latitudes between the waters adjacent to
the American and European continents.
Poutassu provides a potential yield on the order of two million
tons. It inhabits the open areas of the northeastern Atlantic Ocean
almost entirely away from coastal waters, which is another proof of
its offshore distribution. A similar pattern of distribution is typical
of saury in the northwestern Atlantic Ocean, whose abundance in
that area is sufficiently great and whose area of distribution is ex-
tremely vast.
The wide oceanic distribution of such a commercial species as
grenadier, which is found in relatively deep areas, is even more
manifest. The chief spawning area of this species is the middle of
the mid-Atlantic underwater ridge. Larvae and young fish are
spread from this area of reproduction to Labrador, Greenland, Ice-
land, Spitsbergen and northern Norway. Hence, the abundance of
this species and the consequent efficiency of its fishery in the coastal
zones of the northern Atlantic Ocean fully depend upon the status
of the main reproductive part of this population found in the area
of the underwater ridge, many hundreds and even thousands of
miles from the present areas of fishery.
A somewhat different example can be given of the Patagonian
hake, dwelling near the Atlantic coast of South America. During
some periods of the year it leaves the coast for much deeper areas
to spawn and is found beyond the economic zones. The so-called
Falkland round herring and, especially, Patagonian poutassu are
even more pronounced oceanic inhabitants which leave the Pata-
gonian shelf during the warm period of the year in search of areas
rich in food, penetrate far into the Antarctic waters, and feed there
extensively.
In addition, if one recalls the typical inhabitants of the epipelagic
layer of the World Ocean, primarily large and small tuna (with a
potential catch on the order of three to five million tons), marlins,
swordfish, sailfish, sharks and many species of squid and other rep-
resentatives of this most spacious central region (with an area of
over 100 million square kilometers), and takes into account that the
catch of these species can be on the order of 10 million tons, one will
understand that the fishing fauna of the World Ocean cannot be
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considered tied up merely to its coastal areas, but that this fauna
is distributed very widely throughout vast oceanic areas.
In discussing the problem of rational utilization of the living re-
sources of the World Ocean, and the methods of its legal limitations,
one ought to place a particular emphasis on the close interconnec-
tion between many links of ecological systems, including the
connection between the abundance values of many commercial
species constituting these systems.
It is a well known fact that as a result of a sharp decline in the
abundance of Californian sardine, the size of anchovy population in
this area has increased. A similar process was observed off the coasts
of South Africa. Intensive fishing together with unfavourable natu-
ral factors in recent years has led to a decline in the abundance of
herring, rockfish and some other species in the North Pacific, which
has given rise to a sharp growth of pollock stocks and considerable
expansion of its area. Pollock now is found in large quantities off
British Columbia and more southerly where it did not occur earlier.
On the other hand, the abundant young pollock is preyed upon by
juvenile herring intensively, which is a considerable obstacle to the
process of restoration of the stocks of this valuable species now in
depression.
No doubt there exists a dependence between the drop in the
abundance of large cod in the northern Atlantic Ocean and the
significant increase and changes in distribution of capelin and Polar
cod in these areas. Such changes have brought about a manifold
increase in catches of these fish, which in recent years reached sev-
eral million tons.
A hypothesis suggests itself that the decline in the stocks of sperm
whales capable of transoceanic migrations can be accompanied
(and, in fact, is accompanied) by an increase in the abundance of
squid in many areas of the World Ocean, and by a decline in such
commercial pelagic fish as saury, sardine, anchovy, etc. This means
that the intensity of Antarctic whaling can affect the efficiency of
fisheries in many countries located many thousand miles away from
this area.
One can find many more similar examples of how greatly the
living resources of the World Ocean are interdependent, but what
has already been said indicates that it is impossible to regulate sea
fisheries more or less objectively on the basis of isolated efforts by
separate countries, which have "in their possession" small areas of
the World Ocean adjacent to their shores.
One should not forget that according to present estimates, the
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potential yield of fish and large invertebrates in the World Ocean
can be on the order of 90 to 100 million tons, while the volume of
possible catch of the above mentioned species only reaches 40 to 50
million tons; i.e., these inhabitants of the ocean determine the effec-
tiveness of the utilization of biological resources of the World Ocean.
As we have tried to show, their exploitation cannot be performed by
any separate country without due coordination of efforts with other
fishing countries. It appears therefore that any decision pertinent to
international jurisdiction and aimed at rational utilization of the
living resources of the World Ocean must be accepted solely with
due regard to the biological peculiarities of the ocean.
Only the coordinated decision of all interested countries, which
are responsible both for the fate of living resources and for their
rational and effective utilization, will produce the soundest interna-
tional legal acts.
AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE SEABED BEYOND
NATIONAL JURISDICTION*
Thomas M. Franck**
I. INTRODUCTION
It was concern over the disposition and husbanding of the as yet
only faintly apprehended resources of the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction that impelled Ambassador Pardo of Malta to direct the
attention of the United Nations toward the concept of a "common
heritage of mankind." This resulted in the declaration' passed by
the United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1970, which
sought to establish the principle that the seabed and its resources
beyond national jurisdiction were not subject to unilateral appropri-
ation by any state or persons. Rather, the U.N. declared that this
area would be developed in accordance with a new international
regime to be created by negotiation.!
The General Assembly thereupon moved to enlarge both the com-
position and mandate of its ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction3 and to charge it with responsibility for convening a
global "conference on the law of the sea which would deal with the
establishment of an equitable international regime-including an
international machinery-for the area and resources of the sea-bed
and ocean floor. .... "4
This preparatory committee began having meetings in Geneva in
March and July through August of 1971, and in New York in Octo-
ber of 1971. During the inceptive year it elected the Sri Lanka Am-
bassador, Mr. H.S. Amerasinghe, as Chairman and divided its mis-
sion among three subcommittees. Subcommittee I was charged with
the task of preparing
* Mr. Franck's article also appears in 13 OSc.OODE HALL L.J. (1975). The Editors of the
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law wish to thank the Osgoode Hall Law
Journal for granting permission to publish this piece concurrently.
** Director of the International Law Program, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; Professor of Law, New York University Law School and Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University. B.A., 1952, LL.B., 1953, University of British Columbia; LL.M., 1954,
S.J.D., 1959, Harvard University.
I G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
2Id.
' The Committee had been established by G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 14,
U.N. Doc A/6716 (1967), and its mandate was augmented by G.A. Res. 2467A, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 18, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
1 G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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draft treaty articles embodying the international regime-
including an international machinery-for the area and resources
of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof, be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction, taking into account the
equitable sharing by all States in the benefits to be derived there-
from, bearing in mind the special interests and needs of developing
countries . . economic implications resulting from the exploita-
tion of the resources of the area . . . as well as the particular needs
and problems of land-locked countries .... I
Already during this session, the subcommittee had before it the
thoroughly formulated but radically divergent views of various
states and groups of states: (1) a draft convention prepared by the
United States;' (2) a working paper by the United Kingdom;' (3)
proposals by France;8 (4) a Tanzanian draft statute for a seabed
authority;9 (5) Soviet draft articles for a treaty; ° (6) a Polish work-
ing paper;" (7) a Maltese draft ocean space treaty;" (8) a working
paper submitted jointly by 13 Latin American States; 3 (9) a prelim-
inary working paper introduced by seven land-locked, shelf-locked
and zone-locked ("geographically disadvantaged") states; and (10)
a Canadian working paper. 5 As the rapporteur observed with con-
siderable understatement, "[i]t was generally accepted that the
establishment of an international sea-bed regime should be based
on the Declaration contained in resolution 2749 (XXV). But the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, Report, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Geneva fl.
1 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, annex V, at 130, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970); Geneva I, supra note
5, at 17-18.
1 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, annex VI, at 177, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970); Geneva I, supra
note 5, at 18-19.
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, annex VII, at 185, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970); Geneva I, supra
note 5, at 19.
1 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/33 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 19.
11 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/43 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 20.
" 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/44 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 20.
" 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 105, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/53 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 20-21.
" 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/49 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 21.
11 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 194, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/55 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 22.
" 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 205, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/59 (1971); Geneva I, supra note 5,
at 22.
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various draft proposals and opinions expressed reflected different
interpretations as to the nature of this relationship. .. .
During the period from 1971 to 1973, the First Committee of the
conference, primarily under the chairmanship of Paul B. Engo of
the Cameroon, and with a working group headed by C. W. Pinto of
Sri Lanka, succeeded in preparing an extensive set of alternative
texts for 52 articles of a draft convention on the law of the sea. These
again reflected sharply divergent views, but at least presented them
in an organized fashion suitable for serious negotiations." Thus, by
the time the first working session of the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea was convened in Caracas between
June 20 and August 29, 1974, the First Committee,'" in the view of
one United States representative, "was far ahead of the other Com-
mittees of the Conference."'"
By the time the next meeting of the Conference had concluded in
Geneva on May 9, 1975, another United States representative,
Ambassador John N. Moore, expressed exactly the opposite conclu-
sion. In his opinion the First Committee was now far behind the
other two (territorial sea and economic zone; preservation of the
marine environment) in progressing toward an acceptable universal
convention on the law of the sea. 0 The object of this paper, there-
fore, is to examine the causes of this loss of momentum and to
examine the prospect of avoiding a situation in which an otherwise
agreed upon universal convention-which now appears within
reach-with its substantial benefits for all mankind, is allowed to
founder on the issue of an international regime.
At the outset, it is important to note that the First Committee's
loss of momentum toward an agreeable text is not due to indolence.
At its plenary meeting on April 18, 1975, the Geneva Conference
requested the chairman of each of the three main committees "to
6 Geneva I, supra note 5, at 23-24.
' Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, Report, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, vol. I, at 13-60, vol. II, U.N. Doc.
A/9021 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Geneva II].
" The basic structure of the Committee was carried over into the Conference. Ambassador
Amerasinghe, Chairman Engo, and Mr. Pinto simply assumed at the Conference positions
analogous to those held during the sessions of the Committee; the First Sub-Committee
essentially became the First Committee of the Conference, albeit with the enlarged member-
ship of all participating states.
" L. Sohn, The Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea, Feb. 21,
1975, at 2 (mimeographed paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association) [hereinafter cited as Sohn].
" Interview with Ambassador John N. Moore, in Washington, D.C., May 19, 1975
[hereinafter cited as Moore Interview].
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prepare a single negotiating text covering the subjects entrusted to
his committee."2 Chairman Paul Engo, in a minor miracle of draft-
ing zeal, produced a complete text of 75 articles and one annex-a
remarkable feat considering the variety and disparity of views
within his committee. However, the difficulty with this draft is that
to a greater extent than those prepared by the chairmen of the other
two committees, it represents one tendency-namely, the tendency
of the "Group of 77" [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 77]
or the developing countries (which now actually number more than
100)-and fails to achieve a workable reconciliation with the
strongly held views of the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada,
Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. These differences extend over
almost but not quite all of the issues within the jurisdiction of the
First Committee.
Il. THE AREA SUBJECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME
Fundamental to an agreed convention establishing a seabed re-
gime is a consensus on the area to be included. Such a consensus
does not yet exist. A study made in 1972 by the United States
Geographer analyzes the areas that would be allocated to each state
if outer limits of national jurisdiction were set, respectively, at 40
miles from shore, at 200 miles, at a depth of 200 meters and at the
edge of the continental margin.2 Notably, the study showed that the
United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia and Indonesia
stood to be five of the six top gainers among all of the states under
any of these four options. 3 The growing awareness of the fact that
they could not lose made both superpowers-originally reluctant to
accede to the demand of the Group of 77 for a 200 mile economic
zone under national jurisdiction-much less opposed to schemes for
reducing the area of seabed under international jurisdiction.
Six different offshore limits of the economic zone have been dis-
cussed by the Committee and Conference at various times: (1) 40
miles; (2) 200 meter isobath; (3) 500 meter isobath with a 100 mile
minimum; (4) 3,000 meter isobath; (5) 200 miles; and (6) the edge
21 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIAT-
ING TEXT, pt. I, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATING
TEXT]. The President of the Conference has stated that the Negotiating Text "should take
account of all the formal and informal discussions held so far, would be informal in character
and would not prejudice the position of any delegation nor would it represent any negotiated
text or accepted compromise." Id.
2 BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEA (Int'l Boundary
Study Ser. A, No. 46, 1972).
1 Id. at 5-34.
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of the continental margin. The economic implications of several of
these alternatives have been explored in some detail. The limit
which is adopted obviously affects the extent of resources available
to an international regime.
Under the 40-mile limit, 90 percent of the world's proven offshore
hydrocarbon resources and 59 percent of ultimate as yet unproven
potential hydrocarbon reserves are believed to be within the eco-
nomic zones. No known mine-grade manganese nodules would be
within the national areas, and it is expected that rich mineral de-
posits (e.g., gold, platinum, zircon, and sulphur) will be exploited
beyond the 40 mile limit in the future." In the case of the 200 meter
isobath limit, almost all of the proven reserves and 68 percent of
total potential seabed petroleum resources would be within the eco-
nomic zone. While no manganese nodules are located landward of
the 200 meter isobath line, some of the minerals noted above will
probably be found. 5 If a 3,000 meter isobath limit is used to define
the economic zone, all known reserves and 93 percent of potential
hydrocarbon resources will come under exclusive national control.
Moreover, some quantities of manganese nodules (albeit less abun-
dant than at lower depths) and many of the minerals listed above
would also be within the national economic zones. 6 The 200 mile
limit would embrace all known petroleum reserves and approxi-
mately 87 percent of estimated total seabed hydrocarbon resources,
as well as about 10 percent of possible mine-grade manganese no-
dules, all of the presently exploitable mineral resources, and most
of those having potential economic value in the next few decades. 7
The edge of the continental margin limit would include all potential
hydrocarbon resources.
The first deduction to be drawn from this evidence is that under
any conceivable new global convention, the principal benefits will
accrue to already affluent states, including the United States, the
Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. Among the less developed,
Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil (the wealthier of the poor)
stand to gain substantially, while China, Japan, Vietnam, the Phil-
ippines and India have high hopes of finding large petroleum
deposits in the sizable areas between their coasts and the edge of
1' U.N. SECRETARY GEN., ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE IN TERMS OF SEA-BED MINERAL RESOURCES,
OF THE VARIOUS LIMITS PROPOSED FOR NAT'L JURISDICTION, 33-34, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/87
(1973).
Id. at 34-35.
2' Id. at 36.
Id. at 37-38.
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the continental margin. Most other states probably stand to gain
little. Landward of the 200 meter isobath line there may be as
many as 1,544 billion barrels of oil. At a price of US$5.50 per barrel,
the aggregate value of these reserves is US$8,492 billion. 9 However,
13 nations with gross national products greater than US$1,000 per
capita have approximately 66.2 percent of this oil.3 0 In effect, no
conceivable economic zone agreement, despite its being the brain-
child of the less developed countries (prodded by the Latin Ameri-
cans), is likely to have anything but a reinforcing effect on the
present overall global disparity between the rich states and the poor,
although it might incidentally make a few of the poor less so. To a
large extent this outcome is the fault of the poor nations themselves.
Instead of pressing for some system of general revenue sharing in the
huge windfall area that will constitute the economic zone, they have
instead focused their attention on establishing a regime favorable
to their interests in the area beyond national jurisdiction even as the
size and economic importance of that area has continued to shrink
with the full consent of the Group of 77. This mismanagement of
the less developed countries' strategy is primarily attributable to
the genius of a relatively small number of broad-shelf and rich
coastal fisheries states in their ranks who were able to persuade the
rest that their interest also lay in the direction of very broad eco-
nomic zones established solely for the benefit of the coastal state.
This need not have been a foregone conclusion. In 1970 the United
States supported the notion of a worldwide renunciation of any
sovereignty claims to the seabed beyond a depth of 200 meters." Its
draft treaty of August 3, 1970, envisioned the creation of "Coastal
State Trusteeship Areas" in the area beyond the 200 meter depth,
embracing the continental margins, 2 in which revenue derived from
seabed exploitation would be equitably shared and in which an
international authority would share rulemaking jurisdiction with
the coastal state. At that time, Canada, as another major broad-
shelf beneficiary, took an equally generous position, actually pro-
" For a further discussion see Franck, El Baradei & Aron, The New Poor: Land-Locked,
Shelf-Locked and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States, 7 J. INT'L L. & POL. 33 (1974);
Franck, Kennedy, & Trinko, An Equitable Regime for Seabed and Ocean Subsoil Resources,
4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 161 (1974).
" LEWIS & LEVERING, USE OF OIL REVENUE FROM THE PRESENT INT'L SEABED: AN ANALYSIS OF
ALTERNATIVES 1 (1974).
" Id. at 2.
Draft U.N. Convention on the Int'l Seabed Area: U.S. Working Paper Submitted to U.N.
Seabeds Committee, 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 209, 210 (1970) [HEREINAFTER CITED AS 63 STATE].
32 Id. at 212.
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posing in 1969 to share revenues from the entire area between the
12 mile territorial sea and the continental margin.3 When these
proposals elicited no visible response from the Afro-Asian States
that would have stood to gain the most, the position was quietly
downgraded by the United States, and abandoned outright by Can-
ada. 4 At Caracas, the United States indicated its willingness to go
along with the Group of 77 to accept a 12 mile territorial sea and a
200 mile economic zone, so long as these changes in the status quo
were part of a comprehensive package including freedom of naviga-
tion and overflight. 5 The United States, like Canada, also indicated
that where the continental margin extended more than 200 miles
from shore, the economic zone should embrace the additional area .3
The Soviet position also evolved toward broader national areas of
jurisdiction and commensurately smaller international areas of ju-
risdiction. At Geneva in 1973, the Soviets had supported a 12 mile
territorial sea 37 and a limit for the economic zone at the 500 meter
isobath (with a minimum of 100 miles from the baselines from
which the territorial sea is measured) .38 At Caracas, the Soviets, like
the United States, embraced an economic zone of 200 miles, contin-
gent upon reaching agreement on straits transit and overflight as
well as upon an agreed 12 mile limit for the territorial sea.39 France,
too, at Caracas, agreed that "[flor reasons of simplicity and of
fairness to the countries lacking a continental shelf, a distance crite-
rion should be used" and "favored a limit of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines."' 40
1 Martin, Canada Won't Share, is Rebuffed, The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 19, 1975,
at 7, col. 4.
, Statement of Mr. Davis (Canada) before the 27th Meeting of the Plenary Session of the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 3, 1974, in THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, I OFFICIAL RECORDS 97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1 CARACAS];
R. LOGAN, CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE THIRD LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 23 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as LOGAN]; see, e.g., 119 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 61, 101 (1974).
11 Statement of Mr. Stevenson (United States) before the 38th Meeting of the Plenary
Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 11, 1974, in 1 CARACAS,
supra note 34, at 160.
SU.S. Gives Position on Seabed Regime, Scientific Research, Straits, and Economic Zone
at Law of the Sea Conference, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 402, 417 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 71
STATE].
37 Geneva II, supra note 17, vol. III, at 1.
3' Id. at 29.
3' Statement of Mr. Kolosovsky (Soviet Union) before the 22d Meeting of the Plenary
Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, June 28, 1974, in 1 CARACAS,
supra note 34 at 68, 69; statement of Mr. Kolosovsky (Soviet Union) before the 28th Meeting
of the Second Committee of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 6, 1974,
in THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS 221 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 2 CARACAS].
,1 Statement of Mr. Jeannel (France) before the 37th Meeting of the Plenary Session of the
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At their spring 1974 meeting in Nairobi prior to the Caracas ses-
sion, the Group of 77 still found themselves basically grouped
around the 200 mile economic zone concept, but with some favoring
an option by the coastal state to extend its economic jurisdiction to
the edge of the continental margin where that was more than 200
miles from shore, while still others, including some of the land-
locked states, called for a less than 200 mile economic zone or pre-
ferred it to be a regional, rather than a national zone.' At Caracas,
an irresistible momentum emerged around the limit of 200 miles or
more, and when the issue was again taken up in Geneva in 1975, the
overwhelming majority of nations had formally lined up behind an
economic zone of at least 200 miles, leaving open the question of any
further extension to the edge of the continental margin.
One ray of hope did emerge for salvaging something for the cause
of an equitable international system out of all this national aggran-
dizement. The unofficial working group of approximately 35 states
convened by the Norwegian Minister Jens Evensen early recognized
during meetings in New York in mid-February 1975, that the idea
of revenue sharing could be revived in a limited way so as to gain
general acceptance among all states for the claims of broad-shelf
nations to an economic zone incorporating the area between 200
miles and the edge of the margin: a distance which, in Canada's
case, could be as much as 600 miles off the Newfoundland coast.2
The United States continues to support some form of sharing in this
area, proposing that it begin in the sixth year of production at one
percent of "wellhead market value," rising to five percent after ten
years. Canada, at the end of the 1975 conference, has again accepted
some form of revenue sharing in this area. Great Britain has indi-
cated a willingness to "look seriously" at sharing 3 but Australia,
another broad-shelf state with a margin of up to 600 miles, has so
far refused to go along.
In any event, the international area has now been firmly forced
back to the seabed beyond the continental margins. While the draft
text prepared by the chairman of the Second Committee at the end
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 11, 1974, in 1 CARACAS, supra note 34, at
154.
" Working Group Appointed to Prepare for the Nairobi Meeting of the Group of 77 on the
Law of the Sea, Report, Spring 1974, (mimeographed) [hereinafter cited as Nairobi Report].
This is an informal paper of limited distribution which has not been assigned an official U.N.
document number.
'3 LOGAN, supra note 34, at 24.
Martin, Canada Won't Share, is Rebuffed, The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 19, 1975,
at 7, col. 4.
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of the 1975 Geneva Conference distinguishes between the regime of
the economic zone and the Continental Shelf" this appears to be
largely a distinction without a difference as far as the regime of the
shelf is concerned. The result would grant to coastal states exclusive
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring [the Continental
Shelf] and exploiting its natural resources,"4 "to the outer edge of
the continental margin.""
In sum it appears that the international regime will be confined
to an area seaward of the 200 mile limit or to an area seaward of
the edge of the margin, whichever is the farthest from the coastline,
and that accordingly, its jurisdictional importance, range of activi-
ties, and revenues will be far less than had originally been proposed
by the initial United States draft treaty. On the other hand, it again
appears possible that there will be revenue sharing in the area be-
tween 200 miles and the continental margin, and, in the estimate
of United States authorities, even though only a few states would
be required to make contributions under such a project, the amount
accruing from this source to the international authority would, for
the foreseeable future, substantially exceed revenues derivable from
the seabed beyond national jurisdiction." For this reason a few dele-
gations, the French in particular-even though their coastal config-
uration does not place them in the position of having to share with
the international authority any part of their coastal production-are
opposed to the proposal because they fear that it would unduly
strengthen the authority and make it too independent: a sort of
world government of the seas.48 To France, a continental margin
revenue sharing scheme would be acceptable only (1) if it bypassed
the international authority and (2) if revenues derived from produc-
tion were distributed directly by contributors to recipients in ac-
cordance with an agreed formula laid down in the treaty. The out-
come of this unresolved issue will affect considerably the viability
and future development of an international authority.
III. THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
The degree to which nations are willing to entrust independent
supervisory powers to an international authority is inversely propor-
" NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. II, arts. 45, 62.
Id. pt. II, art. 63.
, Id. pt. II, art. 62.
, Moore Interview, supra note 20.
" Interviews with members of the Evensen Group, Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, in New York City, Feb. 20, 1975.
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tional to individual national mining capabilities. Thus, the "capa-
ble" nations favor-at the most-some form of licensing or contrac-
tor system, while the developing counties support a stronger author-
ity in which they can exercise a large degree of control. 9
The United States, Canada, the European Countries and Japan
have consistently pressed for freedom of exploitation under mini-
mum conditions of international standards and regulations while
the developing countries have wanted an international authority,
which they designate "the enterprise," to have maximum powers.
The United States favors a seabed mining system in which access
will be permitted under conditions favoring investment, 0 but has
asserted that an international authority must have basic rights: (1)
to protect the environment; (2) to accumulate data on matters rele-
vant to its function; (3) to prevent unauthorized exploitation; (4) to
require that mining be carried out safely; (5) to provide for overseas
training and technology transfer programs set up to benefit the
developing countries; (6) to insure against monopolies by a few de-
veloped states; and (7) to participate itself in the benefits of re-
source development. 5' Similarly, an international authority should
assume certain duties: e.g., (1) to assure free, equal and nondiscrim-
inatory access for all states to deep sea resources and (2) to pro-
vide stable investment conditions. Further, (3) it should avoid need-
less regulation and protect proprietary data,52 and (4) its control
should be limited to matters directly related to the exploration and
exploitation of seabed resources.5 3 Initially, the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe wanted an international authority to be
limited to granting exclusive mining licenses to natural and juridi-
cal persons, 54 but the United States has since begun to broaden its
approach to include other, presumably more complex "legal ar-
rangements"55 which perhaps would include some forms of joint
venture. The United States prefers an international authority not
to operate as a mineral exploiter itself, but prefers such an authority
" For a comparative analysis of national positions see First Committee Working Group,
Proposals Regarding Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation, March 18, 1975
[hereinafter cited as CP/Working Paper No. 2]. This is an informal paper of limited distribu-
tion which has not been assigned an official U.N. document number.
" U.S. Position on the Law of the Sea Reviewed, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 397,400 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 70 STATE].
SI 71 STATE, supra note 36, at 403.
5' Id. at 404.
" Id. at 405.
CP/Working Paper No. 2, supra note 49, at 7.
Sohn, supra note 19, at 3.
SB Moore Interview, supra note 20.
[VOL. 6:151
CONFERENCE-INTERNATIONAL REGIME
to grant areas to state and private enterprises which, in the case of
"hard minerals," would not exceed 30,000 square kilometers-areas
half the size proposed by Western Europe." Lastly, the United
States has favored a treaty which would set out the basic conditions
of exploitation quite specifically in an appendix. 8
The Soviet position is only to a limited extent different from that
of the United States. They have supported a licensing system like
the one proposed by Washington, but would make lots for exploita-
tion available only to nations, and not available to private enter-
prises. 5 The Soviet Union has also pioneered the idea of reserving
lots for later exploitation by developing nations, 0 a proposal which
has had a sympathetic hearing in the United States delegation and
which is also supported by France' and some other Western States.
The French have also pressed for very specific regulation in the
treaty itself of the terms of licensing and exploitation. For example,
the French have pressed for specific regulation of the term of years,
and the size and condition of leases, thereby leaving less discretion-
ary or rulemaking power in the organs of an international author-
ity.62
At Caracas, the 77 submitted their proposal to the First Commit-
tee. It states:
All activities of exploration of the Area and of the exploitation of
its resources and all other related activities including those of sci-
entific research shall be conducted directly by the Authority. The
Authority may, if it considers it appropriate, and within the limits
it may determine, confer certain tasks to juridical or natural per-
sons, through service contracts, or association or through any other
such means it may determine which ensure its direct and effective
control at all times over such activities. 3
5, United States: Draft Appendix to the Law of the Sea Treaty Concerning Mineral Re-
source Development in the Int'l Sea-Bed Area, Aug. 13, 1974, art. IV, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.1/L.6 [hereinafter cited as United States: Draft Appendix].
5' United States: Draft Appendix, supra note 57, passim.
, Statement of Mr. Romandv (Soviet Union) before the First Committee of the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 19, 1974, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/SM.8.
60 Id.
11 Statement of Mr. Jeannel (France) before the 37th Meeting of the Plenary Session of the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 11, 1974, in 1 CARACAS, supra note 34, at
155; statement of Mr. Jeannel (France) before the 6th Meeting of the First Committee of the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 16, 1974, in 2 CARACAS, supra note 39, at
25.
62 Belgium, et. al. Working Document-Annex to the Law of the Sea Convention (Condi-
tions of Exploration and Exploitation), Aug. 16, 1974, art. III, IV, VII, VIII, X, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3.
11 Draft Articles considered by the Committee at its Informal Meetings (articles 1-21), Aug.
5, 1974, art. 9-B, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3 [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles].
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The Group of 77 thus strongly aligned itself with an international
authority having wide powers to regulate all activities in the inter-
national area which would conduct exclusive mining activities itself
through service contracts with appropriate parties."4 The service
contract approach was intended by the 77 as a concession to the
developed countries,65 but they were careful to provide that "direct
and effective control" over all operations will remain with the inter-
national authority at all times.6 At Caracas, the 77 did offer to
include certain provisions in the regime which were intended to
placate the technologically advanced states: (1) contracts would be
awarded on a competitive basis; (2) a contractor who fulfills the
requirements of one stage would get priority in later stages; and (3)
the international authority would have the duty to ensure security
of tenure to a contractor, within the terms of the agreement. 7 But
there is much in the 77 proposals that is left to the discretion of the
authority. Namely, the sizes of the areas to be subjected to service
agreements are not specified, nor are the time spans of the individ-
ual agreements. 8
Most private entrepreneurs would almost certainly be unwilling
to operate with so little protection. In particular it is quite clear that
the 77 see their approach as wholly unlike any form of licensing-
which is an unacceptable concept to the third world. 9
The 77 further proposed at Caracas that any proceeds collected
by a nation through taxing an exploiting enterprise which is its
national, must be paid to the international authority. If the state
itself is the party to the service contract, an equivalent amount will
be paid.76 The central role envisioned by the 77 for an international
authority is underscored by several elements added to their position
at Caracas: (1) title to the international area, as well as to the
resources in it, should be inalienable and reside in the international
authority;7 (2) there must be no assignment of contractual rights
s, Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson &
Oxman].
Sohn, supra note 19, at 4.
" Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 64, at 9.
67 Sohn, supra note 19, at 4.
" Text Prepared by the Group of 77 and Circulated in Accordance with the Decision Taken
by the Committee at its Informal Meeting on August 16, 1974: Basic Conditions, Aug. 16,
1974, paras. 3, 11, 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1 [hereinafter cited as Group of 77 Text].
11 Statement of Mr. Truque (Colombia), speaking as Chairman of the Group of 77, before
the 11th Meeting of the First Committee of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Aug. 6, 1974, in 2 CARACAS, supra note 39, at 55, 56.
70 Draft Articles, supra note 63, art. 10-B.
Group of 77 Text, supra note 68, para. 1.
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without consent of the international authority;" (3) the interna-
tional authority shall constantly be informed of all relevant data
uncovered by the contractor;13 (4) the international authority can
take steps to ensure the efficient and timely performance of service
contractors; 4 (5) a broad right of inspection is vested in the interna-
tional authority. 5
The Canadians, some Europeans, and the Australians, seeking to
reconcile the approach of the 77 with that of other states, have
suggested a parallel licensing/direct exploitation system."6 Thus,
Australia has stated that an international authority "should not
merely be a regulatory or licensing authority, but should be empow-
ered to enter into other contractual arrangements with States and
also to undertake exploration and exploitation on its own behalf
when it had accumulated the necessary resources and experience.'""
Essentially the developing countries fear that the United States
and Soviet approaches would lead to full-scale exploitation of man-
kind's last frontier by a few technologically advanced nations to the
exclusion of the vast majority. The developed states, on the other
hand, are concerned that the 77 would set up an international au-
thority controlled by the least advanced states with unlimited au-
thority to curtail production, control marketing, and discriminate
in their own favor in allocating mining rights and setting prices.
The Single Negotiating Text drafted by the Chairman of the First
Committee at the end of the 1975 Geneva Conference sides deci-
sively with the 77's views, despite some efforts at compromise. It
establishes an operating enterprise which, "subject to the general
policy direction and supervision of the Council" shall "undertake
the preparation and execution of activities of the Authority in the
Area. ... 78 The governing board of the enterprise is to be heavily
controlled by the 77 with the seats being allotted half to Africa,
Latin America and Asia, one third to Eastern European and other
Socialist states, and one sixth to Western Europe, the United
" Statement of Mr. Truque (Colombia) before the 14th Meeting of the First Committee of
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 19, 1974, in 2 CARACAS, supra note
39, at 72, 73.
13 CP/Working Paper No. 2, supra note 49, § 19.
74 Id. § 24.
75 Id. § 30.
71 Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 64, at 7.
71 Statement of Mr. Loomes (Australia) before the 2d Meeting of the First Committee of
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, July 11, 1974, in 2 CARACAS, supra note
39, at 7.
" NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, art. 35.
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States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and others." It provides for
a Hydra-headed bureaucratic system for administering the deep
seabed including not only the enterprise and its governing board,
but also an assembly, council, economic planning commission, tech-
nical commission, tribunal and secretariat. These are discussed
below. Within the area beyond national jurisdiction "all rights in
the resources are vested in the Authority""0 including all "title to the
minerals or processed substances derived from the area" except as
provided by the convention, the rules of the international authority
and the terms of contracts made by the international authority."'
Exploration and exploitation "shall be conducted directly by the
Authority" or by states or by entities or persons sponsored by states
to the extent the international authority, in its unfettered discre-
tion, decides to share its monopoly." The international authority
may also construct processing facilities and engage in transporta-
tion or marketing. 3 It may "to the extent that it does not currently
possess the personnel, equipment and services for its operations"
employ outsiders on service contract. 84 Marketing of its products is
to be carried out with a double standard: at not less than interna-
tional market prices except that lower prices may be charged devel-
oping countries. 5 The international authority may enter into joint
ventures but these must "ensure direct and effective fiscal and ad-
ministrative control by the Authority at all stages of opera-
tions .. ."8 There is no provision for state or private exploitation
of the ocean floor except through a joint venture contract with the
international authority. But these joint ventures do not approxi-
mate the concept as understood in the capitalist states. The interna-
tional authority is left essentially unfettered discretion in awarding
joint venture contracts and setting their terms, except that "selec-
tion from among the applicants shall be made on a competitive
basis ' 87 taking the convention as a whole into account and prefer-
ence shall be given to an applicant who, pursuant to an earlier
contract, is the discoverer.8 The maximum number of contracts any
7' See id. pt. I, art. 27, para. 1, subpara. c.
Id. pt. I, annex IA, art. 1.
SI Id. pt. I, annex IA, art. 2.
12 Id. pt. I, annex IA, art. 3, para. b.
13 Id. pt. I, annex IB, art. 4.
" Id. pt. I, annex IB, art. 4, para. d.
Is Id. pt. I, annex IB, art. 4, para. e(ii).
NId. pt. I, annex IC, art. 6, para. b.
'7 Id. pt. I, annex IC, art. 8, para. c.
Id. pt. I, annex IC, art. 8, para. e.
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state may hold shall be the same for all nations, regardless of size
or level of technological development."9
There is nothing in the proposed rules to require the international
authority to enter into contracts with any parties anywhere. Con-
tractors are required, in accordance with their contract, to give the
international authority access to all their secret data to the extent
"relevant to the effective implementation of the powers and func-
tions of the organs of the Authority. . . ."0 The international au-
thority also would have an unlimited right to inspect all facilities
of a contractor in the area." Industrial enterprises contemplating
this requirement will scarcely be comforted by the ensuing proviso
that the "Authority shall not disclose to third parties . . . such of
the transferred data as is deemed to be proprietary by the Contrac-
tor"" given the fact that the international authority, its enterprise
and secretariat, will be heavily staffed by persons who, if U.N. expe-
rience is any guide, may be presumed to be reporting back to "third
parties."
The discretion of the international authority to make rules and
regulations is left extremely wide by the Single Negotiating Text's
draft annex, particularly as to size of contractually-allotted areas of
exploitation and length or renewability of tenure. This virtually
unlimited discretion may work well enough if its effect is to cause
the international authority and those with advanced technology to
bargain in good faith. On the other hand, there is a justifiable suspi-
cion that the developing countries would just as soon see seabed
resources-which, despite evidence to the contrary,93 they continue
to see as dangerous competitors to their own land-based re-
sources-continue to go unexploited. If so, the unlimited discretion
to set terms would facilitate the international authority in taking an
uncompromising position vis-a-vis developers, which would be any-
thing but serious arm's-length negotiations.
On a more constructive note, the Single Negotiating Text does
provide that in the event of a dispute between the international
authority and the contracting party arising out of interpretation of
the convention, contract, or authority rules and regulations, either
1, Id. pt. I, annex IC, art. 8, para. f.
go Id. pt. I, annex IC, art. 10, para. a.
11 Id. pt. I, annex IC, art. 13.
92 Id. pt. I, annex IC, art. 10, para. a.
11 For a study of this question see U.N. SECRETARY GEN., ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE, IN TERMS
OF SEA-BED MINERAL RESOURCES, OF THE VARIOUS LIMITS PROPOSED FOR NAT'L JURISDICTION,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/87 (1973). A revised version of this report was prepared for the Secretary
General prior to the 1975 Geneva Conference.
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party may invoke the dispute settlement procedures established by
the convention. 4 This provides, successively, for (1) consultation,
(2) negotiation, (3) conciliation or other procedures chosen by the
parties and, (4) if these fail to resolve the dispute within one month
of its commencement, "any party to a dispute may institute pro-
ceedings before the Tribunal, unless the parties agree to submit the
dispute to arbitration. . . ,, 1 (5) The judgments of the tribunal
shall be final and binding and enforceable in the territories of mem-
bers as if awarded by the highest domestic court.9 But (6) if the
judgment goes against the international authority, there is no
"domestic jurisdiction" within which enforcement may be levied. It
also should be noted that the Single Negotiating Text seems to
contradict this wide grant of judicial review by suggesting elsewhere
that the tribunal's jurisdiction to enter into contractual disputes
exists only where specifically provided by a contract. 7 It also ap-
pears that the proposed procedures for compulsory judicial settle-
ment of disputes"8 may not yet have been accepted by the Soviet
Union and several other states. It may be, however, that the western
powers ought to be the ones to be reluctant. Given the proposal that
the judges be elected by the assembly on the recommendation of the
council-both to be controlled, if the Single Negotiating Text were
adopted, by states not notoriously sympathetic to free enter-
prise-and that the terms of the judges be for only five years, it is
more than a little likely that the tribunal will reflect the dominant
sociopolitical and economic assumptions of the numerical majority
in the other organs of the international authority.9
IV. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
Just as the dimensions of a satisfactory role for the international
authority depend on the size of the area under its jurisdiction, so,
too, designing appropriate powers and discretion for the interna-
tional authority is closely related to the way power is balanced
within and among its organs. The United States position is best
"1 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, annex IC, art. 20.
5 Id. pt. I, art. 57.
16 Id. pt. I, art. 59, para. 1.
,1 Id. pt. I, art. 32, para. 1(b).
g1 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, TEXT ON SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES, annexes I, IA, IB, U.N. Doc. SD.Gp.2d Seso./No. 1/Rev.5 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as DISPUTE SETTLEMENT TEXT].
" NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, art. 32, paras. 5, 6.
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summarized in the words of Ambassador John Stevenson and Ber-
nard Oxman, another United States representative to the Law of the
Sea Conference: "The best alternative is to agree on a Council that,
in composition and voting structure, sufficiently balances the sub-
stantive interest ifivolved to inspire confidence when coupled with
precise and enforceable treaty limitations on the substantive scope
of decisions."'
The United States in 1970 suggested an international authority
consisting of an assembly, a council, an operational arm, and a
dispute settlement body. The assembly would be responsible for
broad policy guidance and would make decisions by a majority vote
of those present and voting.'"' The council would handle executive
decision making with concentration on the system of exploration
and exploitation.' 2 It would have 24 members, including the six
most industrially advanced states, at least 12 developing states and
at least two land-locked or geographically disadvantaged states.
Decisions by the council would require triple majorities among all
the members, the six industrially advanced states and the other 18
members. 03 The dispute settlement body (or tribunal) would consist
of five to nine judges elected by the council.0 4 Lastly, the United
States has suggested a rulemaking procedure similar to that em-
ployed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
rules would be drafted by a specialized subsidiary organ, and after
council approval, forwarded to all states for review. If after a fixed
period, less than one third of the members have objected, the pro-
posed rules would become binding.' 5 As has been observed, these
proposals are light years removed from those of the Group of 77 first
circulated in a draft of January 1975 and February 1975.01 A similar
proposal had also been put forward earlier by thirteen Latin Ameri-
can States.'0 The Group of 77 proposed that the assembly be "the
supreme policymaking organ" with power to lay down general
'" Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 64, at 11.
"0 70 STATE, supra note 50, at 15; United States: Draft Convention on the International
Seabed Area, reprinted in 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 451, 458 (1971).
102 70 STATE, supra note 50, at 15.
' 63 STATE, supra note 31, at 209, 215.
104 Id.
"1 70 STA'rE, supra note 50, at 17.
'0 These memoranda were circulated privately and have no document number. The Febru-
ary draft is referred to as the "Supplemental Draft Articles of the Working Group of the Group
of 77" and contains new drafts of articles 10, 22-24, 32-35 [hereinafter cited as Supplemental
Articles].
0 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 93, U.N. Doc. AIAC.138/49 (1971).
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guidelines. It would vote in substantive matters by a two-thirds
majority.'"' The council would be the executive organ of the author-
ity' °' and would also vote in substantive matters by a two-thirds
majority."10 Its membership would be elected by the assembly. Up
to one-third of the places would be reserved for states with "special
interests"-half of these from among the developed and half from
the developing nations. Among the former would be those with most
advanced technology and sea investment, as well as the major im-
porters of the land-based minerals which are also produced from the
sea. Among the developing states, "special interests" would include
the principal exporters of the land-based minerals also found on the
seabed, as well as the states with large populations and land-locked
and geographically disadvantaged states. The principle of geograph-
ical distribution would apply to election of both the special interest
and the general members of the council."' In addition there would
be the enterprise to explore, exploit, and enter into joint ventures"12
and a governing board of the enterprise elected by the assembly
which would operate by majority vote."'
The Soviet position, like that of the United States, differs mark-
edly from that of the 77. In the Soviet version there would be a
conference of all members and an executive board of 30 members,
elected on a geographically allocated basis with five members for
each of five regions"4 and one land-locked member from each
region." 5 The conference would take substantive decisions by a two-
thirds majority"' while the board, wielding most specific powers,
would proceed by consensus in matters in substance."7
There are numerous variations on these themes. The Canadian
proposal, for example, calls for an assembly in which all members
would be represented, which would be empowered to approve bud-
gets, elect members of its executive body (council) and decide on
matters referred to it by the council. Assembly decisions would be
made by a two-thirds majority vote."' The council would approve
Supplemental Articles, supra note 106, art. 34.
" Id. art. 36.
110 Id.
.Id. art. 35.
"' Id. art. 38.
113 Id.
"' The five regions are the socialist countries, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe
and others.
"I Geneva I, supra note 5, at 73.
l Id.
Il Sohn, supra note 19, at 7.
IS Geneva I, supra note 5, at 219.
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mining and exploration regulations, manage marketing operations
and oversee the distribution of benefits. In constituting the council
the Canadian proposal utilizes classes of national interest: level of
technology, length of coastline, land-locked status, level of eco-
nomic development and, not unexpectedly, size of continental shelf.
Total membership would not exceed 30, and decisions would be
made by a two-thirds majority vote."1 9 Canada also proposed the
creation of a secretariat which would report to the council and as-
sembly on the authority's work and which would also collect and
disseminate data,'20 and a resource management commission with
mixed operating and licensing functions combining some elements
of the United States and the Group of 77's proposals. This commis-
sion notably would be made up of experts who, among other things,
would issue licenses, supervise and inspect mining operations, en-
force regulations, collect fees and royalties, and regulate volume and
method of production.' 2' Canada also proposed establishment of a
tribunal for dispute settlement which would be comprised of experts
representing various legal systems and which would be elected by
the council or assembly. Alternatively, disputes could be settled by
the peaceful means set out in article 33 of the U.N. Charter. Appeals
from tribunal decisions could go to the International Court of Jus-
tice.'2 1
As with the allocation of functional responsibility to the interna-
tional authority as a whole, so in the instance of the authority's
institutional structure, the Single Negotiating Text prepared by
Chairman Paul Engo leans precipitously towards the preferences of
the Group of 77. Between now and the New York Conference of 1976,
much hard bargaining will be required to accomplish something
approximating an agreed-upon text.
The Single Negotiating Text proposes establishment of an assem-
bly, council, tribunal, enterprise and secretariat.'2 3 The assembly,
consisting of all members, is allocated powers exactly as set out in
the January-February 1975 draft of the 77.124 It is specifically given
control over revenues and budgets and is mandated to adopt the
criteria, rules and regulations for "the equitable sharing of benefits
derived from the Area and its resources .... -,,2 In this connection,
ie Id. at 219-20.
"2 Id. at 220-21.
"I Id. at 221-22.
'n-Id. at 222.
t NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, art. 24, para. 1.
24 Id. pt. I, art. 26.
" Id. pt. I, art. 26, para. 2(x).
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it should be noted that the Single Negotiating Text is quite unclear
as to whether the expenses of the authority constitute a first charge
on all income derived from licensing, joint ventures and other opera-
tions.2' The council is to be the "executive organ" as proposed in
the 77 draft. It shall implement the "apportionment of benefits
derived from activities in the Area" on the basis of the rules laid
down by the assembly, and will have power to supervise the activi-
ties of the enterprise, and approve and supervise contracts.'27 It shall
consist of 36 members, one third to represent "special interests" as
set out in the proposal of the 77, and two thirds to be distributed,
four each, among (1) Africa (2) Asia (3) Eastern Europe (4) Socialist
States (5) Latin America, and (6) Western Europe and others., 8
This differs from the proposal of the 77 only in adding the category
of "socialist" in addition to that of Eastern Europe-an addition
quite unacceptable to the Western states, a substantial number of
which, including the United States, Australia, and Canada, are left
to scramble for places among the "others" subcategory of "Western
European and others." As already noted, the same eccentric "geo-
graphic" allocation is also applied by the Single Negotiating Text
to the important governing body of the enterprise.
The proposal of Chairman Engo's Single Negotiating Text regard-
ing the enterprise and the draft concerning the tribunal have al-
ready been discussed above.
V. MODES OF RECONCILING DIVERSE PROPOSALS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME
The disagreement over the scope and method of operations by the
international authority could delay or even frustrate agreement re-
garding the convention as a whole. It is therefore essential for all
sides to begin to negotiate this issue seriously and in a spirit of
compromise-something which has not yet occurred in the First
Committee.
Both the developed and the developing nations, as well as the
Single Negotiating Text, have accepted the "joint venture" concept,
and it is from this nominal agreement that a substantive consensus
may yet be built. The concept of joint venture defined in the Single
Negotiating Text does not, however, embody such a compromise
and constitutes little more than subcontracting of functions essen-
"' Id. pt. I, arts. 42-45.
I Id. pt. I, art. 28.
"2 Id. pt. I, art. 27, para. 1(c).
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tially reserved to the authority. A genuine compromise would re-
serve to the international authority or the enterprise overall control
within specified guidelines as to matters pertaining to the environ-
ment, safety, and the awarding of exclusive contracts. Beyond that,
joint venture contracts should contain certain standard provisions
permitting the state or private enterprise, as contractee, to operate
without administrative or other intervention by the international
authority except in instances where the contract is being vio-
lated-a matter to be determined by the tribunal. In other words,
the benefits derived from the joint venture would be divided be-
tween the parties in accordance with the terms of the contract, while
the administration of the venture, subject to applicable provisions
of the convention, would rest with the holder of the contract. The
convention would also have to provide with greater certainty than
at present that a party authorized to explore would have an option
to develop, and that a developer would have reasonable security of
tenure with an option to renew under conditions reasonably within
the original expectations of the parties. The proviso for unilateral
revision, or termination of contract by the enterprise "in case of
radical change in circumstance"'' 9 will have to be tightened up.
The joint venture concept does not exclude the possibility that a
contracting state or free enterprise may agree to pay the enterprise
its share of profits in a joint venture by providing other services to
the enterprise. Thus a typical joint venture exploitation agreement
could conceivably include a proviso by which the state or private
contracting party agreed to exploit two adjacent blocs of seabed, one
as leaseholding operator with sole operational responsibility and the
other as the enterprise's subcontractor operating under its direction.
In the first bloc, the participation of the enterprise would be limited
to profit sharing. In the latter, its participation would be tanta-
mount to operational control. The international authority's profits
from its share in the former-which presumably would be put in
production first-thus would be available to pay for the delivery of
subcontracted services in the development of the latter.
The prospects for achieving some such compromise between the
technologically underdeveloped majority and the only states capa-
ble of exploiting the deep seabed within the foreseeable future, de-
pends upon achieving a further compromise on institutional ar-
rangements for governing the activities of the international author-
'" Supplemental Articles, supra note 106, art. 38, para. 3. The matter has been left for
further study by the NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, annex I, art. 15.
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ity in general and the enterprise in particular. Key to such a com-
promise is the principal organ of the proposed international author-
ity, namely, its council. One proposal, made by Professor Louis
Sohn, is as follows:
In view of the constant increase in the size of international coun-
cils, it is quite likely that a relatively large Seabed Council would
be created. The figure of 48, proposed by Kenya, coincides with the
number of members of the General Committee of the Law of the
Sea Conference, which was finally agreed upon after a considerable
discussion. If the distribution of seats in that Committee were
followed, Africa would get 12 seats, Asia also 12, Latin America 9,
Western Europe 9 and Eastern Europe 6.
Within these numbers a few permanent seats might be reserved
for some countries. To avoid the stigma of inequality, equal num-
ber of such seats might be provided for the major developed coun-
tries and for the major developing countries. While the first ones
might be chosen on the basis of gross national product, the second
ones might be chosen on the basis of population, three from each
developing region.
In any case, to protect the interests of all major groups, a high
majority should be required, for instance five-sixths. In view of
recent difficulties about some so-called "procedural" decisions, it
might be desirable to apply this majority to all decisions, without
any distinction between substantive and procedural decisions.13°
VI. LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS
It is already possible to foresee the kinds of problems which would
become central concerns of the international authority once an in-
ternational regime for the exploitation of the seabed has been estab-
lished.
A. Sourcing and Redistributing Revenues
There is no single agreed-upon formula either for assessing the
costs of the proposed international authority or for redistributing
such profits as it may eventually derive. The matter of profit redis-
tribution is likely to become important early rather than late if
revenue sharing becomes applicable to the outer continental margin
beyond 200 meters and if those shared revenues are made payable
to the international authority. A simple formula would confine itself
to two variables, namely, population and poverty:
Average per capital income of world Population of state
x 100
Average per capital income of state Population of world
" Sohn, supra note 19, at 8.
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There is much to be said for an agreed-upon allocation formula since
an annual pie-splitting contest within the organs of the interna-
tional authority could plunge that organization into bitter factional-
ism.
It should also be clarified that the general expenses of the organi-
zations would constitute a first charge on the income of the enter-
prise and of the authority as a whole, if only to prevent the develop-
ment of a sea-monster bureaucracy which would be financed by
annual assessments.
B. The Rate of Exploitation
Even if the convention makes adequate provision for joint ven-
tures under defined operating conditions, it will still, to some ex-
tent, be up to the international authority to control the rate at
which areas of the seabed enter into production. It presumably will
be the international authority which would create reserved areas
specifically set aside for future production by the developing states.
Moreover, the international authority will be in a position to decide
when to let contracts for the exploration and exploitation of speci-
fied areas. While there will be some pressure on the international
authority and the enterprise to authorize production-not only from
the technologically advanced and industrial states, but also from
populous and poor states that would stand to benefit from the redis-
tribution of the income of the enterprise-it must also be expected
that there will be countervailing pressures to delay exploitation in-
definitely. The debate on this point to date is instructive in consid-
ering the long-term problems.
Two reports on this subject have been prepared by and for the
Secretary General of the U.N. The major differences between the
two studies may best be underscored by a brief listing of the central
propositions of each:
The First Report states that: (1) Manganese nodules are the most
likely deep-sea minerals to be exploited for the foreseeable future.
(2) Enough is now known to permit commercial exploitation (in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans-especially in the central Pacific region).
(3) Significant technical problems are being encountered in dredg-
ing and pumping minerals to the surface. (4) A detailed compara-
tive study of marine versus land-based mining is not yet practical,
largely because of the lack of publicly available cost information,
the immaturity of the marine mineral industry which results in
higher costs, and questions concerning the future extent of regula-
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tion. However, it is believed that mining is viable and can begin as
soon as 1976. (5) The likelihood that marine mining will commence
depends largely on whether firms feel they are technologically
ready, whether they believe the legal setting is "safe," and whether
they have adequate financing. (6) It is predicted that by 1985, six
groups will be mining marine minerals, involving a total volume of
about 15 million tons. (7) Nickel will be the "mainstay" of deep
seabed mining, with copper, cobalt, and manganese obtained as by-
products. (8) Nickel production should experience a minimum long-
term growth rate of 6 percent per annum, and nodule production
may account for 18 percent of total world demand by 1985. (9)
Developing countries now account for 13 percent of world nickel
production and are increasing rapidly as principal suppliers. This
will have a substantial impact on the industry, "but it should not
have a serious effect on land-based production as a whole." (10) The
world market for copper is about 14 times that for nickel. Nodule
production of copper is expected to have a small impact on the
large, growing copper industry. (11) The market for manganese is
small, and therefore nodule production will probably depress prices.
This may hurt earnings of present producers. Many of these are
developing countries, although only one such producer depends
heavily on these revenues. (12) Cobalt is an expensive, lightly-used
metal. By 1985, nodule production may account for half of world
demand. Prices may decrease to approximately two-thirds of pres-
ent levels. (13) By 1985, if maximum production is permitted,
seabed mining might account for 66 percent of cobalt demand and
28.6 percent of world nickel demand. The impact of seabed develop-
ment could be quite substantial in terms of the interests of develop-
ing nations.''
The Second Report while agreeing with the First Report's esti-
mate of the effect on cobalt production holds that: (1) The probable
impact on manganese prices is still uncertain since several potential
miners are doubtful whether the recovery of this mineral will be
economic. Nickel production from nodules will probably only help
to counter the steady trend of price increases for this metal around
the middle of the next decade. Copper prices are not expected to be
much affected by nodule mining since supply from this source is
likely to account for only 1.3 percent of world demand by 1985. (2)
It is obvious from the interrelation of variables in the impact model
M U.N. SECRETARY GEN., ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SEA-BED MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
INT'L AREA, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 (1974).
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that decreases in metal prices would act as a brake to the further
expansion of the nodule industry. (3) Developing countries, with
only one exception, are not highly dependent on the exports of these
minerals. By the end of the next decade, nodule mining might exert
a downward pressure on nickel prices, affecting a few developing
countries; the countries in question, however, are not highly depen-
dent on nickel exports. (4) If the impact of nodule mining is ex-
pected to be rather moderate for both producers and consumers for
the foreseeable future, who will benefit most from this new
industry? The answer is obviously that the world community at
large will benefit most and the advanced countries possessing no-
dule technology will benefit most in particular. '32
The United States position essentially has been that it is in the
interests of all consumers to encourage seabed mineral production.
It is further claimed that appreciable decreases in existing producer
income are unlikely. 3 ' The United States argues that increases in
copper demand will greatly exceed the rate of development in
seabed production. Nickel presents a similar picture, and man-
ganese production from the seabed is presently unlikely. Thus, says
the United States, it is only with respect to cobalt that a significant
adverse impact upon developing nations could result from seabed
mining operations. In this case, appropriate relief (e.g., through
utilizing a compensation scheme) could be fashioned."'
It is the view of the United States that production restrictions,
multilateral commodity agreements, and compensation plans will
all force mineral prices up.'35 Since only a small number of develop-
ing countries are producers of nickel, copper, cobalt and man-
ganese,3 I such price increases would primarily benefit the developed
countries. Moreover, because seabed mining will account for only a
small proportion of total world production of these minerals, its
restriction would not effectively stabilize or increase the revenues of
land-based producers. 37 In any event, the real losers in any attempt
32 U.N. SECRETARY GEN., ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SEA-BED MINING IN THE INT'L AREA,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/37 (1975).
' Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 64, at 10.
'4 70 STATE. supra note 50, at 400.
'u United States: Working Paper on the Economic Effects of Deep Sea-Bed Exploitation,
Aug. 8, 1974, pt. III, at 7-10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.5 [hereinafter cited as United
States: Working Paper]; Statement of Mr. Ratiner (United States) before the First Commit-
tee of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 1, 1974, at 15-16, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.9.
, United States: Working Paper, supra note 135, pt. I, at 1.
'3' Id. at 10.
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to restrict seabed mineral production would be the consumers, in-
cluding the peoples of the developing countries who depend on capi-
tal goods made with these minerals. 3 Lastly, the United States
supports the notion of nondiscriminatory access to the seabed's re-
sources.
3 9
The 77, on the contrary, are most concerned that prices paid to
land-based products be protected. Fluctuations must be minimized
while resources are developed through a system of comprehensive
control.'40 Similarly, they argue that the benefits of seabed exploita-
tion should be equitably distributed, with special concern for the
developing countries.'4 ' While the Group of 77 concedes that a ma-
jority of the developing countries would benefit from decreased
prices that would likely result from increased resource supply,"'
they are quick to question the accuracy of U.N. studies which mini-
mize the negative impact of seabed mining. In these conflicting
concepts, which are unlikely to be resolved in any but the most
general way by the convention, lies another important source of
future disagreement.
C. Creeping Jurisdiction
All institutions to some extent suffer or benefit from a tendency
toward self-aggrandizement. There is no reason to expect an inter-
national authority for the high seas and seabed to behave differ-
ently. The Single Negotiating Text however, leaves ajar the door to
virtually unlimited expansion. It visualizes power for the interna-
tional authority not only to manage resources but also to control all
activities in the area beyond national jurisdiction.4 3 Specific au-
thority is given to control pollution,'44 effect technology transfer to
developing countries,'45 control scientific research,'" and more gen-
erally, to regulate "activities in the area," which is defined to in-
clude not only exploration and exploitation of resources, but also
"other associated activities ... ,,,4 On the other hand, the "area"
'' Id. at 6, 10.
139 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 8781, at 5 (1974).
1,0 Statement of Mr. Thomas (Trinidad & Tobago) before the 12th Meeting of the First
Committee of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 7, 1974, in 2 CARACAS,
supra note 39, at 60, 61 [hereinafter cited as Statement of Mr. Thomas].
Draft Articles, supra note 63, art. 9-B.
" Statement of Mr. Thomas, supra note 140, at 61.
", NEGOTIATING TEXT. supra note 21, pt. I, art. 21.
'" Id. pt. I, art. 12.
', Id. pt. I, art. 11.
'" Id. pt. I, arts. 1(ii), 10.
'"Id. pt. 1, arts. l(ii), 6.
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is defined specifically to exclude the water column and the super-
adjacent air space. 4 ' The prevention of pollution from seabed min-
ing, however, implies some responsibility for the ecosystem of the
sea column since this is where pollution damage is likely to occur.'49
There are, moreover, various national proposals for the creation of
international regulatory mechanisms to prevent sea pollution by
ships50 and to preserve living resources 5' in the area beyond na-
tional jurisdiction. While it has not been proposed so far that the
international authority expand its regulatory functions to include
the regulation of such shipping and fishing activities in the sea
column above "its" seabed, it is not inconceivable that it might be
a more appropriate agency for these purposes than the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), or another ad hoc body.
D. Conflict with Coastal States
While there is as yet no indication that oil, gas, or other mobile
substances can be extracted from the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction, it is perfectly conceivable that problems of encroach-
ment on mutual fields might arise between the international author-
ity and the economic zones and Continental Shelves of coastal
states. Even more futuristically, a state might construct traps or
barriers along the edge of its shelf or zone to prevent the "flow" of
nodules or other surface mineral deposits to the deep seabed. Prob-
lems of this sort are touched upon, but scarcely resolved, by the
provision of the Single Negotiating Text that activities in the inter-
national area "with respect to resources in the Area which lie across
limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due regard
to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across
whose jurisdiction such resources lie."' 5 This provision is much
weaker than others which were considered by the First Committee
at Geneva in 1975 which stated that resources of the international
area "which lie across limits of national jurisdiction shall not be
explored or exploited, except in agreement with the coastal State or
"' Id. pt. I, arts. 2(1), 15.
", Eisma, Impact of Deep Sea Nodule Mining on the Ocean Life System, in OCEAN RE-
SOURCES AND THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT (Sierra Club Int'l Series No. 3, 1974).
l1 For the United States proposal which puts forward the possibility of utilizing IMCO see
70 STATE, supra note 50, at 398.
"I United States: Draft Article for a Chapter on the High Seas-Living Resources, Aug.
23, 1974, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.80.
"2 NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, art. 14, para. 1.
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States concerned," and that where the resources of the international
area are located near the boundary of national jurisdiction, explora-
tion and exploitation shall be carried on "in consultation" and
"where possible through such State or States."'53 Even more remote
but still relevant are potential problems of faulting and subsidence
which could occur on the Continental Shelf, or even more remotely,
in the territory of a coastal state as a result of mining activities
carried on in the international area. The Single Negotiating Text
merely provides for liability on the part of states, corporations, or
international organizations which "cause damage" by carrying on
activities in the area not in conformity with the provisions of the
proposed convention'll-a nonabsolute definition of liability insuffi-
cient to cover other forms of damage caused by activities carried on
in conformity with the convention.
There are also likely to be legal problems pertaining to the recov-
ery of historical treasures from the seabed.'55 It has been pointed
out, for example, that in 1959-61, the warship "Adolph" of King
Gustav II was recovered after lying in repose for over 300 years on
the seabed, and it now constitutes the "biggest tourist attraction of
Stockholm."' 56 The Single Negotiating Text would make the dispo-
sition of wrecks more than 50 years old subject to the regulation of
the international authority, and it appears to give the international
authority an option either to "preserve or [to] dispose" of such
objects "for the benefit of the international community as a whole,"
albeit giving "particular regard" to the "preferential rights" of the
country of cultural or historical origin.157
Finally of considerable practical importance among futuristic is-
sues is the question of amending the convention after it comes into
force. Under the draft prepared by Chairman Engo, amendment by
the majority would be very easy, namely, by a vote of two-thirds of
the assembly present and voting, and by ratification by two-thirds
of the states which would be parties to the convention.'58 Hence, the
usefulness of preparing a written document with long-term guaran-
tees would be put in doubt. The key to an agreeable amending
11 Draft Articles Considered by the Committee at Its Informal Meetings (articles 1-21),
March 18, 1975, art. 15-A, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3/Rev.1.
5 NEGOTIATINc. TEXT, supra note 21, pt. I, art. 17.
155 See Matysik, Legal Problems of Recovery of Historical Treasures from the Sea-Bed, in
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (M. Frankowska ed. 1974).
Id. at 141.
's NEGOTIATING TEXT. supra note 21, pt. I, art. 19.
Id. pt. I, arts. 64, 65.
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process would probably have to be the participation of a council
which would vote along the lines of a concurrent triple majority of
all its members and of both representatives of technologically ad-
vanced and developing state members. A subsequent requirement
for a four-fifths majority in the assembly and ratification by four-
fifths of the parties to the convention would provide some guarantee
against the rapid disintegration of the international regime once
established.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE LAW OF OCEAN
USE, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
John Lawrence Hargrove*
I. INTRODUCTION
How will international disputes about ocean activities be settled
after the conclusion of the Third Law of the Sea Conference? This
paper will undertake to survey and assess the formal means likely
to be available for the settlement of disputes arising under the law
of ocean use when a new comprehensive law of the sea treaty comes
into force. There is, of course, already a "law of ocean use" which
will continue to exist even if the Third Law of the Sea Conference
should fail to produce a generally accepted treaty. However, in that
event, the content of that law will doubtlessly have been rendered
somewhat murky by protracted negotiations and by accompanying
governmental moves outside the negotiations in the form of claims
and counterclaims. On the assumption that the Conference will
produce a generally accepted and comprehensive treaty, there re-
mains a somewhat less formidable uncertainty as to what that
treaty will provide for the settlement of disputes. This paper will
adopt that assumption, and will further assume that, in light of the
events which occurred at the recently concluded Geneva session,
one can predict a reasonably probable range of outcomes with re-
gard to dispute settlement provisions in the treaty.
It is important to bear in mind what kind of body of law we are
talking about when we speak of "the law of ocean use." There is no
single or unified regime of such law, but only a collection of individ-
ual regimes springing from different sources in conventional and
customary law. Even a new law of the sea treaty, as sweeping in
scope as it may be with respect to the distribution of basic jurisdic-
tional prerogatives in the ocean, will be only a part of this collection,
albeit the most important single part. And it is possible that the law
of the sea treaty itself, for many important purposes, may look very
much like a collection of self-contained individual regimes govern-
ing particularly uses of the ocean or particular geographically de-
*Director of Studies, American Society of International Law; Lecturer on International
Law and Organization, The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. B.A.,
Baylor University, 1955; LL.B., New York University, 1958; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1965.
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fined jurisdictions. Indeed, one of the important factors determining
the extent to which this will be true is the extent to which the treaty
will contain dispute settlement provisions applicable to questions
arising under any of its rules, thus tying its various parts together
in a procedural if not substantive way.
But regardless of the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference,
and even if one limits the inquiry-as this paper does-to public
international law largely as embodied in multilateral treaties, a
prospective user of the world ocean who wishes to know what law
he must take into account will find himself dealing with a large and
widely disparate collection of sources of law. Most are in the form
of treaties which in fact are not universally applicable either geo-
graphically or in respect to their contracting parties. Some are elab-
orated with great detail and precision, and considerable technical-
ity, while others are in the form of some of the vaguest and most
general rules of customary international law. For example, the use
of the ocean as a medium of transportation has a body of rules which
is perhaps as precisely formulated as those governing any use of the
ocean. This is true both as to the distribution of basic rights of use
among the members of the global community, and as to the regula-
tion of the exercise of that right for various purposes such as the
protection of human life, property, or the marine environment. On
the other extreme, the right to use the ocean as a sink or as a
receptacle for wastes lurks unarticulated in the broadest principles
of national sovereignty and freedom of the seas. And such right is
regulated, if at all, only by similarly broad principles of interna-
tional responsibility-aside from a few recent treaties which deal
with only a small portion of the total use of the ocean for this
purpose.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a prospective user of the ocean,
wishing to know not only what the substantive rules are, but also
what devices are available to settle differences concerning the
meaning of the rules, will find himself confronting an equally motley
array of widely differing mechanisms, most of which are of a highly
specialized application, defined by the treaty regime of which they
are a part.
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA TREATY
The prospective law of the sea treaty nevertheless remains an
appropriate point at which to begin a survey of dispute settlement
with respect to the uses of the .ocean. For there is a reasonable
prospect that the treaty itself will contain a unified set of procedures
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set out in a special chapter on dispute settlement, which parties are
obliged to apply to disputes arising under a number of its basic
rules. And there is the even greater likelihood that the treaty will
embody some dispute settlement procedure, applicable under speci-
fied conditions to virtually all of its rules, and thus covering collec-
tively a very significant portion of the regime of law with which we
are concerned.
At the Geneva session an informal "working group" of some 60
countries produced a text of 17 articles.' The first four of these
articles were transmitted to the Conference President "for the con-
sideration of the Conference," while the remaining 13 were de-
scribed as an "Annex," reportedly to distinguish them as having a
lesser status of acceptance among the members of the working
group.2 (The Soviet delegation, for example, reportedly did not wish
to send all 17 articles forward on the same basis.) The working
group's document included, additionally, annexes on (1) concilia-
tion; (2) arbitration; (3) a law of the sea tribunal (in the form of a
statute for that tribunal); (4) special dispute settlement procedures
for fisheries, pollution, and scientific research; and (5) information
and consultation "regarding the adoption or application of measures
(including legislation regulations, administrative notices and
boundary determination) falling within the scope of this Conven-
tion."3 The major features of the scheme introduced by the working
group document follows.
A. Special Procedures Applicable in Designated Classes of Cases
Special classes of cases initally must be referred to special proce-
dures where the relevant chapter of the law of the sea treaty so
provides, and each such chapter may also provide that these proce-
dures may be the only ones available in such cases. The working
group document contains annexes setting out special procedures for
disputes arising under the chapters on fisheries, pollution, and sci-
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN
OF THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, U.N. Doc. SD.Gp/2d
Sess./No.1/Rev. 5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Working Group Dispute Settlement Text].
I Since the writing of the present paper, the working group text discussed in the following
pages has been superseded by a new text on dispute settlement, issued by the President of
the Conference as a "single negotiating text" for consideration at the next session of the
Conference. THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, TEXT ON SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9 (1975). While much remains the same in the two
texts, the later document does contain changes representing important policy choices. How-
ever, the following analysis of the earlier document remains, on the whole, relevant for
purposes of understanding and assessing the later text.
I Working Group Dispute Settlement Text, supra note 1, annex III, art. 1, para. 1.
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entific research, which have to be referred initially to specially con-
stituted expert committees.4 Such reference would be compulsory in
that it would be done on the request of any of the parties. The
special committees would be required to render a decision within a
certain period unless the parties come to an agreement in the mean-
time, but on its face, the text of each annex leaves unresolved the
question whether the decision would be binding on the parties. It
also leaves unresolved the question whether these would be the only
procedures available in the classes of cases for which they are desig-
nated.
B. Conciliation
In cases where no special procedures are applicable, a conciliation
procedure is available upon the agreement of all parties. The spe-
cially constituted conciliation commission must report within 12
months, and its report is not binding upon the parties.5
C. Reference to One of Three Tribunals
Disputes which are subjected to the foregoing techniques and
which are not settled (note that this implies that decisions under
special procedures might not be binding in some cases), or other
disputes which relate to the interpretation or application of the
convention, are required to be settled by submission to one of three
tribunals, upon the application of any party to the dispute.' The
identity of the tribunal is determined on the basis of the contracting
party against whom the complaint is being made, since each party
is required, upon becoming bound by the convention, to make a
declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction either of an arbitral
tribunal, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, the International Court of
Justice, or any combination among the three.' Decisions both of the
arbitral tribunal and the Law of the Sea Tribunal would be final and
legally binding.'
D. Settlement by Means Other Than Those Provided for by the
Convention
Parties would remain free to agree to settle disputes which are
subject to the dispute settlement provisions of the convention by
Id. annex II.
Id. annex IA, para. 7.
Id. annex I, art. 8, para. 1.
Id. annex I, art. 9, para. 2, subpara. (a).
See id. annex IB, para. 10; annex IC, art. 31, art. 33, para. 2, art. 34.
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some other means,' or in accordance with the provisions of a prior
agreement. 0
E. Special Provisions
1. Provisional Measures
The tribunal would have the power to apply binding provisional
measures in order to preserve the rights of the parties and minimize
damage."
2. Exhaustion of Remedies Required in Special Cases
Exhaustion of local remedies would be required in a dispute relat-
ing to "the exercise by a coastal state of its enforcement jurisdic-
tion" or "its exercise of jurisdiction over resources in the economic
zone." The requirement apparently would not apply to any other
case."
F. Possible Restrictions on the Applicability of the Procedures
The working group document envisages three kinds of limitation
which may be placed on the scope of application of the general
dispute settlement procedures. Each one of these is potentially of
great importance.
1. Express Exclusions of Entire Portions of the Treaty13
There appears, for example, to be general agreement that dis-
putes arising under the chapter dealing with seabed mining in the
international area would be subject to special procedures only, prob-
ably of a compulsory and binding character. (As already indicated,
the articles envisage that special procedures provided for in some
chapters might be of a preliminary character, leading to a later
application of the general procedures provided in the convention;"
or they might expressly exclude the application of any other proce-
dures, as appears to be the intention with respect to seabed mining.)
2. An Optional Declaration Limiting the Applicability of
Dispute Settlement Procedures
An optional declaration by a contracting party limiting the ap-
* Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 3.
Id. annex I, art. 12, para. 1.
" Id. annex I, art. 14, para. 1.
" See id. annex I, art. 6, art. 10, para. 2, subpara. (a).
" Id. annex I, art. 6.
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plicability of at least some of the treaty's dispute settlement proce-
dures to claims that a coastal state has violated its treaty obliga-
tions in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction, by one of the follow-
ing four kinds of misdeeds, has also been envisaged:
(a) interfering with the freedoms of navigation or overflight or of
the laying of submarine cables or pipelines, or related rights and
duties of other states;
(b) failing to have due regard to other rights and duties of other
States under this Convention;
(c) not applying international standards or criteria established
by this Convention or in accordance therewith; or
(d) abusing or misusing the rights conferred upon it by this Con-
vention (abus ou d~tournement de pouvoir) to the disadvantage of
another Contracting Party.'5
3. An Optional Declaration in Certain Cases Excluding General
Dispute Settlement Provisions
An optional declaration by a contracting party excluding at least
some of the general dispute settlement provisions from application
to one or more of a specified list of categories of disputes is the third
limitation which has been suggested; among such specified catego-
ries are:
(a) Disputes arising out of the exercise of discretionary rights by
a coastal State pursuant to its regulatory and enforcement juris-
diction under this Convention, except in cases involving an abuse
of power.
(b) Disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations between ad-
jacent States, or those involving historic bays or titles, provided
that the State making such a declaration shall indicate therein a
regional or other third-party procedure, [whether or not] entailing
a binding decision, which it accepts for the settlement of these
disputes.
(c) Disputes concerning military activities, including those by
government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial serv-
ice, but law enforcement activities pursuant to this Convention
shall not be considered military activities.
(d) Disputes or situations in respect of which the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it
by the Charter of the United Nations, unless the Security Council
has determined that specified proceedings under this Convention
would not interfere with the exercise of such functions in a particu-
lar case.'"
Id. annex I, art. 17, para. 1.
" Id. annex 1, art. 17, para. 3.
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G. The Political Context
As an annex to the Informal Single Negotiating Text 7 produced
at the Geneva session, and also by virtue of the description of the
dispute settlement articles provided by the three co-chairmen of the
working group, the working group's articles are hedged about with
various caveats which indicate that they carry no commitments of
support from delegations. Moreover, the text of the 17 articles and
the appended annexes do not yet form a completely coherent whole,
as the foregoing analysis indicates. It may be fair to say, however,
that these articles and annexes suggest a fair approximation of at
least one set of dispute settlement arrangements which might be
expected to command general acceptance in the event a comprehen-
sive treaty is concluded. If this is so, it is because they represent
approximately the politically "right" mix of strengths and weak-
nesses. The essence of the procedures they set forth appears to be a
compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedure available to
ensure that coastal states do not, in their newly and vastly extended
exclusive jurisdiction, violate reserved ocean freedoms in their own
exclusive zones. (For most other purposes, compulsory and binding
procedures would be available only at the option, exercised at the
outset, of the state against whom they might later be invoked.) The
articles thus would provide a means of policing the basic bargain the
treaty will strike: namely, the grant of a geographically broad
coastal state jurisdiction for economic purposes in return for iron-
clad protection of the traditional freedom of navigation, albeit a
freedom which may be dressed in new language. They thus would
serve a purpose which, if quite minimal, is nevertheless essential to
the concluding of a comprehensive treaty.
It is conceivable, of course, that many states, faced at the outset
with such a set of articles and the choices they would present, might
opt in favor of acceptance of a broad application of compulsory and
binding settlement procedures beyond that core of disputes as to
which the articles leave no option. Each state would recognize the
risk to its own interests that would be entailed by leaving other
states free to invoke its own exceptions against it on the basis of
reciprocity. 8 However, this is a highly uncertain speculation at pres-
ent.
What is much less uncertain is that a new law of the sea treaty
'1 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIAT-
ING TEXT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975).
11 Working Group Dispute Settlement Text, supra note 1, annex I, art. 17, para. 5.
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embodying these provisions could well turn out to be one under
which all but the most politically fundamental provisions would be
left without the protection of reliable means of dispute settlement.
Just what does this mean? The working group's draft articles, de-
spite their tentative and incomplete status, provide the basis for
somewhat greater precision in our speculations as to what classes of
disputes might and might not be covered by compulsory and bind-
ing procedures.
H. Nonexcludable Disputes
It has already been indicated that rights of free navigation-to
which the major maritime powers have attached primary import-
ance throughout the negotiations-appear to be clearly covered.
This is the effect of annex I, article 17, paragraph 1, subparagraph
(a), which speaks explicitly of "interfering with the freedoms of
navigation or overflight or of the laying of submarine cables or pipe-
lines." Presumably the same is true of the language of subpara-
graphs (b) and (c), which speak of "failing to have due regard to
other rights and duties of other States under this Convention '"' and
"not applying international standards or criteria established by this
Convention or in accordance therewith." 0 The latter language
would seem to embrace both a failure of the coastal state accurately
to apply international standards respecting the regulation of pollu-
tion from vessels-a major source of worry on the part of states
primarily concerned with maintaining the freedom of naviga-
tion-but also a coastal state's failure to apply internationally de-
veloped criteria respecting the utilization of coastal fisheries stocks
or the conduct of scientific research. The precise value of both of
these provisions to maritime powers and distant water fishing states
is dependent on the content of other portions of the treaty. It is
clear, for example, that if provisions relating to the economic zone
do not recognize rights to participate in the utilization of the stock
on the part of distant water states, the importance of this provision
in a dispute settlement chapter to those states will be drastically
diminished.
It is worth noting that the language of the four subparagraphs of
article 17, paragraph 1, is broad enough that, should they be carried
forward into a treaty and thereafter interpreted with a certain imag-
ination and progressiveness, they might arguably be used to help in
" Id. annex I, art. 17, para. 1, subpara. (b).
,o Id. annex I, art. 17, para. 1, subpara (c).
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putting teeth into any general exhortations in the chapter on envi-
ronmental protection designed to place the coastal state under in-
ternational obligations to protect the coastal ocean. It is not clear
whether provisions of this kind-for example, a general obligation
to protect the marine environment-will be included in the treaty.
But it is safe to say that, unless they are linked to some procedural
device by which they can be made effective on the initiative of
individual states or of international organizations, they may well be
of little more than cosmetic significance in the treaty as a whole.
I. Excludable Disputes
As to excludable classes of disputes, we should note in the first
place that the strong thrust in the dispute settlement discussions
toward eliminating or restricting the compulsory applicability of
any international dispute settlement procedures within the coastal
state's economic zone is reflected in article 17 in two ways: (1) in
the provisions for optional declaration by parties totally excluding
some important classes of disputes such as boundary delimitations
between adjacent states or rights of historic bays;"' (2) in the provi-
sion for optional declarations apparently excluding all disputes aris-
ing out of the exercise of coastal state jurisdictions, except "in cases
involving an abuse of power."2 The latter provision, reportedly in-
cluded at the insistence of the Canadian Delegation, would have the
effect of further narrowing even the nonexcludable core of disputes
provided for in article 17, paragraph 1. The concept of "abuse of
power" is by no means precise, but the least that can be said is that
it would limit the availability of reliable dispute settlement provi-
sions to a smaller class of disputes, in which the charges of a more
severe encroachment on reserved freedoms by the coastal state
could be persuasively argued.
As to the specific exclusions mentioned in article 17, paragraph
3, one may understand the reasons why the military establishment
of the United States or some other power may wish to provide for
the broad exclusion of all disputes "concerning military activities,"
but the soundness of those reasons is hardly self-evident. The same
may be said for the effort in article 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph
(d), to safeguard the exercise of the prerogatives of the United Na-
tions Security Council. It is true, for example, that parties to the
dispute over the status of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba
" Id. annex I, art. 17, para. 3, subpara. (b).
Id. annex I, art. 17, para. 1, subpara. (d).
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might not be inclined to submit that dispute to procedures estab-
lished by the law of the sea treaty, particularly in view of the in-
tensely political character of the dispute and the fact that it is a part
of a larger and highly intractable dispute of long standing. At the
same time one could hardly expect the dispute settlement proce-
dures of the law of the sea treaty to be less successful in coping with
the dispute than the Security Council has been thus far.
Finally, one may wonder whether it is mere oversight that the
optional provision for exclusion of disputes concerning "sea bound-
ary limitations between adjacent states, or those involving historic
bays or titles' 2 3 does not also extend to similar disputes between
opposite states, or to disputes involving the outer limits of national
jurisdictions over the territorial sea, the economic zone, or continen-
tal shelf. In any event, the inclusion in the draft of article 17 of
additional possible exclusionary provisions in blank has an ominous
ring.
Ill. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REMAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND THE
PERIOD THEREAFTER
To recapitulate, we may conclude that, if there is to be a compre-
hensive and generally accepted treaty at all, it will probably have
to provide compulsory and binding settlement procedures for dis-
putes concerning at least a small core of fundamental questions,
including the question of preserving rights of navigation. But at the
same time, as the process of ratification of the new law of the sea
treaty proceeds, a state of affairs may emerge in which large areas
of even that portion of ocean law which the treaty explicitly estab-
lishes would not be covered by reliable dispute settlement proce-
dures, and often would be covered by none at all.
What conclusions are to be drawn from this projection? The ab-
sence of dispute settlement procedures to which the parties are
bound to resort, and which entail a binding decision once resorted
to, is hardly strange in international affairs. It is, indeed, the rule
rather than the exception in international life. Nevertheless, a num-
ber of states, and notably the United States, have long argued in
the law of the sea negotiations that a new law of the sea treaty would
present an exceptional situation, in which compulsory and binding
dispute settlement procedures would be an essential ingredient of a
workable legal regime.
There is a good deal of merit in this position. First, the treaty
Id. annex I, art. 17, para. 3, subpara. (b).
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negotiations are in large measure an effort to accommodate, through
the orderly processes of law, a conflict which has been emerging
since the end of the Second World War and which continues to grow
in intensity among the various claims and interests of states with
respect to the ocean. This is the conflict between the growing terri-
torial or quasi-territorial pretensions of coastal states, and the his-
toric interests of the maritime states in using the ocean as a medium
of communication. Secondly, the perceived interests of states in the
ocean have greatly increased in importance in the last quarter cen-
tury. While the right of navigation has long been regarded by many
states as vital to economic survival or military security, or both, and
while fishing has been of similar importance to some states, these
interests are now rivaled or surpassed in many cases by an interest
in petroleum or other mineral exploitation. Finally, the number of
states asserting such interests has greatly increased.
The sum effect of these factors will be a gradual proliferation of
human activities in the ocean, and a steady growth of the import-
ance attached to them. The very nature of these activities is such
that rights with respect to them must be distributed in geographi-
cally overlapping ways: there is, for example, no way to delimit an
effective right of navigation which does not overlap the right of
economic exploitation in the coastal zone.
In such a situation it is reasonable to expect that any workable
regime will require not only substantive rules of great precision,
defining the various prerogatives of states in respect of these geo-
graphically overlapping activities, but also more reliable techniques
of resolving good faith differences as to what rules mean or eliminat-
ing outright recalcitrance against the rules.
It may be that the present working group document, if further
work on it proceeds in full appreciation of the importance of effec-
tive dispute settlement procedures on at least certain fundamental
provisions, will emerge as meeting the minimum requirements dis-
cussed earlier in this paper. But what of the large areas of ocean law
and activity, both within the scope of the new treaty and outside of
it, as to which no such procedures would be available? We may
divide the answer of this question into three parts: first, other por-
tions of the law of the sea treaty containing detailed regulations of
some area of ocean activity; second, activities regulated by existing
multilateral treaty regimes, of a global or regional character; and,
finally, one major interest in the ocean, namely the environmental
interest, which is likely to be taken into account by the law of the
sea treaty only peripherally at best.
19761
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
A. Strengthening Dispute Settlement in the Emerging Treaty
As to the first, it is submitted that if the international community
is capable of bringing itself to accept reliable settlement procedures
for disputes arising from conflicts between navigational and coastal
state economic interests, then there is little reason not to make
similarly strong procedures available in the case of other classes of
disputes arising under the treaty. The reason for failure to do so
cannot be that states expect these other disputes to be more intense
and intractable; indeed the contrary is more likely to be the case
overall.
Nor, at the other extreme, can it reasonably be expected that
there will not be significant disputes in these other areas and thus
no need for effective procedures. The law of the sea treaty will be a
substantially more complex effort at regulation of ocean conduct
than ever before, undertaken at a time when ocean activities them-
selves can be expected to proliferate. The reasons are likely to stem
from other sources: a general suspicion of compulsory and binding
settlement procedures in international affairs as unduly infringing
sovereignty; or a belief that, because they are so suspect by many
states, they will not work; a general desire on the part of many
coastal states to assimilate the economic zone as closely as possible
to national territory; or special concerns of an individual state re-
specting a situation in which it is uniquely involved, such as a
special geographic dispute, a special strategic concern, or the like. I
suggest that in the remaining negotiations of the Law of the Sea
Conference, each of these sources of resistance to broadly applicable
and effective dispute settlement procedures should be subjected to
the most careful and skeptical scrutiny. A treaty which applies com-
pulsory and binding procedures only to a narrow class of disputes
about what are now regarded as fundamental issues may be ade-
quate to command adoption by the conference and ultimately to
enter into force. However, it is not clear whether such a treaty would
stand the test of time as a viable, working regime for the oceans.
B. Dispute Settlement Under Existing Ocean Treaties
As to other areas of ocean activity subject to detailed regulation
in existing multilateral treaties, two things may be said. First, the
great majority of these treaties contain provisions for the settlement
of disputes arising under their provisions, and it may be possible to
detect a trend with some recent treaties toward forms of arbitration
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or adjudication. 21
Secondly, it would appear that this large collection of dispute
settlement provisions in individual treaties would remain legally
unaffected by the coming into force of the law of the sea treaty with
its own dispute settlement provisions except possibly in the case of
prior law of the sea conventions which might be expressly su-
perseded by the new treaty. This would probably be the case even
in the absence of provisions in the new treaty such as those con-
tained in working group articles 2 and 3, preserving the right of
parties to agree to settle a dispute by means other than those pro-
vided in the law of the sea treaty, or to resort to a prior agreement.
C. Approaches to the Settlement of Environmental Disputes:
Regional Treaties, a Global Treaty, a Code of Conduct
Finally, let us look briefly at the problem of disputes respecting
the marine environment after the conclusion of a new treaty. Sub-
stantively, the treaty's efforts to assure protection of the marine
environment are likely to be clearly subordinate to its other objec-
tives and, in general, inadequate in themselves to meet this need as
presently understood. As to ocean activities, the treaty will deal
with pollution from vessels not by establishing standards to govern
the conduct of vessel operators, but by allocating the right to estab-
lish such standards. It will allocate this right to coastal states and
to an international organ or organs, with the division of their prerog-
atives carefully tailored to dampen fears that coastal states might
11 Of some 32 multilateral agreements respecting maritime transport, fisheries, environ-
mental protection, oceanography, law of the sea, conservation of wildlife, and other areas, to
which the United States is a party, one-half contain some dispute settlement procedures. The
four 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conventions are provided with one optional protocol for
compulsory dispute settlement which is applicable to all. Optional Protocol of Signature
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 30, 1958, 2 UNITED NATIONS CON-
FERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS 137, U.N. Doc. AICONF.13/L.57 (1958).
In addition the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 59 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective for United
States March 20, 1966) contains its own dispute settlement procedure.
Of the agreements with dispute settlement provisions, 14 are compulsory in character
(eight of which are in force for the United States), and ten of these provide for a compulsory
procedure which entails a binding decision (five of which are in force for the United States).
Of 21 multilateral agreements dealing with marine environmental protection (including
nine from the group of agreements just mentioned) which were analyzed in a recent publica-
tion of the American Society of International Law, 14 contain some dispute settlement
procedures. Of these agreements with dispute settlement provisions (six of which are in force),
all 14 are compulsory in character, and 12 of these compulsory dispute settlement provisions
entail a binding decision (five of which are in force). See the supplemental Table of Interna-
tional Legal Responses to Activities Threatening the Marine Environment, in WHo PROTECTS
THE OCEAN? (J. Hargrove ed. 1975) (pocket part).
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unduly impede navigation in their coastal zones through the exer-
cise of their power to promulgate or enforce environmental regula-
tions. As to extractive activities, the treaty will likely bestow on the
coastal state the right to regulate these activities for environmental
purposes within its economic zone, and as already indicated, estab-
lish an international mechanism for regulation of mining activities
in the area beyond national jurisdiction. It is unlikely that the con-
vention will provide an effective means by which either an individ-
ual state or the international community at large will be able to hold
a coastal state to minimum standards of diligence in the protection
of the environment of its coastal area from pollution through ocean-
based activities.
Most importantly, however, the treaty will make little or no pre-
tense of providing an effective check on the diligence with which a
coastal state discharges its environmental responsibilities with re-
spect of activities taking place on land but affecting the ocean.
Consequently, environmental regulation of activities in the whole
area in which human activity has its greatest impact on the
ocean-namely the land mass and the coastal ocean to a distance
of at least 200 miles-will be left largely to the sole discretion of the
coastal state. It is true that the treaty may contain general exhorta-
tions with respect to protection of the marine environment, as
indicated earlier, although even these may be weakened by excep-
tions which are thought to be in the interest of developing countries.
But of themselves they are unlikely to have the precision or clarity
necessary to have any significant practical impact. As already sug-
gested, an effort to give them effect through the treaty's general
dispute settlement procedures, so as to enforce minimum standards
of environmental protection on the coastal state in its own jurisdic-
tion, is hardly a promising enterprise. Therefore, in general it may
be said that the protection of the marine environment from the bulk
of human activities likely to create marine environmental threats in
the future will have to be done, if at all, by means which are outside
the law of the sea treaty-even if it is done on the basis of the
jurisdictions established by that treaty.
The same may be said for international procedures designed to
forestall or to settle disputes involving specifically environmental
interests. It may be a source of some encouragement that promising,
although on the whole fairly modest, starts have been made in this
direction in recent years in the form of the two recent conventions
on dumping and, more recently, the several European subregional
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conventions."5 Of the latter, perhaps the most comprehensive is the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea,"6 of which the Soviet Union is a signatory. Neither the
Oslo 7 nor London Ocean Dumping Conventions, 8 concluded in
1972, contain explicit dispute settlement procedures. The Nordic
Conventionz" contains provisions for suit in foreign courts, even by
individual aggrieved persons,"0 as well as for consultation between
governments assisted by an advisory commission.' The Baltic Con-
vention contains comprehensive dispute settlement procedures pro-
viding for negotiation, conciliation and eventually arbitration or
adjudication, but resort to these procedures is not compulsory. 2 It
may be expected that the Mediterranean States which recently met
in Barcelona to begin the drafting of instruments designed for the
protection of the environment of that great enclosed sea, will be able
to profit by the experience of the negotiators of the Baltic Treaty.33
Article 18 of the current Draft Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment Against Pollution in the Mediterranean 3 pro-
vides for compulsory submission to adjudication by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice or to arbitration.
" See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, adopted Nov. 13, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 626 (1973). Though this
Convention was adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the
Dumping of Wastes at Sea, held in London, October 30 through November 13, 1972, the
Convention has not yet entered into force. See also Convention for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 262 (1972); Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-
Based Sources, opened for signature June 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 352
(1974). This Convention was adopted by the Conference on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion from Land-Based Sources on February 21, 1974; it has not yet entered into force. See
also Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, done
March 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 544 (1974); Convention on the Protection
of the Environment, done Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MA'IS 591 (1974).
6 Done March 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 544 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Baltic Convention].
,1 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,
done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 262 (1972).
'1 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, adopted Nov. 13, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 626 (1973).
11 Convention on the Protection of the Environment, done Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in 13
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 591 (1974).
o Id. art. 3.
3, Id. arts. 11, 12.
32 Baltic Convention, supra note 26, art. 18.
The Intergovernmental Meeting on the Protection of the Mediterranean was held in
Barcelona from January 28 to February 4, 1975. See Draft Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment Against Pollution in the Mediterranean Area, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/WG.2/INF.3 (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 481 (1975).
34 Id.
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Regional treaties among states sharing an ocean area or a drain-
age basin are in any event one promising approach to the large task
of environmental protection which the law of the sea treaty will
probably leave essentially untouched. Two other possible comple-
mentary approaches deserve mention. One is the negotiation of a
general treaty on protection of the marine environment which would
contain at least general substantive principles applicable to all
sources of environmental threat to the ocean, and which would con-
tain general procedures of dispute settlement or avoidance.35 An-
other is the proposal which was recently considered and adopted by
the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) to elaborate a code of conduct with respect to what
are called "shared natural resources. ' 36 As envisaged by the report
of the Executive Director of UNEP, such a code, which would not
necessarily be of binding legal status, would elaborate principles
applicable between two or more states with respect to the manage-
ment of a natural resource shared by them. A shared drainage basin,
or a shared coastal ocean or enclosed or inland sea, would be prime
examples of such a shared resource. The code, according to the
Executive Director's proposal, in substantial measure would be of
a purely procedural character, dealing with such matters as the
obligation of advance notification or consultation, exchange of infor-
mation, and resort to peaceful methods for the resolution of disputes
once they have arisen. It might also deal with substantive principles
having to do with responsibility for environmental injury.
" See the proposal contained in A. CHAYES & R. STEIN, THE AVOIDANCE AND ADJUSTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES (Special publication of the American Society of International Law
to be published in 1976).
36 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT CONCERNING NATURAL RESOURCES SHARED BY Two OR MORE STATES, REPORT OF THE EXEC-
UTIVE DIRECTOR, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/44 (1975).
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